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ID:
101414
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study examines the time series behaviour of oil production for OPEC member countries within a fractional integration modelling framework recognizing the potential for structural breaks and outliers. The analysis is undertaken using monthly data from January 1973 to October 2008 for 13 OPEC member countries. The results indicate there is mean reverting persistence in oil production with breaks identified in 10 out of the 13 countries examined. Thus, shocks affecting the structure of OPEC oil production will have persistent effects in the long run for all countries, and in some cases the effects are expected to be permanent.
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| 2 |
ID:
028893
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| Publication |
Stanford, Hoover Institute Press., 1984.
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| Description |
xxxiii, 151p.: maps, tableshbk
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| Series |
Hoover International Studies
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| Standard Number |
0817978712
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 025238 | 953.053/STO 025238 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
062800
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| 4 |
ID:
104729
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| 5 |
ID:
138557
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| Summary/Abstract |
Pull up to a gas pump anywhere in Saudi Arabia, and you can fill your tank for 45 cents a gallon. The price hasn’t changed since the King dropped it from 90 cents in 2006. It’s the King who sets the price because the number has little or nothing to do with the price of oil on the world markets. It has more to do with how much it costs to lift each gallon out of the ground and refine it. Because, after all, the Kingdom owns it all.
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| 6 |
ID:
184594
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| 7 |
ID:
125629
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Industrial action, organised attacks, and the fighting among the armed groups the government relies on for security have severely reduced Libya's oil production. Richard Cochrane assesses the near term effects of these recurrent problems.
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| 8 |
ID:
104868
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| 9 |
ID:
129221
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| 10 |
ID:
124382
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In making their case for maintaining the United States' policy of "deep engagement," Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth stress that the U.S. security commitment to states in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, together with the formidable specter of American preponderance, stifles regional rivalries and hinders the resurgence of a dangerous era of multipolar power politics. The authors contend that a policy of U.S. retrenchment could spark the "return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers," whereas a continuing policy of deep engagement, by "supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management … lowers security competition in the world's key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities." In short, they suggest, deep engagement reduces the chances of a major Eurasian war; a new strategy of retrenchment would increase them.
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| 11 |
ID:
184597
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| 12 |
ID:
150810
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This paper investigates the effect of OPEC production decisions (increase, cut, maintain) on both WTI and Brent crude oil prices between Q1 1991 and Q1 2015 by employing the event study methodology and by using two indices as benchmarks (BCI and S&P GSCI). We employ an EGARCH model to take into account the high volatility of oil prices and some stylized facts characterizing this volatility. We find that the impact of OPEC’s announcements on oil prices (i)evolves over time and among decisions, (ii) is more significant for production cut and maintain, (iii) is different for WTI and Brent prices, and (iv) is sensitive to the benchmark index. Moreover, OPEC’s decisions depend on the exploration and extraction cost of more expensive/unconventional oil resources.
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| 13 |
ID:
126565
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars have argued that oil resources lead to poor quality institutions and governance, which causes slower economic growth, an increased propensity for civil war, and other maladies. Such conclusions, however, rest on strong modernization assumptions that oil resources are unrelated or detrimental to the level of economic development. Utilizing a unique multilevel version of extreme bounds analysis (EBA), we find that oil's deleterious effects on governance are not well established. Instead, when we relax strong assumptions about the exogeneity of economic development and utilize more objective indicators of institutional quality, oil has a net positive impact on governance. Moreover, when accounting for endogeneity, there is little to suggest either an intervening or independent effect of poor governance on civil conflict in petro-states.
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| 14 |
ID:
113156
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the five years from 2003 to 2007, global perceptions of risk were unusually low, as reflected in the market pricing of sovereign debt, corporate debt and options. These perceptions were wrong, as the ensuing five years have abundantly illustrated. Today, in 2012, nobody doubts that the world faces many serious economic and political risks
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| 15 |
ID:
133275
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars have long debated the causal impact of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund. This study investigates Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), an organization that purports to have significant influence over the market for the world's most important commodity-petroleum. Using four empirical tests, I find that OPEC has little or no impact on its members' production levels. These findings prompt the question of why so many people, including scholars, believe in OPEC's influence over the world's oil supply. The idea of OPEC as a cartel is a "rational myth" that supports the organization's true principal function, which is to generate political benefits for its members. One benefit it generates is international prestige. I test this idea using data on diplomatic representation and find that OPEC membership is associated with increased international recognition by other states. Overall, these findings help one to better understand international regimes and the process of ideational change in world politics.
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| 16 |
ID:
120175
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2013.
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Plentiful spare capacity persists in the oil production and tanker industries, contrary to Michael Levi's contention in his response to our earlier article, "Protecting 'The Prize.' " OPEC leaders retain excess capacity to minimize cartel members' cheating, and tanker companies retain considerable flexibility that allows them to adapt to political-military and other fluctuations in the market. Oil supplies are not on a knife-edge; exaggerated claims of energy vulnerability distort U.S. national security policy.
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| 17 |
ID:
156324
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| Summary/Abstract |
Armen Oganesyan, Editor-in-Chief, International Affairs: Yury Konstantinovich, in its short-term forecast for the energy market in May, the Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy, comes to the conclusion that oil production will grow faster than demand and the oil market will be oversupplied in the foreseeable future. Is this forecast correct?
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| 18 |
ID:
083283
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Despite the inherent contradictions between the WTO and OPEC, however, both organizations are indispensable. OPEC has a pivotal role in the regulation of petroleum supplies and prices and the WTO is an organization that remains the center of gravity of the multilateral trade regime. One possible means consists of establishing an interface between OPEC and the WTO.
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| 19 |
ID:
093341
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| 20 |
ID:
104267
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