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ID:
053063
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| 2 |
ID:
164132
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| 3 |
ID:
119324
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| 4 |
ID:
110676
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| 5 |
ID:
152905
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| 6 |
ID:
168139
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| 7 |
ID:
122142
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| 8 |
ID:
102238
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| 9 |
ID:
139180
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| Summary/Abstract |
Launched in early-August 1965, Operation Gibraltar was designed to infiltrate several columns of trained and well-armed Mujahids and Razakars, led by Pakistan Army Majors into Jammu and Kashmir. Under the cover of fire provided by the Pakistan Army deployed on the Cease Fire Line (CFL), the columns managed to infiltrate, but failed to create large-scale disturbances and did not receive support from the people. In fact, locals often provided information about the columns to the Indian Army, which led to their being captured or neutralised. By the third week of August, the Indian Army’s counter-infiltration operations had been successfully concluded. Trans-CFL operations were then conducted to capture the Haji Pir Pass and important heights in the Kargil sector. This article revisits Operation Gibralter, the thinking behind it and the tasks set, the execution of the operation, the Indian response and the lessons learnt.
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| 10 |
ID:
173704
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