| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
130323
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| 2 |
ID:
156456
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| 3 |
ID:
108181
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| 4 |
ID:
132787
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China will soon have its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, according to a U.S. Defense Department report released last month.
The report said Beijing is placing a "high priority" on updating and developing its submarine force and will soon deploy the Julang-2 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) on its Jin-class submarine.
The Defense Department is required by law to submit an annual report to Congress on China's military capabilities and force modernization.
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| 5 |
ID:
132250
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The UK is investing in a next generation nuclear submarine propulsion plant to meet the needs of tis successor deterrent submarine programme.
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| 6 |
ID:
171607
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| 7 |
ID:
089900
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The main strategic rationale for keeping the option of nuclear tests open will be for the creation and maintenance of the Indian nuclear deterrence capabilities. An effective credible nuclear deterrent would be comprised of four components: (a) sound nuclear doctrine; (b) deterrent capabilities; (c) delivery capabilities; and (d) adversaries' defensive capabilities. A deeper understanding is imperative at this stage to arrive at any conclusion on the issue of India's testing option.
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| 8 |
ID:
132001
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the merits of extending the U.S. nuclear deterrent to the Middle East. It begins by looking at past practices of such an extension before delving into the overall issues presented by providing such a security guarantee. This article then looks at a brief survey of some of the regional issues facing a nuclear extension before considering the P-5 states and their concerns.
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| 9 |
ID:
032062
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| Publication |
London, William Collins sons and Co. Ltd., 1985.
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| Description |
786p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0002165430
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 025510 | 923.142/ZIE 025510 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
157435
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| 11 |
ID:
130675
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| 12 |
ID:
108620
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At its November 2010 summit in Lisbon, NATO proclaimed itself a nuclear alliance, declaring that any change in the status of the 200-odd U.S. B61 gravity bombs stored in various sites around Europe would have to be made by consensus among all 28 allies.
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| 13 |
ID:
071424
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| 14 |
ID:
092099
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Whilst I am not close enough to the problem to know the detail, it is clear to even cursory examination that Defence is, to all intents and purposes, bankrupt.
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| 15 |
ID:
121078
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The debate surrounding the stability of nuclear weapons has been a critical issue for the last half century. On the one hand, realists like Kenneth Waltz argue that the proliferation of nuclear weapons will foster greater stability due to the intrinsic deterrent logic associated with these weapons. The nuclear pessimists, on the other hand, argue that the accidental use of nuclear weapons and unstable regime types are a greater concern for the outbreak of nuclear war. With no clear consensus in sight, this article argues that the nuclear deterrent logic is the most compelling explanation for the lack of full-scale war. It takes as its case study the 1999 Indo- Pakistani conflict at Dras-Kargil. This crucial case study demonstrates that the caution and, therefore, deterrent effects associated with nuclear weapons in the Indo-Pakistan rivalry confirms that caution and stability result from the introduction of these weapons on the Sub-continent.
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| 16 |
ID:
106456
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russia and the United States face conflicting pressures with respect to broadening and deepening the regime of strategic nuclear arms reductions agreed to in New START. The Obama administration favors additional reductions in long-range nuclear weapons as well as talks on the status of NATO and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons located in Europe. At the 2010 Lisbon summit NATO and Russia agreed to prompt discussions on the possibility of creating a European missile defense system with shared responsibility. Against these positives, Russia remains wary of U.S. intent with respect to missile defenses, both states face near term presidential elections that distract from prior commitments, and neither the Obama administration nor the U.S. congressional leadership is ready for a bruising post-New START debate.
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| 17 |
ID:
071170
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| 18 |
ID:
150164
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| 19 |
ID:
104757
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| 20 |
ID:
086844
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The current economic crisis and two costly wars have put much strain on British defence planners. Government expenditure is being placed under increasing scrutiny. There have been voices claiming that Trident is an unnecessary expense. This article counters this argument and advocates the necessity of maintaining and renewing Britain's nuclear deterrent.
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