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| 1 |
ID:
102475
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| Publication |
Westport, Praeger Security International, 2008.
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| Description |
2 vol. set.; xxii, 325p.
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| Standard Number |
9780275994327, hbk
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:2,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055752 | 973.931/ATK 055752 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
| 055753 | 973.931/ATK 055753 | Main | On Shelf | Reference books | |
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| 2 |
ID:
106597
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 9/11 terrorist attacks have been intensively examined as both tactical and strategic intelligence failures but less attention has been paid to the policy failures which preceded them. Perhaps this is due to the presumption that intelligence analysis influences decision-making as a precursor to and foundation for policy. This assumption about the influence of analysis on decision deserves a much closer examination. The 9/11 terrorist attacks provide a good case to study for greater understanding of the influence, or lack of influence, that intelligence analysis has on decision-making. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission Report identifies as a significant failure the lack of a National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist threat between 1998 and 2001, and implies that if one had been produced it might have helped enable decision-makers to prevent the 9/11 attacks. In other words, a failure of strategic intelligence analysis lay at the foundation of the failure to prevent 9/11. But was this really the case? This article takes a closer look at the case of the missing National Intelligence Estimate by first evaluating what decision-makers knew about the threat prior to the 9/11 attacks, the policies they were implementing at the time, and the extent to which the hypothetical National Intelligence Estimate described by the 9/11 Commission would have mattered in terms of influencing their judgement and policy for the better. It concludes that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were more a failure of policy than strategic intelligence analysis.
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| 3 |
ID:
106617
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The use of high value targeting (HVT)-using military and police forces to kill or capture leaders of insurgent and terrorist groups-has increased exponentially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. HVT operations have become the primary tool of the United States for combating Al Qaeda and its affiliates worldwide, and while these operations have eliminated scores of terrorists and insurgents from the battlefield, they haven't always led to strategic success. Utilizing a data set of 20 distinct HVT campaigns dating back to the end of World War II, this article will highlight the positive and negative effects of HVT efforts throughout history and identify six key lessons from past campaigns and their implications for the United States. The body of the paper looks at the important issues inherent to any HVT campaign, including the benefits of having a local force carry out the campaign, the importance of incorporating HVT into a larger counterinsurgency strategy, and the necessity of understanding the dynamics of the group being targeted. The United States has historically struggled in all of these areas, leading to difficulties in achieving success through HVT operations, but these historical lessons also provide opportunities for progress. The article concludes with important implications for the United States and identifies strategies for improvement in these pivotal areas, including expanding relationships with host governments, leveraging new technologies, and contemplating unique ways to approach target sets. Failure to make these changes, the article argues, will leave the United States with the same strategic failures it had with the infamous "deck of cards" in Iraq, where the focus on HVT at the expense of counterinsurgency both helped create and failed to stop the spread of a nationwide insurgency.
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| 4 |
ID:
111039
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| 5 |
ID:
129145
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| 6 |
ID:
125546
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
More than 90% of global trade uses the sea, but the international community has so far paid little attention to ungoverned maritime spaces, Christian Le Miere analyses why policing the sea is a vital in disrupting the operations of non state armed groups.
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| 7 |
ID:
117109
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| 8 |
ID:
117110
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| 9 |
ID:
109041
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| 10 |
ID:
089325
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Bush administration's decision-making process leading to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 has been singled out for its many shortcomings: failure of intelligence; lack of debate concerning options; an insufficient invading force; and poor postwar planning. Contrary to the administration's claim that no one foresaw the difficulties of waging a war in Iraq, many concerns about the challenges the United States would face were raised inside and outside of government. Yet, none of this information had a significant effect on the decision-making process. This paper develops a decision-making model that integrates elements from the individual to the organizational level and explains how important information was marginalized, leading to a poor policy outcome. The model illustrates how the combined effects of the president's formal management style, anticipatory compliance on the part of key players, bureaucratic politics, and the intervening variable of the 9/11 terrorist attacks contributed to a defective decision-making process.
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| 11 |
ID:
094079
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2010.
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On 5 October 2001, not even a month after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (9/11), a person died in Boca Raton, Florida, of inhalational anthrax. The low incidence of this disease (only eighteen occupational exposure cases were recorded in the United States during the twentieth century);1 the concern generated after 9/11 regarding possible al-Qaeda attacks using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons; and the fact that the etiological agent of this illness is the biological weapon (BW) par excellence, triggered alarms when the cause of this death was made public. Traces of the biological agent were detected a few days later in American Media, Inc. (AMI) facilities, where the deceased worked. Two envelopes, postmarked 18 September, addressed to an NBC reporter and to the editor of the New York Post, both with threatening messages and indicating that they contained anthrax, were retrieved. For a series of reasons, the logical thing to do at that time was to relate these mailings to al-Qaeda. Among those reasons were the proximity in time of the postal mailings with the 9/11 terrorist attacks; the messages included in the envelopes had 9/11 allusions and phrases such as "Death to America," "Death to Israel," and "Allah is great"; and the suspected interest of the 9/11 suicide terrorists in agricultural aircraft to disseminate chemical or biological agents. This is when what is colloquially known as the "Amerithrax"-the name that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) gave to the criminal investigation-investigation began.
