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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
111180
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
From 1934, Britain expanded its military and naval intelligence agencies against Japan. At the outbreak of war in Europe, they, and most of their personnel, were moved from Hong Kong to Singapore, and joined into an interservice organization, the Far East Combined Bureau. Much of the evidence about the Far East Combined Bureau is lost, but the surviving record illustrates what intelligence was available to decision-makers in Singapore during 1940-41, thus illuminating every debate about this disaster. Even more: it enables a reconceptualization of the relationship between intelligence and the outbreak of the Pacific War as a whole.
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| 2 |
ID:
087534
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses British perceptions of a Muslim menace to imperial security between 1840-1951. These ideas had a long life. They rarely stood in the first rank of imperial concerns, but sometimes in the second. Over this period, British ideas of an Islamic menace focused first on the political self-consciousness of all Muslims than on subterranean bodies which tried to bind masses and elites for political ends, and moved to nationalist movements with a narrow popular base, and finally to those with a mass base. Between 1915 and 1924, fear of a pan-Islamic menace significantly affected British strategic and imperial policy. These ideas involved the interaction of observation, intelligence, perception, learning, fear, ignorance and uncertainty. Their study illuminates the evolution both of British intelligence and of its ideas about the political self-consciousness of its subjects, and the threat that posed to its rule, particularly about the nature and power of colonial nationalism.
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| 3 |
ID:
059120
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Summer 2004.
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| Description |
Summer 2004
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| 4 |
ID:
051554
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| 5 |
ID:
151466
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Commonwealth assaults against German forces on the western front during 1917 include several famous disasters and successes. Perhaps the least known of these successes is the battle of Hill 70 of August 1917, in which the Canadian Corps seized a powerful German position, inflicted disproportionate and heavy losses on the defenders, and achieved their strategic objective of pinning German forces away from the campaign in Flanders. This success occurred because the Canadian Corps developed a sophisticated and powerful system for set piece battles, in which intelligence played a key role. This article assesses how intelligence affected all aspects of this battle – from national and theatre level decision-making, down to the dissemination of information to individual soldiers. It demonstrates how intelligence worked in tactical and operational terms on the western front in 1917, and shaped battles.
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