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ID:
063840
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| 2 |
ID:
063877
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| 3 |
ID:
063953
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| 4 |
ID:
063963
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| 5 |
ID:
058243
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| 6 |
ID:
064020
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| 7 |
ID:
165277
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| 8 |
ID:
074004
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| 9 |
ID:
063835
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| 10 |
ID:
176239
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| Summary/Abstract |
India has adopted the Indo-Pacific concept with uncharacteristic speed. This article examines India's Indo-Pacific strategy, which evolved out of its earlier ‘Look East’ and ‘Act East’ policies but is much more focused on strategic concerns than on trade or connectivity. As such, the strategy is subset of its China policy, and includes contradictory elements of balancing China by building partnerships with the United States as well as with regional powers, while simultaneously pursuing a reassurance strategy to convince Beijing that India is not really balancing China. The combination of these contradictory elements is characterized as evasive balancing, which is a more useful concept than either pure balancing or hedging for understanding the policies of India and of many other countries in the region that are trying to manage China's rise. However, reassurance strategies rarely work and the combination of balancing and reassurance is even less likely to be viable.
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| 11 |
ID:
072604
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| 12 |
ID:
063931
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| 13 |
ID:
080194
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Routledge, 2008.
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| Description |
217p.
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| Standard Number |
9780415456845
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053000 | 355.0218/RAJ 053000 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
077157
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| 15 |
ID:
063849
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| 16 |
ID:
063907
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| 17 |
ID:
072813
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
India has been pursuing missile defences for a decade. Its missile defence programme is determined more by political than military imperatives, and it appears to be driven primarily by concerns about the threat posed by Pakistan's missile force, with little direct consideration of China. There is little indication that Indian decision-makers have thought through the kind of missile defence architecture that is needed for this emerging requirement, or the political implications of deploying a missile defence system. India's democratic polity has had little influence on decision-making on missile defences, though this is by itself not unusual since strategic policy has rarely invoked much interest or debate in India. But missile defences also sit uneasily with or even contradict other aspects of India's nuclear doctrine, and these contradictions have not yet been addressed.
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| 18 |
ID:
149153
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| 19 |
ID:
084871
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Six propositions drive this article. First, India's relations with the great powers as they evolve over the next two decades are going to be conditioned by India's own emergence as a great power. Second, it will take at least 15 to 20 years for a balance to re-emerge in the contemporary hegemonic system; hence, India's emergence will be simultaneous with the relative decline of the United States (US). Third, Indian policy makers and analysts need to think structurally about India's external relations, especially with the US and China. Fourth, India's relations with the great powers are inseparable from the broader issue of emerging Asian balances and security architectures. Fifth, India needs to keep a keen eye on other major powers, among whom Russia, Japan, the European Union (EU) and Brazil will be particularly important. Finally, while building its capabilities along a broad spectrum, India must not lose sight of the normative component that is inherent in great power status.
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| 20 |
ID:
051796
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