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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
144909
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| Summary/Abstract |
The year 2015 witnessed a bifurcated direction for BRICS and emerging economies: all BRICS members' economic growth slowed or stagnated, resulting in more gloomy forecasts for the future. But at the same time, the New Development Bank was set up. The progress of the preliminary institutionalization of the BRICS was mainly driven by China and Russia, which reflected their strong desire to advance a multilateral world order, and to form a new power base for the non-Western countries. The further substantial development of the BRICS depends upon its capability to overcome the structural obstacles among the five countries, amongst which the huge discrepancy between the economies and the heterogeneous nature of the membership are the most prominent ones.
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| 2 |
ID:
051636
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| 3 |
ID:
110655
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Burgeoning literature within the social sciences studies the effects of culture on collective action. In economics, this topic can be found in the rising fields of behavioral economics (Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin 2004; Diamond, Vartiainen, and Jahnssonin 2007; Thaler 2007; Wilkinson 2007) and experimental economics (Friedman and Sunder 1994; Friedman 2004; Kagel and Roth 1995), where increasing notice is taken of individuals who do not behave uniformly as self-interested, rational utility maximizers. Instead, altruism (Andreoni and Miller 2008), reciprocity (Fehr and Gachter 2000; Fischbacher and Gachter 2010; Rabin 1993), social welfare maximization (Charness and Rabin 2002), and inequality aversion (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999) have been proposed as explanations for behavior in collective action situations.
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| 4 |
ID:
187607
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| Summary/Abstract |
China launched seven pilot areas for climate change mitigation before establishing a unified carbon emissions trading system in 2014. To explore the heterogeneous effect of carbon trading regulation on green innovation in China, we constructed evolutionary games with players of governments and enterprises. We then conducted empirical studies with the difference-in-difference model. With the data of listed Chinese A-share companies from 2008 to 2018, we found that implementing carbon trading pilot projects in China significantly increases the green innovation output of enterprises in the pilot regions. Additionally, the sensitivity to carbon trading policies varies across industries and property rights. Regarding the quality of green innovation triggered by the pilot project, firms in the pilot regions prefer high-quality green invention patent innovations over low-quality green utility model patent innovations. In addition, state-owned enterprises tend to apply for high-quality green invention patents, while firms in high-pollution industries prefer to apply for lower-quality green utility model patents. Finally, we put forward policy suggestions. First, China should accelerate the pilot carbon trading regulation and expand its scope. Second, there should be regional and industrial differences in constricting carbon trading regulations. Third, the government should avoid unreasonable regulatory intensity design.
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