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| 1 |
ID:
154873
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| Summary/Abstract |
From 1921 to 1923, Turkey and the United Kingdom contended for control of the Vilayet of Mosul, now known as northern Iraq. The United Kingdom was the mandatory power in Iraq at that time. Although this crisis, which is known as the Mosul affair, was settled in 1925 in favour of Iraq, Turkey never totally relinquished its historical claim to this strategically important border region. Turkey's persistent claim to the area, and the fact that the region is predominantly inhabited by Kurds whose nationalism shows no signs of waning, make northern Iraq a potentially destabilizing factor in the region. The article will discuss the historical roots of Mosul frontier affairs, which is a legacy of colonialism in the Middle East. This international conflict has many dimensions, but the article will confine itself to the study of the distinguished career of Ali Shafiq, also known as Ozdemir, a Turkish statesman and the architect of Turkish policy during the Mosul affair. This is, to a large extent, a political history of the conflict and the author utilizes British and Turkish archival material and contemporary memoirs, journals, and relevant secondary sources in Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish, and English.
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| 2 |
ID:
051674
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| 3 |
ID:
099325
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| 4 |
ID:
154045
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| Summary/Abstract |
Throughout its existence, the Iraqi Ba‘thist regime engaged in a war against Kurdish insurgents. Declassified Ba‘th Party documents reveal that beyond military means, Baghdad saw identity as a useful resource in suppressing the uprising. The documents tell of a sophisticated divide-and-rule strategy, using bureaucracy, law, and militia recruitment to manipulate the various minority communities in northern Iraq against the rebels and each other. Drawing on these documents, this article provides a detailed analysis of this strategy.
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| 5 |
ID:
147599
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study analyzes the war against the Islamic State (IS), specifically on the front in northern Iraq, and the mental strategies that the Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers use to maintain their combat motivation. For this field study, dozens of soldiers of various ranks were interviewed and observed on three fronts outside of Mosul, Erbil, and Kirkuk in February 2014. While some mental strategies are nearly universal, others depend on the characteristics of the fighting force and the threat that they face. The article identifies five distinct mental strategies for dealing with the stress of fighting the IS: simultaneous dehumanization and humanization of the enemy, seeing a larger cause, use of humor, religious identity, and martyrdom. The findings suggest that factors beyond primary group cohesion, on which much previous research has focused, can play an important role in increasing soldiers’ fighting power.
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| 6 |
ID:
059568
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| 7 |
ID:
172113
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| Summary/Abstract |
For decades, Turkish policymakers have perceived the possible emergence of a Kurdish autonomous region or an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq as an existential threat to Turkey. However, from 2008 onwards, under the Justice and Development Party government, Turkish foreign policy towards the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) was gradually desecuritized. In light of Turkey’s experience, this paper explores the role of context in desecuritizing foreign policy issues in general and Turkish foreign policy towards the KRG in particular. It argues that the changing civil–military relations in Turkey as well as the country’s broader political and economic conjuncture allowed for the desecuritization of Turkey-KRG relations from 2008 onwards. The context also determined what kind of a desecuritization Turkey experienced towards the KRG.
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| 8 |
ID:
106795
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Several countries have used coercive diplomacy to dissuade sponsor-states from supporting non-state armed groups. This study argues that when a sponsor-state and a non-state armed group's common identity creates common aspirations and motives, coercive diplomacy towards the sponsor-state is unlikely to succeed in the long-term. To assess its efficacy, this research examines Turkey's strategy towards Syria in 1998 and in northern Iraq from 2007 onwards. Under the abovementioned conditions, it concludes that there has been no conclusive evidence for Turkey's assumption that its approach would succeed; therefore, it should utilise alternative strategies to coercive diplomacy.
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| 9 |
ID:
113215
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is an extended book review of the Turkish book Commanders' Front (Komutanlar Cephesi, Istanbul: Detay Publishing, 2007), written by prominent Turkish journalist Fikret Bila, who compiled a series of interviews with retired Turkish military commanders and two former presidents. It provides a foreign perspective on counterinsurgency/terrorism strategies and lessons learned from Turkey's small war against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The interviews reveal the generals' views on Turkey's long-standing fight with the PKK, discussing topics ranging from the social aspect of the PKK problem to mistakes made in arming local militia. In addition, it presents the Turkish perspective on US policy in Iraq.
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