|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
092453
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The world of intelligence has grown exponentially over the last decade. This article suggests that prevailing explanation of this expansion - the spectre of 'new terrorism' - reflects serious misunderstandings. Much of the emergency legislation which has extended the power of the state so remarkably was already sitting in the pending trays of officials in the late 1990s. Instead, the rise of both the 'new terrorism' and its supposed nemesis - the secret state - both owe more to long-term structural factors. Globalisation has accelerated a wide range of sub-military transnational threats, of which the 'new terrorism' is but one example. Meanwhile the long-promised engines of global governance are nowhere in sight. In their absence, the underside of a globalising world is increasingly policed by 'vigilant states' that resort to a mixture of military power and intelligence power in an attempt to address these problems. Yet the intelligence services cannot meet the improbable demands for omniscience made by governments, nor can they square their new enforcer role with vocal demands by global civil society for improved ethical practice.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
066017
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
175056
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
For decades, espionage during the Cold War was often presented as a competition between East and West. The extent to which the Global South constituted the main battleground for this conflict is now being appreciated, together with the way coups and covert regime change represented a continuation of colonialism by other means. Recent revelations about the nature of technical surveillance and signals intelligence during this period paint an even more alarming picture. New research materials released in Germany show the ways in which Washington, London and even Moscow conspired to systematically attack the secure communications of the Global South. For almost half a century, less advanced countries were persuaded to invest significant sums in encryption machines that were adapted to perform poorly. This was a deceptive system of non-secrecy that opened the sensitive communications of the Global South to an elite group of nations, that included former colonial rulers, and emergent neo-imperial powers. Moreover, the nature of this technical espionage, which involved commercial communications providers, is an early and instructive example of digital global information inequality.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
115279
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2012.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The United States and its closest allies now spend over $100 billion a year on intelligence. Ten years after 9/11, the intelligence machine is certainly bigger-but not necessarily better. American intelligence continues to privilege old-fashioned strategic analysis for policy-makers and exhibits a technocratic approach to asymmetric security threats, epitomized by the accelerated use of drone strikes and data-mining. Distinguished commentators have focused on the panacea of top-down reform, while politicians and practitioners have created entirely new agencies. However, these prescriptions for change remain conceptually limited because of underlying Anglo-Saxon presumptions about what intelligence is. Although intelligence is a global business, when we talk about intelligence we tend to use a vocabulary that is narrowly derived from the experiences of America and its English-speaking nebula. This article deploys the notion of strategic culture to explain why this is. It then explores the cases of China and South Africa to suggest how we might begin to rethink our intelligence communities and their tasks. It argues that the road to success is about individuals, attitudes and cultures rather than organizations. Future improvement will depend on our ability to recognize the changing nature of the security environment and to practise the art of 'intelligence among the people'. While the United States remains the world's most significant military power, its strategic culture is unsuited to this new terrain and arguably other countries have adapted to it better.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
087533
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The most important recent change within the realm of intelligence and security services has been the expansion of intelligence co-operation. The growing connectivity between both foreign intelligence services and also domestic security services means that we might speak - not just of growing international co-operation - but perhaps even of global co-operation. This essay considers the complex interplay of intelligence and globalization since 1989. It argues that there is an obvious tension between a developing global style of co-operative activity and the traditional mechanisms of oversight, which have tended to be national. Accordingly, it moves on to discuss the recent efforts by national, regional and international systems of inquiry to examine issues that involve intelligence co-operation. It suggests that while formal committee-type mechanisms have limited purchase, they are not the only options for oversight in a globalized context.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
134056
|
|
INS special forum: implications of the Snowden leaks
/ Johnson, Loch K; Aldrich, Richard J; Moran, Christopher,; Barrett, David M, Hastedt, Glenn, Jervis, Robert, Krieger, Wolfgang, McDermott, Rose, Omand, David, Phythian, Mark, Wark, Wesley K
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2014.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In 2013, the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States became embroiled in controversy - again. Its questionable use of wiretaps (Operation MINARET) and its improper reading of international cables sent and received by Americans over decades (Operation SHAMROCK) had been revealed by the Church Committee in 1976; and in 2005 the New York Times disclosed that the NSA had been wiretapping selected American citizens without a warrant, contrary to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
001966
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
|
| Description |
xxiv, 500p.Hbk
|
| Standard Number |
0521641861
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 043121 | 940.548641/ALD 043121 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
092452
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the advent of a UK National Security Strategy in 2008, there has been surprisingly little public discussion of the long-term future of the intelligence and security services, together with cognate subject of special operations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
172916
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The story of Operation Rubicon provides a ‘missing link’ in the history signals intelligence. It connects the period of the Second World War, dominated by Bletchley Park and Arlington Hall, with the Snowden era. This special section examines signals intelligence in the latter decades of the twentieth century, arguing that the processes of covert interference that were used help us to understand sources and methods in our present times. It examines new material that has emerged in Europe that expands our comprehension of the intelligence co-operation between the United States, Germany, Switzerland and Sweden, focusing on the control of technology corporations, especially Crypto AG. It argues that, as a result of Operation Rubicon, all states with high-grade computing, even the Soviet Union, were probably secret beneficiaries of this process and derived substantial flow of intelligence as a result, mostly from the global south. However, the task of exploring the material generated by Operation Rubicon has only just begun, since most of the product remains classified.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
