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| 1 |
ID:
079658
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| 2 |
ID:
075859
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The refusal of the UN forces in Lebanon to accede to Israel's request to provide information on events they were witness to (the October 2000 abduction of three Israeli soldiers on the border), and the subsequent crisis between the two, are not unprecedented. A much more severe crisis broke out in 1960 after nearly the entire Egyptian army surprisingly deployed a few kilometres behind the UN Emergency Force's (UNEF) posts along the border with Israel in Sinai. Israel hurried to request UNEF to provide information-considered crucial to its survival-on this deployment, but was refused.
The author reviews this unknown incident and tracks on the diplomatic efforts made by the then UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld alongside about UNEF's role and functions in this affair. He examines the UN's refusal and concludes that while the Egyptians did partially violate some informal understandings with the UNSG, it was indeed justified.
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| 3 |
ID:
080321
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following the establishment of an apparently successful peacekeeping operation
(PKO) in South Lebanon after the July 2006 war, the idea of deploying a similar operation
in the Israeli-Palestinian was raised by European leaders and the Palestinian
Authority. Israel was quick to reject this proposal. However, the June 2007 Hamas
seizure of power in the Gaza Strip has softened this stance, with Israel reappraising
the issue. Based on experience with the two peacekeeping forces (UNDOF and
UNIFIL), the article assesses the potential impact of a Palestine-oriented PKO for
Downloaded By: [Inst for Defence Studies & Analysis] At: 07:12 18 February 2008
Israel. The article defines the most relevant operational functions for such a PKO,
specifically: to make defection difficult, to increase confidence in the arrangement,
and to serve as a conduit for communication between the sides. The article then
reviews recent precedents for success, explaining why UNDOF succeeded in fulfilling
expectations, whereas UNIFIL has not. By exploring the reasons for Israel's opposition
to another PKO, the article elaborates on the salience of the parties' ability to
suppress violence. A key factor in Israel's decision should be whether Palestinian
entities (in Gaza or the West Bank) have the capacity to control violence or will
apply it. In its absence, Israel's troubled experience with UNIFIL should serve as
the relevant guide.
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| 4 |
ID:
053094
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| 5 |
ID:
058434
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