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| 1 |
ID:
117525
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How do states respond to uncertainty over their opponents' military strength? We analyze a model of crisis bargaining in which, prior to negotiation, an uninformed state chooses how to allocate scarce resources across armaments and intelligence gathering. Arming improves military capabilities, while intelligence gathering improves estimates of the other state's military capabilities. Our model thus allows both the distribution of power and the level of uncertainty in the crisis to be determined endogenously. We derive some notable results. First, the relationship between information revelation and war is conditional on beliefs held before the information is received, as more accurate information can reduce the probability of war for optimistic states but increase it for pessimistic ones. Second, the allocations that minimize the probability of war are often not those made in equilibrium. Finally, considering the interdependence between the two allocations yields unique insights into the relationship between the distribution of capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war.
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| 2 |
ID:
115509
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| 3 |
ID:
143117
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The good thing about our world today is that the spread of information leaves little secret about history. To illustrate this I would like to remind our readers about the Anglo-Russian Convention signed in St. Petersburg in 1907, which left Tibet with China, put Afghanistan under British rule, and divided Iran between Britain and Russia, giving the latter control over the Caspian Sea. If the October Revolution of 1917 had not taken place, the Great Game would have been over. The Sublime Porte shrank enormously after World War I, Russia acquired new territories in Eastern Anatolia under the Sykes-Picot Agreement (a special provision gave Russia control over the Black Sea Straits), and the U.S. presence in the Middle East was barely noticeable, while Britain and France played a leading role in the region.
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| 4 |
ID:
131700
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article investigates the role of status considerations in the response of dominant powers to the rise of emergent states. Accordingly, the hypothesis explored is that dominant actors are prone to fear that they will lose their upper rank, and, due to this status anxiety, resist the efforts of emergent powers to match or surpass them. The article begins by explaining why political actors deem status important and puts forward a theory of status anxiety in world politics. The more pronounced is this anxiety across status dimensions (economic and military capabilities as well as prestige), the higher the likelihood of conflict. This argument is then tested against competing theories of dominant power behaviour in two cases: the relations between France and Britain from the 1740s to Napoleon and those between Britain and Germany from the 1880s to World War One.
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| 5 |
ID:
171986
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The literature examining national militaries in the Arab world paints a near-universally bleak picture of their capabilities. Some argue issues rooted in “Arab culture”—so-called essentialist rationales—fatally undermine military effectiveness. Others assert that regime security concerns encourage leaders to actively politicize, coup-proof, and consequently weaken their military. This article challenges these literatures by demonstrating that United Arab Emirates (UAE) forces have repeatedly exemplified unusual levels of military effectiveness and sophistication in hostile campaigns. Using approaches from public policy studies (the Advocacy Coalition Framework), this paper investigates how the UAE military bucked the trend. The 1990 invasion of Kuwait was a “focusing event” that prompted a rethink of existing approaches. Catalyzed, a key “policy entrepreneur,” Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, changed approaches to training, unified federal militaries, and tested forces in challenging operations. Such findings undercut lingering essentialist critiques of Arab militaries, provide a potential pathway for other states to emulate, demonstrate that secure and motivated leaders can overcome coup-proofing concerns, and showcase the fruitful pollination of methodologies from public policy to security studies.
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| 6 |
ID:
184926
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| 7 |
ID:
133588
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Sino-American relationship is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world. Whether this relationship remains peaceful or becomes conflictual will have far-reaching economic and political ramifications. For more than two decades, American analysts have been attempting to answer one question: Is China a threat to the United States? The result has been a voluminous collection of data that equally supports contradictory answers. I contend that if we want to understand the probable course of the Sino-American relationship, we need to ask a different question: When and why are Americans likely to perceive China as a threat? This paper reports the results of a social psychological experiment designed to explore the basis of American attitudes toward other states in general and toward China specifically. Contrary to expectations that economic insecurity drives American attitudes toward economic competitors, this study finds that American attitudes toward China are shaped primarily by cultural and institutional judgments. These results contribute to the field of IR by challenging preconceptions about the extent and potential impact of Americans' economic insecurities, by contributing to a nascent constructivist literature that examines how threat is constructed in the national imagination, and by informing how policymakers approach important bilateral relationships.
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| 8 |
ID:
132579
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2014.
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There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things - Machiavelli
There has been a continuing transformation in the art and science of war ever since the aircraft was first used as a weapon of war, and then with the adoption of technological excellence. The use of the third dimension to enhance military capabilities had developed and settled during World War II. Gen Eisenhower put emphasis in his words when he stated, "The Normandy landings were based on a deep-seated faith in the power of the air force in overwhelming numbers to intervene in the land battle." Ever since that era, aviators, the world over, have been putting forth their case that air power should hold centre-stage in any war.
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| 9 |
ID:
132787
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2014.
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China will soon have its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, according to a U.S. Defense Department report released last month.
The report said Beijing is placing a "high priority" on updating and developing its submarine force and will soon deploy the Julang-2 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on its Jin-class submarine.
