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| 1 |
ID:
082707
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper examines the Dutch humanitarian response to the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake through the lens of geopolitics. It analyses the ways geopolitical representations shape non-state collective action, in this case the relief effort to help victims of the tsunami of 26 December 2004. Drawing on earlier work on geopolitical visions and national identity, the paper develops a framework to study people's geopolitics, the geopolitics of non-state collective actions. These insights are further explored through an examination of the Dutch tsunami relief effort. The paper discusses how the Dutch media framed this collective action as a national effort and articulated a sense of proximity and responsibility to mobilise people's generosity. Dutch geopolitical vision and national identity (water as a major threat to the national territory, the country's role as development aid donor, its relation to the regions affected) offer a frame to mobilise people. The tsunami is also analysed as a critical event for Dutch geopolitical representations and the tsunami relief effort as a peak experience providing a sense of recovered national identity in times when Dutch society was painfully divided between Muslims and non-Muslims after the murder of Theo van Gogh in November 2004. The concluding section discusses directions for further research into people's geopolitics.
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| 2 |
ID:
077123
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| 3 |
ID:
069199
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| 4 |
ID:
125103
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the transformation was set in motion to change Western armed forces from large-scale mechanized defensive organizations into smaller agile expeditionary crisis response forces, the call for organizational flexibility has rocketed. Yet, actual research into the key organizational drivers of flexibility has hardly been done. To bridge this gap, the present study has analyzed to what extent modular organizing and organizational sensing have contributed to flexible military crisis response performance. The study uses the Netherlands' armed forces as a representative example of a contemporary Western crisis response organization and empirically draws upon its recent operational experiences. It has uncovered that within most mission contexts, modular organizing acts as a facilitator for the organizational sensing process. Yet, within highly turbulent crisis response missions, organizational sensing becomes the predominant driver, stimulating ad hoc solutions that challenge existing structures, available technology, and standard procedures.
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| 5 |
ID:
129207
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
If we are to believe the international media, this is going to be the year of the "far right anti-European populists." In the first three days of 2014, The New York Times published two opinion essays warning of the far right's rise, while The Economist focused its first issue of the year on "Europe's Tea Parties." Before this came months of public warnings of a "European populist backlash" issued by prominent European Union politicians, including the presidents of the EU, the European Commission, and the European Parliament (EP), and by national politicians, such as Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta and Dutch Deputy Prime Minister Lodewijk Asscher. While the warnings have employed different terms and point to somewhat different groups
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| 6 |
ID:
115289
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper discusses the responses of The Netherlands Indies colonial government to the rise in urban unemployment in Java brought about by the 1930s Depression. At least one in six of the large European/Eurasian population in the colony, and an even larger proportion of urban Indonesian workers, became unemployed as a result of the Depression. The colonial government and the European community were greatly concerned that the growth of unemployment among Europeans would lead to destitution for many, ultimately forcing them into the native kampung1. They were also concerned about what they saw as the moral decay of local-born European/Eurasian youth who were unemployed in unprecedented numbers. Furthermore, the European community feared that the growth in unemployment among western-educated Indonesians in the towns and cities in Java would create a fertile recruitment ground for nationalist political parties leading to urban unrest. Fear of the kampung for destitute Europeans, and fear of urban unrest from unemployed western-educated Indonesians, shaped the colonial government's responses to urban unemployment. The impact of the Depression on both Indonesian and European unemployed in the towns and cities in Java triggered lengthy debates on the role of the state in the provision of social security.
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| 7 |
ID:
068412
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| 8 |
ID:
131721
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2014.
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Thalas, Netherland is set to reveal a new capability upgrade package for the squire battlefield radar at the 2014 Eurostory defence exhibition in Paris in June.
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| 9 |
ID:
130593
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2014.
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Following the defeat of Germany in 1918, the dissolution of the Allied coalition and the gradual liberation of Germany from restrictions on its armed might, placed the neighboring Benelux countries before the dilemma of how to defend themselves against resurgent German aggression. The Netherlands and Luxemburg chose to rely on neutrality; Belgium at first flirted with the idea of joint defense with France, but from 1936, influenced among other things by the growing mechanization of warfare, embraced la grande illusion: that it could deter its neighbors from using its territory in case of a new war. Pursuance of this illusion until Germany actually attacked, together with the failure of the Netherlands and Belgium to create a joint defense, played a decisive role in the catastrophic Allied defeat of May 1940.
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| 10 |
ID:
128545
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following the defeat of Germany in 1918, the dissolution of the Allied coalition and the gradual liberation of Germany from restrictions on its armed might, placed the neighboring Benelux countries before the dilemma of how to defend themselves against resurgent German aggression. The Netherlands and Luxemburg chose to rely on neutrality; Belgium at first flirted with the idea of joint defense with France, but from 1936, influenced among other things by the growing mechanization of warfare, embraced la grande illusion: that it could deter its neighbors from using its territory in case of a new war. Pursuance of this illusion until Germany actually attacked, together with the failure of the Netherlands and Belgium to create a joint defense, played a decisive role in the catastrophic Allied defeat of May 1940.
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| 11 |
ID:
106091
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| 12 |
ID:
052351
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| 13 |
ID:
127209
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Numerous regional authorities within the European Union are committed to meet renewable energy targets in line with the EU-20-20-20 strategy. Energy from biomass occupies a pivotal position in the renewable energy strategy of many regions. Effective bioenergy policy often depends on an assessment of the regional resource potential for energy from biomass. Using the Dutch province of Overijssel as a case study, this study presents a biomass resource potential assessment, based on existing statistics and a resource-focused methodology, to determine the region's theoretical and technical potential. Additionally, a methodological framework is provided to translate the outcome of this biomass resource potential assessment into the policy domain, to allow the region's bioenergy policy ambition to be evaluated. The results indicate that Overijssel's potential bioenergy target is a share of 8.3%, which does not match with the desired policy target of 14%. It is therefore clear that it is unlikely that the province's bioenergy ambition will be met with the current supply of biomass, in the absence of additional policy measures. The outcome of the biomass resource potential assessment has therefore been used to deduce and recommend multiple policy measures.
