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| 1 |
ID:
165225
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's economic miracle has been achieved at considerable environmental cost. To fight against environmental pollution more effectively, the Chinese government established the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) in 2008. This study investigates the stock market reaction to this event and finds that, on average, listed firms in polluting industries experienced a statistically and economically significant negative abnormal return on the event date, which implies that the compliance costs of these polluting firms are expected to increase. In addition, this study finds that enterprises with different ownership styles and different political influence experienced different price reactions during the event window. More specifically, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in general experienced a less negative abnormal return over different event windows, and provincial SOEs perform much better than central SOEs and sub-provincial SOEs.
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| 2 |
ID:
156609
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| Summary/Abstract |
In this article, we examine the administrative functions that have been carried out by social organizations (SOs) in China since 2013. We use evidence from Guangdong to demonstrate that the transfer of authority to SOs is selective, tends to create more burdens for local government, and generally does not lead to greater autonomy for SOs. We focus on five types of SOs that are undertaking new administrative functions with varying degrees of operational autonomy, which relates to the consultative authoritarian model proposed by Jessica Teets. Consultative authoritarianism allows for the expansion of relatively autonomous SOs and the development of indirect state control mechanisms. The model is designed to improve governance without democratization by expanding the role played by intermediaries such as SOs in public administration and service delivery. The evidence from Guangdong permits us to conclude that the transfer of authority to SOs allows for innovations in public administration, but that politics continues to motivate government decisions as to which functions are suitable for SOs to undertake, casting doubt on the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to achieve sustainable improvements in local governance and public service provision.
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| 3 |
ID:
091101
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper looks at how recent Japanese prime ministers have counterintuitively limited political control over the bureaucracy. It uses conflicts at the foreign and defense ministries to illustrate how the presence of multiple principals alters principal-agent theory and its implications for the politician-bureaucrat relationship. This study integrates the Japanese case into comparative scholarship on Taiwan and Korea.
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| 4 |
ID:
124203
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article examines the results of the first session of the 12th National People's Congress of China (NPC) (March 2013) and a session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), new appointments to high state and government posts of the PRC, legislative activity, and specific features of the law-making process. Special attention is paid to certain premises of the administrative reform, which began to be discussed at the NPC session this year.
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| 5 |
ID:
113571
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| 6 |
ID:
123217
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since 2006, a major drive for reform of the Japanese bureaucracy's personnel system has been continuing in order to enhance political control over bureaucrats. In spite of a bipartisan agreement on the reform's vision, heightened party competition has suspended its actual implementation.
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| 7 |
ID:
119180
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As a result of economic reform and administrative restructuring in China, a number of powerful state-owned business groups ("national champions") have emerged within sectors of strategic importance. They are headed by a new corporate elite which enjoys unprecedentedly high levels of remuneration and managerial independence from government agencies and which derives legitimacy from symbolizing China's economic rise. However, through the nomenklatura system, the Party controls the appointment of the CEOs and presidents of the most important of these enterprises and manages a cadre transfer system which makes it possible to transfer/rotate business leaders to take up positions in state and Party agencies. In order to conceptualize the coexistence of the contradicting forces for further enterprise autonomy and continued central control that characterizes the evolving relationship between business groups and the Party-state, this paper proposes the notion of integrated fragmentation.
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| 8 |
ID:
052031
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March 2004.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article discusses two aspects of government reform in Shunde County in Guangdong during the 1990s, ahead of national developments. One was the restructuring of the government, including: marketization; delinking of enterprises and government bureaus; rationalization of organizational boundaries; and streamlining of the top city leadership structures. The other involved the divestment of public assets and a substantial redefinition of the role of the government in the economy. The role of local agency is highlighted in the processes of change, and the national impact of Shunde's early reforms is noted.
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| 9 |
ID:
092650
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| Publication |
2009.
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Recently, British public management has relied too much on private sector approaches suited to market-facing situations, to the detriment of systems based on a realistic estimate of the special nature of public business, and its needs for economy and co-ordination. Accountability processes have suffered from over-simplification (targetry) and from a gross multiplication of mechanisms focusing on individual error, as opposed to ensuring intelligent assessment of business results. There has been an over-emphasis on management of inputs and outputs, as opposed to systems gearing the result-producing mechanisms to means for policy formation and co-ordination of effort. We need now to re-think and define properly the systems whereby ministers are advised, account is rendered, resources are allocated and effort is co-ordinated-and the qualifications of the relevant actors. Suggestions are made to these ends
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| 10 |
ID:
044240
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| Publication |
Bombay, Somaiya Publications Pvt. Ltd., 1970.
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| Description |
xvi, 427p.hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 004403 | 954.0354/ZAK 004403 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
175659
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| Summary/Abstract |
Japan’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), one of the country’s most important foreign policy instruments, was until recently regarded as a prime example of a bureaucratic-led and fragmented decision-making system. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has held great control over ODA, using it for his political goals. This paper focuses on Abe’s efficient employment of ODA analysing the ODA-related administrative reforms he implemented. The analysis also looks at the ODA’s history to include reforms since the time of Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro in order to unravel the roots of Abe’s influence. Yet, the analysis concludes that the prime minister’s increased authority is not followed by a static and predictable ODA strategy.
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