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ID:
122393
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Donald Rumsfeld was right. Force transformation works. The techniques
that led to the initial victories in Afghanistan in 2001 were precisely those
that produced success in Libya in 2011.1
Small-scale deployments of special
forces backed by precision strike and deep attack capabilities used to support an
allied indigenous armed group proved an effective military tool for achieving
specific strategic outcomes. In contrast, the results of large-scale troop deployments as part of counterinsurgency (COIN), stabilization and nation-building
activities over the past 1ten0 years in Iraq and Afghanistan have been less definitive. Despite intensive investment in blood, treasure, and military effort, the
precise long-term outcomes of these two campaigns remain unclear and will
be open to debate for years to come. This challenging operational experience
has, however, highlighted some necessary and enduring truths about the use of
military force. Despite great advances in military technology and the increasing
sophistication with which organized violence can be applied in a range of situations, all warfare remains characterized by uncertainty; there exists no silver
bullet that can guarantee enduring political success from the barrel of a gun.2
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| 2 |
ID:
086409
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 American geopolitical categories changed as the world was remapped into categories congruent with the prosecution of the global war on terror. The designation global was linked to the capabilities of the new military technologies of the revolution in military affairs in official documents that codified the Bush doctrine. The official US doctrine now explicitly states that ending tyranny on earth is the national security objective for which these new forces will be used. But a careful reading of the official 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, and Thomas Barnett's popular exposition of the logic of the war on terror in The Pentagon's New Map shows that both these geographical specification of contemporary geopolitics, and the high-technology forces planned to fight the war, offer little promise that it will be successfully prosecuted. Geopolitics remains much more complicated than either contemporary policy statements or popular cartographic justifications suggest.
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| 3 |
ID:
123535
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper seeks to uncover the drivers of maritime strategy formulation in Russia and China, two active players on the international stage that have often been identified as both rising and regional powers. The paper takes as its starting point the realist theory of state power and threat perception, which provide the means and motivation for states to accumulate material capabilities in an effort to safeguard their position in the international system. Given the increasing pressures of a changing security environment, China's and Russia's maritime strategies show a trend towards greater complexity and capability. The paper also addresses the impact of the revolution in military affairs ( rma ) and its subsequent manifestation as force transformation in Western states, especially the USA. Given that this new, qualitatively focused way of war has gained supremacy, at least where high-intensity inter-state war is concerned, the question remains of whether the Chinese and Russians will choose to emulate the leading powers in the system or, instead, will forge into the unknown and formulate an entirely different and innovative maritime strategy.
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| 4 |
ID:
051916
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