The Defense Department is required by law to submit an annual report to Congress on China's military capabilities and force modernization.
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| 10 |
ID:
114233
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2012.
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China's defense white papers have long been dismissed as lacking substance and offering little useful information on China's real strategic intentions and military capabilities. Nevertheless, since 1998 Beijing has continued to issue defense white papers on a regular two-year frequency. Indeed, in recent years it has accorded greater importance to these documents. This paper argues that China's defense white papers warrant more attention than they have received so far. An examination of the making of the white papers, the functions designated for these documents and their evolving content and structure reveals not only the different nature and purpose of the Chinese white papers compared with their counterparts in Western countries, but also important changes and continuities in China's strategic outlook and its evolving perceptions of the role of the use of force in the context of the country's re-emergence as a major player in international affairs.
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| 11 |
ID:
146270
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S everal landmark events happened in the development of Chinas military capability last year. In April 2015, China for the first time sent its troops to a war-torn country overseas: a Chinese navy task force landed in the Yemeni port of Aden to evacuate Chinese naval force citizens.
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| 12 |
ID:
134099
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| Publication |
2014.
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Since the end of World War II, Japan has relied on the United States for its security, an arrangement enshrined in the US-written Japanese Constitution of 1947 and augmented by subsequent agreements between the two allies. Article IX of the Constitution prohibits Japan from taking part in any conflict or building a traditional military. (When President George H.?W. Bush organized the "coalition of the willing" against Iraq in 1991, Japan was able only to offer financial assistance because of this stipulation.) But with the rise of China and its assertion of sovereignty in regions Japan claims as its own, Tokyo has begun to expand its military capability. Some government officials wonder how these moves will affect relations with the United States, Japan's protector for the last half-century.
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| 13 |
ID:
170592
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International political outcomes are deeply shaped by the balance of power, but some military capabilities rely on secrecy to be effective. These “clandestine capabilities” pose problems for converting military advantages into political gains. If clandestine capabilities are revealed, adversaries may be able to take steps that attenuate the advantages they are supposed to provide. On the other hand, if these capabilities are not revealed, then adversaries will be unaware of, and unimpressed by, the real balance of power. Most of the existing literature emphasizes that states have few incentives to signal their clandestine capabilities. This conclusion deserves qualification: the condition of long-term peacetime competition can make signaling a profitable decision. Within this context, two important variables help determine whether a state will signal or conceal its secret capabilities: the uniqueness of the capability and the anticipated responsiveness of the adversary. An extended case study of Cold War strategic antisubmarine warfare confirms these predictions.
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| 14 |
ID:
156500
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| 15 |
ID:
156402
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| 16 |
ID:
090970
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Given the rise of major economic powers in the Asia-Pacific that rely on energy imports to sustain their economic growth, the Indian Ocean region has assumed a new importance. Various powers are once again vying for the control of the waves in this part of the world. This article examines the emerging Indian approach towards the Indian Ocean in the context of India's rise as a major regional and global actor. It argues that though India has historically viewed the Indian Ocean region as one in which it would like to establish its own predominance, its limited material capabilities have constrained its options. With the expansion, however, of India's economic and military capabilities, the country's ambitions vis-à-vis this region are soaring once again. India is also trying its best to respond to the challenge that growing Chinese capabilities in the Indian Ocean are posing to the region and beyond. Yet, preponderance in the Indian Ocean region, though much desired by the Indian strategic elites, remains an unrealistic aspiration for India given the significant stakes that other major powers have in the region.
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| 17 |
ID:
057594
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| 18 |
ID:
132003
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The five states that surround the Arctic Ocean- Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark, and Norway-have in recent years taken various measures to protect their economic and security interests in the north. The measures include not only the adoption of Arctic strategies, but also the development of new military capabilities. As in other parts of the world, one state's military efforts to enhance its security may have the unfortunate effect of making others feel less secure, and therefore more likely to undertake similar efforts. Thus, despite being a low-tension region, the Arctic is by no means immune to the logic of the security dilemma.
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| 19 |
ID:
144154
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This article presents an overview of literature and previous estimates of defence specific investment cost escalation (ICE). ICE, the cost increase between two generations of a weapon system, can place a heavy strain on defence budgets if not properly accounted for. Previous literature specifically pinpoints the competition element as the main driver behind ICE. This article also discusses the role of technology and of supply and demand. Finally, we provide more recent estimates of ICE, using more sophisticated methods than those previously used. Results indicate that ICE estimates are reduced when changes in weapon system characteristics are accounted for.
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| 20 |
ID:
133623
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| Publication |
2014.
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During the past three decades, numerous Western media sources have portrayed Iranians as opposed to the United States, epitomized by a small group shouting "death to America." However, many Westerners who have traveled to Iran have seen a completely different picture, often finding that many Iranians have more positive attitudes.1 Many American visitors have described Iranians as the most pro-American people in the Middle East.2 Deep frustration with the Islamic Republic and mistrust of the clerical establishment's propaganda have made Iranians "avid fans of America: its culture, films, food, music, it's open, free-wheeling society
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