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| 1 |
ID:
145318
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| Summary/Abstract |
Considerable attention has been paid in recent years to improved intelligence sharing among Western countries in an effort to face common threats.1 Most studies have focused on efforts by the United States with other states or among such coalitions as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Considerably less attention has been devoted to intelligence sharing efforts in other parts of the world. Africa in particular represents a good area for examining regional approaches to intelligence sharing.
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| 2 |
ID:
192648
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| Summary/Abstract |
Operational analysis of irregular warfare typically focuses on politically-based actions (typically violent) against governments. Intelligence services very often base their planning, collection efforts, and analysis on opposing insurgent or terrorist groups, proxy forces, and governments that might be supporting them. A key threat to stability in these complex security environments – organized criminal activities – has rarely received similar attention. Using commonalities revealed by patterns of organized crime in multiple regions as a basis for essential elements of information can provide a template for more comprehensive intelligence support and more sophisticated operational strategies.
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| 3 |
ID:
069048
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| 4 |
ID:
092311
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Multiple ethnic insurgencies have existed in Myanmar since independence. The military junta's response has been extremely brutal at the tactical level, but has shown some political astuteness at the strategic level, with a series of ceasefires with most of the ethnic groups. Despite these ceasefires - most of which have resulted in the continued existence of quasi-independent armed groups - other ethnic movements have continued their armed operations. The overall strategic picture is one of stalemate, with the ethnic movements continuing to exist, but with few realistic prospects of expanding their operations.
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| 5 |
ID:
051933
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| 6 |
ID:
122423
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Mali has been faced with a series of uprisings by its Tuareg over a number of years. Although each of these rebellions was ended by a cease-fire, the Malian government never succeeded in instituting longer term peace agreements. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion has presented even more significant security threats. The environment in northern Mali now is marked by multiple armed groups, with multiple competing agendas. This complex situation, with Tuareg rebels, Islamists with varying goals, and local militias, with a pattern of varying levels of cooperation and conflict, will at best be very difficult to resolve in the long term. Combined with an almost complete security vacuum in northern Mali on the part of the government, this situation could be intractable even with external intervention. At the same time, the focus on counterterrorism in northern Mali may not be conducive to a long-term resolution of what in reality is a much more complicated security environment.
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| 7 |
ID:
165891
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| 8 |
ID:
167175
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| Summary/Abstract |
Most counterinsurgency campaigns have featured the use of some form of local defense forces. Such forces have had a somewhat mixed record, both in their usefulness in actually countering insurgents and in their longer-term impact on internal security. This article focuses on historical cases that provide lessons for the best operational and strategic uses of local defense forces and measures to control their activities.
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| 9 |
ID:
080093
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| Summary/Abstract |
The insurgency in southern Thailand has proven to be intractable over the last few years. The insurgents, who comprise several different groups, have largely retained the initiative in a series of relatively unsophisticated operations. Although involving ethnic Malay Muslims - and marked by an increasingly strong Islamist ideology - the insurgency has been predominantly ethnic rather than religious. External jihadist involvement has been minimal at best. The recent coup in Thailand may improve the odds of reaching some form of accommodation with the southern insurgents; but it is likely that the south will remain a continuing security problem for Bangkok
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| 10 |
ID:
148350
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| Summary/Abstract |
Particularly in African operations, United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces have faced significant problems in restoring stability. In at least a few situations, unilateral national military interventions have been launched in the same countries. In the cases of Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, the British and French interventions respectively played a significant role in re-establishing stability. Lessons from these operations suggest that if effective coordination and liaison channels are established, such hybrid unilateral-UN missions can in fact be more successful than “pure” peace operations.
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| 11 |
ID:
105997
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| Publication |
2011.
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Despite some tentative internal peace agreements, Nigeria continues to face violence from multiple groups. This violence feeds upon itself, with segments of the population being mobilized both for self defense and for pressing their ideological and practical goals. These multiple sources of violence, which the Nigerian government appears unable to control to any significant degree, have a long term corrosive effect on the country's internal stability. There are few reasons to be sanguine as to any rapid changes to the level of overall violence or the relative number of armed groups, although their specific identities may shift. Nigeria represents a good case study of a country in which relatively low but persistent violence by a multiplicity of groups can have major impacts on internal security.
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| 12 |
ID:
188336
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the strategic environments worsened both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US tried to improve security by sharply increasing the number of troops. In the case of Iraq, the US achieved at least operational success, but the results were seemingly minimal in Afghanistan. Two factors were critical in Iraq: surge forces were focused on a relatively small center of gravity, and the operations were greatly assisted by the rise of the Awakening movement. The additional forces in Afghanistan had a much broader geographical area for their operations, and although efforts were made to mobilize local security forces, the results were at best mixed. The public time constraints on the additional forces in Afghanistan also were more prominent, leading to a ‘good enough’ approach by necessity. Although not strictly part of the surge, the US was able to turn over more security responsibilities to Iraqi forces as the ‘clear-hold-build-transfer’ process than they were to the Afghanistan forces. The results in Afghanistan in particular lead to questions as to how well expeditionary counterinsurgency forces can succeed in widespread insurgencies.
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| 13 |
ID:
173825
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| Summary/Abstract |
Cattle rustling and conflicts between herders and farmers have long existed in several areas in Africas. In recent years, however, both security challenges have increased exponentially. The extent of the problem, exacerbated both by organized crime links and corruption, has reached levels in which it should now be viewed as a national security issue. This particularly is the case due to most of the criminality and conflicts occurring in border regions and involving cross-border operations. The rise of local uncontrolled armed groups, significant conflict between ethnic groups, inability of the regional governments to gain control of peripheral areas, and the increased politicization of the conflicts all indicate an environment that is highly conducive for creating the rise of insurgent movements.
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