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| 1 |
ID:
089680
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Uganda's northern region of Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader have been ravaged by a conflict between the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the government of Uganda. The decades of war have been some of the worst violence committed against children and adolescents in the world. The LRA professes to fight a spritual war on behalf of the minority Acholi people, but has been responsible for countless attrocities committed against civilians in northern Uganda, southern Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), including the abduction of thousands of children and adolescents to serve as child soldiers, porters, cooks, and sex slaves.
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| 2 |
ID:
090311
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Dominic Ongwen is an indicted war criminal and former child soldier in one of the world's most brutal rebel organisations, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Ongwen is at once victim and perpetrator: what justice strategy is relevant? I introduce the concept of complex political perpetrators to describe youth who occupy extremely marginal spaces in settings of chronic crisis, and who use violence as an expression of political agency. Ongwen represents a troupe of young rebels who were 'bred' in the shadows of illiberal war economies. Excluded from the polity, or rather never having been socialised within it, such complex political perpetrators must be recognised in the debate on transitional justice after mass atrocity, lest cycles of exclusion and violence as politics by another means continue.
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| 3 |
ID:
106058
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Established conflict theories focus on the role of incentives in the decision to join, stay, or leave an insurgency. These theories, however, disregard the pressure that an organization can impose on its members. Similar to legal organizations, we assert that a rebel organization can sustain itself by effective human resource management. Using narratives resulting from psychological trauma therapy of former combatants of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), these management strategies are examined. The analysis shows that the LRA sustains itself in the first place by the use of brute force. However, they also manage themselves by a careful selection process of their fighters, by the conscious creation of social control, and by offering their members an alternative social network in which promotion and compensation play a role.
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| 4 |
ID:
076946
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2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that although the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) may have begun its war for instrumental goals, such as to create political change, these goals have largely been replaced by existential motivations, in the sense that the LRA organization fights in order to continue providing security and a vocation to its members, which would be lost by a return to wider society. It is posited that the factor allowing for this turn from instrumental to existential motivation is that the LRA organization has effectively separated itself from wider society and created an autonomous political community. The implication of this is that it may be necessary to first reintegrate members of the LRA into the greater Acholi and Ugandan community and then to find a political settlement. The article also discusses lessons learned for dealing with other existentially motivated armed groups, such as Al Qaeda.
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| 5 |
ID:
133263
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the influence of actors and organisations outside the corridors of power in Washington, DC on US 'crisis foreign policy making' in Africa. Focusing on the case of US policy towards the lra/northern Uganda crisis - particularly the Obama administration's 2011 decision to send 'combat-equipped US forces' to pursue the rebel group across central Africa - it is argued that the role of African governments themselves merits greater consideration. The decision to send in these 'military advisers' was arguably strongly influenced by campaigns run by Western policy institutes, notably the International Crisis Group, and US advocacy groups since around 2007. The Ugandan regime of Yoweri Museveni has - it is suggested - nevertheless itself fundamentally shaped the nature and direction of the debate into which such groups have entered. This raises crucial questions about the agency of African governments in Western 'crisis' decision-making fora.
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| 6 |
ID:
103526
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| 7 |
ID:
137757
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the last decade, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) became a regional problem in the border area of the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, involving multiple national and international actors. This article explains why these actors often present diametrically opposed images of the LRA instead of developing a unified vision. More specifically, the article discusses how the Ugandan and Congolese governments and armies, and the US government and advocacy groups, each frame the LRA differently. These various frames are influenced by the actors' interests and by the specific historical development of political relations between them. Politically influential constituencies played a significant role in this endeavour. In the US, lobby groups such as Invisible Children, Enough, and Resolve had an important impact on the way in which the American government framed the LRA. Conversely, the lack of such a powerful constituency in the LRA-affected countries gave these governments ample space to frame the LRA in a variety of ways. The lack of reliable information about the current capacities of the LRA, combined with the LRA's lack of a strong and coherent image, further contributed to this situation. In short, the ways in which the LRA is framed enabled these key actors to pursue goals that may remain distant from the reality of the LRA.
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| 8 |
ID:
052759
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