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| 1 |
ID:
105995
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Counterinsurgency (COIN) has again emerged as a topic of both contemporary and historical interest in the age of what has been called a global counterinsurgency. However, little attention is being paid to the historical lineage of a COIN doctrine that is being rediscovered and promoted by an enthusiastic group of military intellectuals and commanders as the basis for US Army and Marine Corps doctrine. This article argues that historical claims for COIN success, based on courting popular gratitude by improving economic conditions, are at best anchored in selective historical memory, when not fantasy fabrications. The first argument of this article is that COIN does not constitute a distinct form of warfare, but merely a sub-set of minor tactics. Second, 'hearts and minds', so-called population-centric warfare, has seldom been a recipe for lasting stability. Rather, historically counterinsurgency succeeded when it has shattered and divided societies by severely disrupting civilian life. In fact, COIN is a nineteenth century legacy of empire whose uniqueness and impact was mythologized in its own day, and that is unlikely to prove a formula for strategic success in the twenty-first century.
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| 2 |
ID:
082510
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Historically, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reinsertion (DDR) has provided a useful means to terminate conflicts. Since being catapulted to office in August 2002 with 53 percent of the vote of 46.45 percent of the voters,1 Colombian Presidentlvaro Uribe has vigorously pursued a demobilization program, both individual and collective. However, despite the fact that over 40,000 combatants have demobilized under these programs, evidence is growing that this latest round of Colombian DDR is merely transitioning, rather than terminating, violence in that Andean country.
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| 3 |
ID:
132285
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Foreign Legions in the generic sense have evolved in ways that would surprise Beau Geste. Not only are more foreigners or recent immigrants enlisting in Western military forces, but also the post-Cold War era has seen the revival of warlord militias and Private Military Companies. Western militaries, in particular that of the United States, have also sought to increase their strategic reach through security assistance to regional military forces. While there have been some successes, security assistance has proven to have its limitations, not to mention unintended consequences for civil military relations, democracy promotion, and military efficiency.
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| 4 |
ID:
069214
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| 5 |
ID:
112635
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While the success of Colombia's fight against illegal armed groups, led by Fuerzas armadas revolucionarias de Colombia - ejército del pueblo (FARC-EP), is generally lauded as evidence of the effectiveness of both COIN doctrine and security assistance, the configuration of Colombia's counter-insurgency effort remains largely unstudied. This article will explain the success of one of those campaigns carried out principally by the Colombian marines (Colmar) in an area of northern Colombia known as the Montes de MarÃa. Contingent factors shaped the success of this campaign, beginning with the fact that the Montes de MarÃa forms an area where insurgents, relative late comers to the region, found it difficult to put down deep roots. However, operations to eradicate them were complicated by the inexperience of the Colmar, and by constraints placed by Colombia's Constitutional Court on COIN methods modeled on those successfully applied by the British in Malaya and Kenya. Therefore, Colmar officers initiated their five-year campaign by building up a base of popular support in the towns and targeting insurgent logistical networks. This bought time to strengthen the Colmar's combat and intelligence capabilities, and take the offensive that eventually isolated and killed the leader of the FARC in the Montes de MarÃa, MartÃn Caballero. Unfortunately, the failure of the Colombian government to follow up the Colmar victory by installing a regional and local governments viewed as legitimate by the population, and to resolve long standing land tenure issues, has meant that, so far, the Colmar looks to have delivered a tactical victory in a strategic vacuum.
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| 6 |
ID:
085525
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Traditionally women and children have been seen as victims rather than protagonists in conflict. However, since the 1970s, women and children have assumed an active role as combatants in Colombian insurgencies. This is especially true of the FARC-EP, which integrates women into its political and military structure in ways that give them a sense of participation, accomplishment and satisfaction. Without their contributions, including sexual services, the FARC could probably not survive. However, despite their favourable experiences, many women ultimately become disillusioned with the FARC's masculine culture and value system that fails to accommodate their aspirations as women
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| 7 |
ID:
096699
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Military intelligence forms a vital element of counter-insurgency operations. When the Colombian military suffered setbacks at the hands of the FARC in the 1990s, military intelligence received much of the blame. It was also accused of human rights violations. With the help of US. financed Plan Colombia, military intelligence has been reorganized, expanded, strengthened with upgraded technical capabilities, constrained to operate within defined legal boundaries, and refocused to match the government's strategic priorities. Human intelligence has laid the groundwork for impressive tactical and operational results since 2006. Nevertheless, like all intelligence services, that of the Colombian military continues to experience problems of structure and political outlook.
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| 8 |
ID:
021873
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Winter 2002.
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| Description |
85-107
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| 9 |
ID:
028154
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| Publication |
London, Croom Helm, 1977.
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| Description |
273p.Hbk
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| Series |
Hoover Institution Publication no.188.
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| Standard Number |
0856643912
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 017582 | 946.9042/POR 017582 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
037753
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| Publication |
London, Croom Helm, 1977.
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| Description |
273p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 021919 | 355.009469/POR 021919 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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