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| 12 |
ID:
129288
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| 13 |
ID:
119882
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2011.
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The United States' preeminent position as the leading democracy in the world is threatened today by a breakdown in our politics that can be traced back to the 2000 election and the policy failures that occurred in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. I have seen this erosion in America's standing firsthand in my work abroad. For the last 17 years I have worked on campaigns outside of the United States as a political consultant. That work, regarding the way in which American consultants run high-level political campaigns abroad, has been the subject of a study group that I led this fall at the Harvard Institute of Politics.
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| 14 |
ID:
183024
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In light of the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, the aim of the current set of studies was to examine if attitudes towards terrorists and—by extension—uninvolved outgroups (i.e., Muslims, refugees, and immigrants) changed before vs. after these attacks. In a Belgian student sample (Study 1a), we investigated the impact of the Paris attacks on various facets of outgroup attitudes: feelings towards terrorists, Muslims, and refugees, immigrant trust, immigrant threat, and immigrant prejudice. The impact of the Brussels attacks was studied in a Belgian convenience sample (Study 1b), specifically focusing on feelings towards refugees, refugee trust, refugee threat, and avoidance of contact with refugees. Results from frequentist and Bayesian analyses in both samples revealed no significant short- and long-term longitudinal changes in outgroup attitudes after both the Paris (Study 1a) and Brussels (Study 1b) attacks. We discuss these findings and connect them to the alleged refugee crisis; another recent event that polarized European societies.
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| 15 |
ID:
126943
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| 16 |
ID:
129218
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| 17 |
ID:
105369
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Developed and developing nations alike face low-probability but high-consequence exogenous shocks, including ice storms, chemical spills, terrorist attacks, and regional blackouts. Recently, "natural" disasters have dominated the airwaves; mega-catastrophes that claim more than 1,000 lives have become an almost yearly occurrence. In 2010, the Haiti and Chile earthquakes killed more than 200,000 people between them and felt all too familiar to many observers in the West. Before them were Cyclone Nargis in Burma, which took 130,000 lives in 2008; Hurricane Katrina, which killed more than 1,500 New Orleans residents and left 80% of the city flooded in 2005; and the Indian Ocean tsunami, which claimed roughly a quarter of a million lives in India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand in 2004.
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| 18 |
ID:
114442
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Infiltration, skirmishes and wars on the borders, terrorist attacks
in cities, the Naxalite menace, natural calamities, major accidents,
evacuation of expatriates from troubled foreign countries, humanitarian
aid to foreign countries, reconstruction and development in war-torn
friendly countries - the response to all these situations and many more,
demands large-scale movement of men and material. Often, secrecy is
essential; always, time is of the essence. Reliable airlift capability and
prompt action is the lifeblood of such missions. A timely airlift of troops
by the Indian Air Force (IAF) to the Maldives frustrated the designs
of a band of terrorists and averted a coup d'état in November 1988.
Operation Cactus was a shot in the arm for Indian diplomacy. In some
ways, India continues to gain from the stature thus attained. Airlift
capability is a powerful tool for pursuing foreign policy objectives
through employment of resources and capabilities. It has the power to
change attitudes and build perceptions.
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| 19 |
ID:
087387
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the potential array of atypical medical contingencies that the U.S. health system could face if confronted with mass-casualty events (MCE) resulting from terrorist attacks using conventional explosives, American hospitals are neither sufficiently funded nor prepared to effectively respond to such potentialities. Historically, the bias in most MCE planning has been toward the worst case scenarios, often entailing weapons of mass destruction (such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons), on the assumption that any other MCEs, including those where conventional explosions are used, can simply be addressed as a lesser-included contingency. Yet, MCEs present unique medical challenges that to date the United States has mercifully rarely experienced but nonetheless must be prepared for.
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| 20 |
ID:
107153
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 2 May 2011 US special-forces raid on al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad marked a low point in already strained US-Pakistan relations. Although Washington provides more than $1 billion in annual aid to Islamabad, divergent strategic interests with regard to Afghanistan have caused friction between the allies, and many Pakistanis resent that they are on the front line of America's war against terrorism (over 4,300 civilians have been killed in terrorist attacks across Pakistan since 2007). This tension manifested on 14 May, when, in response to the Abbottabad raid, a joint session of both houses of the Pakistani parliament passed a unanimous resolution to defend the country's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity against US military actions.
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