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| 1 |
ID:
071457
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| 2 |
ID:
109552
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
WHEN OPERATION Odyssey Dawn commenced in the skies over Libya on March 19, 2011, it represented a major turnaround in U.S. policy. Only nine months earlier, U.S. ambassador Gene Cretz had characterized the regime as a "strategic ally" of the United States due to Libyan cooperation on counterterrorism and nonproliferation issues (and its halting, tentative steps toward greater openness). Now Libya found itself on the receiving end of conventional U.S. military power for repressing a civilian population agitating for governmental change.
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| 3 |
ID:
075252
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this election cycle, politicians eschew debate in favor of an all-things-to-all-people foreign policy posture with Democrats mostly offering a kinder, gentler version of the Bush strategy rather than any real alternatives.
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| 4 |
ID:
143235
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THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL campaign is turning into a mirror of the 2008 race. Democratic frontrunner Hillary Clinton seeks to distinguish herself from the policies of the sitting chief executive, while sundry Republican candidates maintain that Obama’s incompetence has made America less safe and diminished its position in the world. No one seeking to become Barack Obama’s successor is promising to continue his approach in foreign policy, just as, in 2008, no one ran on a platform of adopting the policies of the George W. Bush administration.
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| 5 |
ID:
192570
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Deterrence offers the United States not only a more effective security policy but also a more moral one than its alternatives—so contended Elbridge Colby in 2007. The author of the new book Strategy of Denial joined Orbis editor Nikolas Gvosdev to discuss how his perspective has changed over the last fifteen years. Excerpted and revised from an FPRI Zoom event in July 2022.
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| 6 |
ID:
173034
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| Summary/Abstract |
The fusion of populism and great power rivalries introduces an additional degree of unpredictability in an international affairs environment already beset by a condition reminiscent of an individual in the midst of a nervous breakdown, itself due at least in part to ongoing strategic realignment and cleavages.
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| 7 |
ID:
155250
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| Summary/Abstract |
Donald Trump’s unexpected victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential election will bring to the Oval Office a person with no past political experience. Having run on a foreign policy platform that, at times, challenged the established bipartisan orthodoxy in Washington, he must also deal with a Congress which, although nominally dominated by his own political party, is more likely to wish to exercise a close check on the new administration. Given the chill between the Republican party’s foreign policy establishment and the President-elect and with the proviso that the new Chief Executive will need to get Senatorial confirmation for his nominees to the top echelons of the executive branch departments, it raises the possibility that the new team will continue with trends already noticeable in the last three presidential administrations: to shift the focal point of decision-making away from the national security bureaucracy and the Cabinet in favor of the “palace” of advisors and White House staff surrounding the president.
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| 8 |
ID:
170156
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While there may be some ideological components at stake in the Russian Federation undermining democracy in the West, the Kremlin primarily views interference as a tool to accomplish its strategic interests. Russia is less concerned about regime type (authoritarian versus democratic) and more concerned with how a foreign power advances its strategic interests. While many governments that advance Russia's interests tend to be authoritarian, this is not always the case. Russia does not view non-Western democracies as a threat because the Kremlin considers them predictable and consistent. However, the use of “sharp power” to interfere in the internal affairs of Western democracies is coupled to an assessment of how such interference either promotes Russian interests or decreases Western capabilities to interfere in Russian foreign and domestic policy.
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| 9 |
ID:
165842
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| Summary/Abstract |
Reaffirmation of Article V, however, must occur hand-in-hand with a renewed emphasis on Article III: the self-help provision of the alliance.
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| 10 |
ID:
181612
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Predictions that Russia or China would take the lead in the fight against the pandemic have not panned out. Instead, countries around the world are clamoring for forging new trade, technological, and health alliances with the United States.
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| 11 |
ID:
053895
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| 12 |
ID:
076214
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| 13 |
ID:
182879
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| 14 |
ID:
051937
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| 15 |
ID:
188120
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| 16 |
ID:
132113
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
IN 1708, Charles XII of Sweden invaded Ukraine. His aim was to use it as a base for a final advance on Peter the Great's Moscow. The Cossack hetman, Ivan Mazeppa, decided to throw his lot in with the Swedes in a bid to secure Ukraine's complete independence. His decision split the Cossacks; while some followed Mazeppa, others elected a new leader, Ivan Skoropadsky, who reaffirmed his loyalty to the Cossack alliance with Russia. The following year, Charles was defeated by Peter at the climactic Battle of Poltava, Russia emerged as a player in European affairs, Ukraine was brought under closer control by the imperial government and Mazeppa fled into exile.
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| 17 |
ID:
058999
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