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| 14 |
ID:
083103
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1986 it was discovered that Jonathan Jay Pollard, an employee of US Naval Intelligence, had worked as a spy for Israel. Until then the case of Joseph Sidney Petersen was the most important example of espionage against an US intelligence service by an ally. Petersen, who worked for the National Security Agency, was arrested in October 1954 and charged with obtaining top secret documents to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation. According to the International Herald Tribune this represented a case with worldwide implications. During the subsequent trial it emerged that Petersen had forwarded these top secret codeword documents to the Netherlands. For the first time an attempt will be made here to fully reconstruct the Petersen affair based on declassified American and Dutch archival holdings. Special attention will be paid to when Petersen was recruited and by whom, how long his spying lasted, what intelligence he delivered to the Dutch, what led to his arrest and trial and what the impact that had on American-Dutch relations. This article will close with some still remaining and unanswered questions.
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| 15 |
ID:
131729
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2014.
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Operators around the world are finally building experience filing their NH90s. Pieter Bastiaans, Ian Bostock, Gereth and Luca Peruzzi report on some of the prominent users progress to date.
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| 16 |
ID:
089895
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to explain the dramatic rise of Pim Fortuyn's right-wing populist party during the campaign for the parliamentary elections in the Netherlands in 2002. Fortuyn succeeded in attracting by far the most media attention of all political actors and his new party won 17 per cent of the votes. This article analyses how this new populist party managed to mobilise so much attention and support so suddenly and so rapidly. It uses the notion of 'discursive opportunities' and argues that the public reactions to Pim Fortuyn and his party played a decisive role in his ability to further diffuse his claims in the public sphere and achieve support among the Dutch electorate. The predictions of the effects of discursive opportunities are empirically investigated with longitudinal data from newspapers and opinion polls. To study the dynamics of competition over voter support and over space in the public debate during the election campaign, an ARIMA time-series model is used as well as a negative binomial regression with lagged variables to account for the time-series structure of the data. It is found that discursive opportunities have significantly affected the degree to which Fortuyn was successful both in the competition for voter support, and regarding his ability to express his claims in the media. Combining these two results, a dynamic feedback process is identified that can explain why a stable political situation suddenly spiralled out of equilibrium. Visibility and supportive reactions of others positively affected the opinion polls. Consonance significantly increased Fortuyn's claim-making; dissonance undermined it. Furthermore, electoral support and negative claims on the issue of immigration and integration in the media by others enhanced Fortuyn's ability to further diffuse his viewpoints and to become the main political opinion-maker during the turbulent election campaign of 2002.
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| 17 |
ID:
124426
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In debates on the preemptive measures of the war on terror, criminal law is often regarded as the antithesis to exception-a conventional mode of response that acts on the basis of past harm. Since September 11, 2001, however, significant new terrorism laws have been adopted in most countries in order to make possible the disruption and prosecution of potential terrorists engaged in preparatory activities. Thus, ancillary acts undertaken increasingly in advance of actual violence are brought within the remit of criminal law. This paper engages the question of the precautionary turn in criminal law itself, and how it plays out in actual courtrooms. We examine the terrorist trial as a performative space where potential future terror is imagined, invoked, contested, and made real. By focusing on the cases of the Hofstad group in the Netherlands, and the Rhyme trials in the UK, the paper examines how present criminal offenses involving terrorist aims and intent are constituted through the appeal to potential future violence. In conclusion, the paper teases out the political dynamic of secondary risk management that-frequently-underlies contemporary terrorism prosecutions.
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| 18 |
ID:
129671
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2014.
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The rise of piracy in the Indian Ocean in the first decade of the 21st century prompted international action to protect civilian vessels. This article examines the case of Spain, a major European protagonist in the fight against piracy, leading maritime security governance with official as well as private security forces. It explains Spain's twin-fold approach to counter-piracy, participating through its armed forces in the European Union's Operation Atalanta and deploying armed private security personnel on civilian vessels, an approach with strong support in Spain, but controversial in other European countries. This analysis emphasizes sources of legitimacy, and shows that the two-fold strategy has a high output-legitimacy, supported by interested groups and the Spanish public. Use of both official and private security forces is perceived as the best way to protect lives and national economic interests. Other major European maritime countries - including France, Germany and Netherlands - struggled with these problems, gradually shifting to emulate the Spanish solution. These findings support theoretical assumptions about output-legitimacy; a policy gains legitimacy if involved actors consider it the best way to solve the problem.
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| 19 |
ID:
052607
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Winter 2003-04.
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| 20 |
ID:
080541
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Netherlands is one of the few countries in Western Europe that did not experience massive terrorist attacks and where counterterrorism actions did not feature prominently on the political agenda. Until quite recently, the Netherlands had neither emergency legislation for terrorist incidents nor a specific Act that criminalized terrorist offences. In response to the European Union framework legislation, a bill was produced that penalizes participation in a terrorist organization, flanked by a vast array of other measures. This article analyses the policy, institutional and legislative responses to terrorism in the Netherlands and compares these with responses from other European states. The events of 9/11, as well as the political and public anxiety over the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, acted as a firm wake-up call for the Netherlands insofar as the threat of terrorism is concerned. Whilst most countries adopted an incremental approach to countering terrorism, the Netherlands witnessed a radical shift in criminal justice and law enforcement policy following these events
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