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YARYNICH, VALERY (2) answer(s).
 
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ID:   052835


From negotiations to cooperation / Yarynich, Valery Aut-Win 2003  Journal Article
Yarynich, Valery Journal Article
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Publication Autumn-Winter 2003.
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2
ID:   108151


One hundred nuclear wars: stable deterrence between the United States and Russia at reduced nuclear force levels off alert in the presence of limited missile defenses / Blair, Bruce; Esin, Victor; Mckinzie, Matthew; Yarynich, Valery   Journal Article
Yarynich, Valery Journal Article
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Publication 2011.
Summary/Abstract Nuclear exchange models using Monte Carlo methods were used to test the stability of U.S.-Russian deterrence for reduced nuclear force sizes off alert in the presence of missile defenses. For this study U.S. and Russian weapons were partitioned into a postulated First Echelon, consisting of single-warhead, silo-based ICBM launchers that can be generated in hours to launch-ready status, and into a postulated Second Echelon of more diverse nuclear forces including multiple-warhead, road-mobile and sea-based systems that require days to weeks to become launch ready. Given reasonable estimates of weapons characteristics, First Echelon nuclear forces can survive to retaliate in numbers that satisfy the requirements of deterrence, given limitations on the numbers of missile defense interceptors, a result which is bolstered by the added capabilities of the more deeply de-alerted Second Echelon.
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