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| 1 |
ID:
089166
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| 2 |
ID:
105516
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| 3 |
ID:
174936
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ever since 05 May 2020, when the Pangong Tso fracas became public, there has been an unending cacophony of news, views, critiques and suggestions. But after the loss of 20 Brave Hearts at Galwan, on the night 15/16 Jun, the Indian blood has been on the boil ! Recommendations spanning from hard-core punitive military action to soft diplomatic resolution have come forth from the academia and strategists. The Indian Government has since banned numerous Chinese apps, and imposed various economic checks, and the common public too has swung into action to shun everything Chinese. But, from what is gradually emerging, the recent intrusions and face offs, backed up by heavy force levels, are pre-meditated, deliberate, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military actions — with a definite aim. It would, therefore, be prudent that instead of knee-jerk response(s), the ‘Chinese Intent’ be first ascertained / deduced with sufficient clarity to tailor-make a response which not only thwarts its immediate military designs with minimal efforts but also obstructs its larger strategic goals. The article attempts to deduce the PLA’s immediate Military Aim(s) and Chinese Intent, and then suggests India’s military response and follow up strategy.
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| 4 |
ID:
110386
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| 5 |
ID:
064415
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| 6 |
ID:
125304
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Thus, India has potential to be considered as an important power in the international system, but it is imperative for its policy makers to visualize them in proper perspective and realized them with skilful diplomatic maneuvering. For this it has to shun its defensive posture and reluctance to transform its capacities into capabilities. This can only be attained through its strong domestic input, along with enhanced external capabilities to engage its regional and global clout in its favour. Thus, India can neither achieve this status by just becoming a 'hard' or a 'soft' power alone, but can attain it by becoming a 'smart' power utilizing the virtues of both.
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| 7 |
ID:
083893
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| 8 |
ID:
109712
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| 9 |
ID:
004328
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Deep and Deep Publishers, 1993.
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| Description |
vii,197p.
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| Standard Number |
8171004741
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 035103 | 327.54/YAD 035103 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
064268
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| 11 |
ID:
135807
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| Summary/Abstract |
India’s interest in the Indo-Pacific region seem to be in terms of both its foreign policy priorities and its lack of capability as a major power. Through it is making progress in attaining the status of a rising power, yet it has to establish such a claim through a threefold manifestation in the form of its hard power position; its soft power status; and its demonstrative capabilities. Besides, Indian interests are more or less limited towards its immediate and extended neighbourhood.
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| 12 |
ID:
146726
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| Summary/Abstract |
In case of China, present regime is following a cooperative- competitive syndrome through enhanced economic ties, on the one hand; and, collaborating with external powers to manage Chinese assertive influence, on the other hand. With Pakistan main emphasis has been to build goodwill and confidence, along with offensive- defense strategies. With proximate smaller states Modi’s is continuing with the past approach of reconciliation and appeasement towards them. In the extended neighbourhood, India is making efforts to develop broader consensus on macro- global issues, on the one hand; and, asserting its position for attaining appropriate place in the emerging multi-polar global order, on the other hand.
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| 13 |
ID:
151118
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| Summary/Abstract |
Indo-Pacific has acquired significance in India’s foreign policy in recent times. India’s such efforts can be visualized through its policy initiatives in terms of ‘look east’; ‘extended neighborhood’ and ‘Act Asia’ policies. Besides, India’s joining of inter-regional and multilateral groupings like ASEAN, BIMSTEC, IORA, ARF, EAS etc. are manifestation of its changed thrust. But to be a power of consequence in the region, India need to become a ‘smart power’ – a combination of its ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ capabilities – to manifest its demonstrative capabilities. For realization of such goal, India need to reorient its diplomacy in the form of its enhanced domestic strength, along with creating balances in the activities of major outside power in the region vis-àvis strength of the states of this region. Thus, Indo-Pacific has huge potential for India’s policy; but it requires significant domestic and external responsibilities to actualize such initiatives.
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| 14 |
ID:
172640
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| Summary/Abstract |
India faces a Two and a Half Front active and ever increasing threat viz. China, Pakistan and Internal Terrorism & Insurgency, which definitely places the nation in a high threat category and, therefore, the Indian Armed Forces ought to be structured, manned and equipped on threat basis and not on short term considerations of revenue availability (though this may be an important guiding factor). The Indian soldier has always fought the wars more with personal valour and spirit, as state of the art equipment was mostly not available, so like it was on the icy hills of 1962, or while assaulting on the suicidal cliffs of Kargil or while facing the terrorist bullets in J&K with large deficiency of bullet proof jackets for quite a period. The fighter pilots too have never wavered to fly the ageing jets, and nor have the helicopter pilots ever held back from flying their machines much beyond their endurance and ceilings to support their comrades, and similarly the navy also has been making do with retro-fitted and kitted vessels. Lately, swayed by budget considerations, an impression has been created that the Armed Forces can make do with weapons and equipment of lower specifications. While this too is a subject for debate, one thing is clear that if the soldiers get a feeling that they might be equipped with comparatively inferior weapon systems than their adversaries, it could severely impact the morale. This article outlines in brief the problems and the suggested solutions.
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