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ID:
025940
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| Publication |
London, Macdonald & James, 1978.
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| Description |
xxv, 669p.: mapshbk
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| Standard Number |
0356080900
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 018381 | 956.04/DUP 018381 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
077255
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| 3 |
ID:
052723
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| 4 |
ID:
081905
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In March 2007, following arbitration between Israel's director of Military Intelligence in the Yom Kippur War, Maj. Gen. Eli Zeira and the Mossad chief in 1973, Zvi Zamir, it was officially ruled out that Zeira leaked the identity of Israel's most important source in Egypt to unauthorized journalists. The agent, Dr Ashraf Marwan, Nasser's son-in-law and Sadat's close advisor, had since 1969 given the Mossad excellent information about Egypt's war preparations. He was also the source for the warning that ultimately geared Israel to war a few hours before it started on 6 October 1973. This article describes the process through which, from the early 1990s, Zeira leaked to unauthorized students of the Yom Kippur War information concerning the identity of the source and hypothesizes about what could have motivated him to take this action
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| 5 |
ID:
124354
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There was no shortage of intelligence, nor was there a lack of intelligence alerts about the Yom Kippur War. The reasons for the famous mechdal (Israel's lack of preparedness for the war) should be judged in the context of the 1973 conditions and not according to "what if…" questions. The reasons are, first, the unhealthy mixture of the military top echelon with the political leadership, which prevented the chief of staff from carrying out the appropriate military preparations on October 6, 1973. The second reason for the mechdal was a successful disinformation operation conducted by the Russians and their Arab allies. The third and main reason was the Israeli fear of "losing" the Americans-an outcome, the Israelis anticipated, of the struggle for the freedom of Soviet Jewry. For the Israeli public the war was a surprise; not for the political leadership.
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| 6 |
ID:
077254
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