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ID:
103099
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| 2 |
ID:
098102
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that how President Chen Shui-bian's provocative initiatives have impacted cross-strait stability since 2003 generates crucial lessons, not available in the past, for understanding the propelling and constraining dynamics of a cross-strait military conflict in the long run. The lessons are grounded in three interrelated sets of interactive logic: between the Chen Administration and the Taiwan electorate; between Taiwan people's aspiration for an exclusive national identity and their risk-averse proclivity in the face of China's military threat; and between Washington's and Beijing's acts of signaling toward Taipei. Specifically, this article demonstrates that Taiwan's voters at first backed the Chen Administration's provocative initiatives in order to seek a national identity instead of de jure independence, and that such popular support receded dramatically once such initiatives came to be perceived, amidst domestic and international developments, by the voters as drifting away from the identity quest and toward evoking their choice between the status quo and independence. The risk-averse voters turned away from the altered character of the initiatives and thus restrained the reckless politicians, largely because of both Washington's signaling which highlighted the change and the ensuing risk of war, and Beijing's refraining from saber rattling toward Taiwan. The voters' decisions foiled the 2004 and 2008 referenda, and forestalled the DPP in 2004 from acquiring a parliamentary majority necessary for legislating its provocative initiatives such as renaming the country and creating a new constitution.
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| 3 |
ID:
171975
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| Summary/Abstract |
As a retrospective exploration of China’s central–local relations over the past four decades of the reform era, this paper argues that since the mid-1990s, relations have evolved with a growing likelihood to break away from the vicious cycle of decentralization and recentralization since 1949. China’s post-reform era started in synchronization with a sweeping move toward decentralization, a trend which generated a myriad of systemic crises that threatened the legitimacy and survival of the regime. Thus, the mid-1990s saw a systematic rollback of decentralization. This rollback is to be understood as a comprehensive scheme of rebalancing rather than a mere replication of pre-reform recentralization. On the other hand, the rebalancing has still occurred in consistence with a cyclical pattern that had characterized the broadly conceived regularity of decentralization and recentralization. While the rebalancing has not been immune from various pathologies, the central state has selected to make contingent and marginal adaptations to cope with the problems instead of shattering the current framework of rebalancing and returning completely to decentralization. Instead of relying solely on original research, this paper will bolster its main argument by conducting a synthetic reasoning from a rich array of extant analyses to sketch out the contours of China’s central–local relations in fiscal, investment, and personnel management policy areas during the past four decades.
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| 4 |
ID:
052979
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| 5 |
ID:
107030
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2011.
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| Description |
xvi, 252p.
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| Series |
Routledge contemporary China series
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| Standard Number |
9780415587488, hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056186 | 338.951/HSU 056186 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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