106595
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2011.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This essay argues that, since 1989, the CIA has been slow to understand the transformative impact of globalization upon its own activities as an intelligence agency. While the CIA spent considerable time examining global trends as part of its work on generalized strategic analysis, its thinking about how globalization would change its own business was less prescient. This problem is explained in terms of the way in which debates over the CIA have been framed historiographically. While intelligence studies as a subject has been successfully integrated into mainstream international history, it has failed to make the same connections with international relations. As a result, those debating how intelligence might change have tended to focus quite narrowly on matters of bureaucratic organization and have taken only limited interest in global politics. This is stark contrast to those working on the subject of terrorism and counter-terrorism, who have engaged in wider debates about world affairs. This needs to change, since the perils of globalization remain the over-arching challenge for the CIA over the next ten years.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
170397
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The study of secrecy and spies remain subjects dominated by Anglo-American experiences. In recent years there has been some effort to refocus the lens of research upon ‘intelligence elsewhere’, including the global South. This is partly because of intense interest in the Arab Spring and ‘managed democracy’, placing a wider range of secret services under the spotlight. However, the approach to research is still dominated by concepts and methods derived from studying the English-speaking states of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance and their European outriders. This article calls for a re-examination of research strategies for Intelligence Studies and for those theorizing surveillance, suggesting that both fields have much to learn from area studies and development studies, especially in the realm of research practice and ethics. If the growing number of academics specializing in intelligence genuinely wish to move forward and examine the global South they will need to rethink their tool-kit and learn from other disciplines. We suggest there is a rich tradition to draw upon.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
089531
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2009.
|
| Description |
xix, 552p.
|
| Standard Number |
9780415420237
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054301 | 327.1273/AND 054301 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
160886
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Britain has long taken a firm public line against terrorist ransom, insisting that yielding to terrorist demands only encourages further acts of intimidation and kidnapping. Hitherto, academic research has tended to take these assertions of piety at face value. This article uses a historical approach to show that the British position has shifted over time and was often more complex and pragmatic. Indeed, Britain’s position with regard to kidnap and ransom insurance has, until quite recently, been rather ambiguous. We use the British case to suggest that, rather than dividing states into groups that make concessions and those that do not, it is perhaps better to recognise there is often a broad spectrum of positions, sometimes held by different parts of the same government, together with the private security companies that move in the shadows on their behalf. One of the few things that unites them is a tendency to dissemble and this presents some intriguing methods problems for researchers.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
183523
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This essay considers secrets, spies and newspaper editors in the context of the Washington Post’s relationship with the CIA. The associated relationships and thoughts of Ben Bradlee, long-serving editor of the Washington Post and one of America’s most iconic journalists, are examined in detail. Bradlee spent much time reflecting on what the appropriate relationship between spies and the media should be and this is captured in his correspondence. This article argues that because the tensions between national security secrets and a free press were often negotiated informally though personal networks, this terrain is best analysed using ideas borrowed from social history. Editors were often wily mediators between Washington’s twin worlds of secrecy and publicity. It also suggests that in considering the CIA and the press, we need to give a little less attention to intrepid reporters and more attention to editors and owners who exercised more power. Overall, this realm is one of human relationships, best viewed not through the prism of policy documents, but through private papers or interviews.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 15 |
ID:
153080
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Academics working on intelligence failure are famous for their pessimism. This paper is more optimistic and sees strategic culture as helpfully constraining the likely options of our enemies. It suggests that there is a wealth of innovative work here that we might exploit here to assist with strategic estimates and argues that it is puzzling that we have not tried to harness it before in a more programmatic way. It examines sets of different but related ideas about notions of strategic culture, historical analogies and social learning that have been developed by leading political scientists and then asks what they might contribute to improved intelligence analysis.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 16 |
ID:
052660
|
|
|
| 17 |
ID:
073653
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Intelligence and defence are often cited as central to the fabric of Anglo-American relations after 1945. However, we still know relatively little about how the Anglo-American intelligence relationship changed during the latter part of the twentieth century. During the 1960s and 1970s the UK continued its long retreat from its world role, driven by recurrent economic crises at home and anti-colonial nationalism abroad. This essay examines UK intelligence in the mid-1970s in the light of recent archival releases pertaining to the Roy Mason Defence Review. This material sheds interesting light on tensions between the military and diplomats in Whitehall over defence intelligence. More importantly, it appears to show that, partly because of the contraction of defence dispositions, UK intelligence activities were called upon to compensate and therefore became relatively more important as a substantive contribution to the alliance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|