Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
111621
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2 |
ID:
098799
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
The eighth Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ended on 28 May with a consensus final document. A further deepening of the non-proliferation regime's crisis was thus avoided. The more cooperative policy of the Obama administration was one of the main reasons for this partial success which was assisted by the pragmatic negotiation posture of some moderate non-aligned states. However, the result is a compromise at the level of the lowest common denominator: the parties did not agree on bold steps towards nuclear disarmament, nor did they strengthen the toolbox for non-proliferation. In the end, the most outstanding result was the plan for a conference on ways and means to foster a Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone.
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3 |
ID:
115794
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4 |
ID:
119129
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5 |
ID:
154196
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Summary/Abstract |
The UN General Assembly last December called for negotiations this year to produce a "legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination." The nuclear ban treaty talks will have to engage the issue of confirming compliance by the parties with the specific prohibitions established by such a treaty and, in addition, can establish guiding principles for the process of eliminating nuclear weapons and maintaining the resulting nuclear-weapon-free world.
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6 |
ID:
093545
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7 |
ID:
104431
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8 |
ID:
160990
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Summary/Abstract |
With the continued use of unsafeguarded naval nuclear-propulsion programs in all nuclear-weapon states, the commissioning of an Indian nuclear submarine, and the potential investment in such programs by non-nuclear-weapon states including Brazil and South Korea, movement toward a regulatory regime for nuclear material in the naval sector has become imperative. Such a framework faces a recurring debate on adequately protecting sensitive military technology while delivering assurances that naval nuclear material is not diverted to nuclear-weapon programs. In this viewpoint, we examine various prospective mechanisms to regulate naval nuclear stocks and assess them in terms of their effectiveness and scope. Drawing on lessons from the drafting, negotiation, and implementation of the Model Additional Protocol, we recommend a safeguards regime for naval nuclear material via a protocol that supplements the existing global nuclear-governance system. This protocol provides a standardized yet flexible approach to naval nuclear-material safeguards across all states (whether nuclear-weapon states, non-nuclear-weapon states, or outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons) to handle variations among naval nuclear fuel cycles and technologies.
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9 |
ID:
152032
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Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the paradox in the reaction of the United States to the two different proliferation cases: Pakistan's proliferation and Iran's weaponization effort. The article tries to find answer to the following key question; why the United States, as one of the guardians of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) which would prefer to see a region that is entirely free of weapons of mass destruction, ultimately has accepted Pakistan's proliferation, while imposed considerable amount of pressure to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
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10 |
ID:
115892
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
India's ties with Iran have become an irritant in the India-US relationship. Several scholars have alleged that the US is influencing India's Iran policy. This article examines three cases in which the US is said to have influenced India's position: the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline; India's votes against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency; and the Reserve Bank of India's guidelines of December 2010, which stopped oil payments to Iran through the Asian Clearing Union. The article concludes that while American pressure on India in each of these cases was tremendous and might have had some influence on India's position, this alone was not the decisive factor that determined India's stance. Given its well-documented tradition of maintaining strategic autonomy in its foreign policy, India would not have taken the positions it did if it had fundamental disagreements with the US on these issues.
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11 |
ID:
105658
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12 |
ID:
115076
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
A broad international coalition agrees that Iran must freeze its nuclear weapons program and may not develop either of the ingredients-sufficient highly enriched uranium and a usable warhead and delivery system-that could result in a bomb for the Islamic Republic. The International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, the UN Security Council, and the governments of almost every influential country-including the United States, Russia, China, Germany, Britain, and France, acting as the P5+1 negotiating group-have not only reached consensus on this demand but acted upon it. Increasingly tough sanctions have been imposed on Iran to force it to stop what is obviously a military program aimed at building a usable nuclear weapon. These diplomatic steps and these tightened sanctions reflect a wide consensus about the dangers that an Iranian nuclear weapon would bring.
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13 |
ID:
143074
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Publication |
Pretoria, Litera Publications, 2015.
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Description |
xvii, 550p.pbk
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Standard Number |
9781920188481
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
058440 | 327.17470968/WIE 058440 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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14 |
ID:
111941
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
ULY 18 marks the 20th anniversary of the Agreement Between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy.
Through this agreement, Argentina and Brazil jointly renounced the development, possession and use of nuclear weapons, affirmed their unequivocal commitment to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy and created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in order to monitor the commitments made.
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15 |
ID:
103023
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16 |
ID:
131077
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17 |
ID:
126318
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Publication |
2013.
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Summary/Abstract |
It is just 10 days since Iran its interlocutors reached an interim deal in Geneva and its implementation has commenced with the announcement of a visit by the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to the heavy water reactor project at Arak. The interim deal is about a temporary freeze, as a first step, in the progress of diverse aspect of the Iranian nuclear program but is of considerable significance even as a first step. This is because of the agreed links in the initial steps, with marginal softening of sanctions and the promise of no more of them. The deal also lays down in a comprehensive package the goal of negotiations and a process towards that goal which has been on the card of many months. An linking of the progress was felt when Iran and the IAEA accepted a work plan on November 11, 2013, to resolve outstanding issues. The subsequent negotiations in Geneva among the foreign Ministers of Iran and the P-5 plus Germany till the wee hours of November 24, 2013, were hard and intensive. Foreign Minister Zarif tweeted on the conclusion these negotiations that "there is white smoke".
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18 |
ID:
138794
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Summary/Abstract |
Mark Fitzpatrick, a non-proliferation analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London, is among the latest to hazard solutions to Pakistan’s nuclear dangers and myriad other problems. In his Adelphi book, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, he identifies four specific dangers presented by Pakistan’s nuclear programme: the potential for
nuclear use; for a nuclear arms race; for nuclear terrorism; and for onward proliferation and nuclear accidents. After an assessment of each danger, he proffers three recommendations, among them the ‘nuclear normalisation’ of Pakistan, defined as offering the country a nuclear-cooperation deal ‘akin to’ the one given to India in 2008.
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19 |
ID:
119035
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20 |
ID:
146545
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Publication |
Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2015.
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Description |
xvi, 238p.pbk
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Series |
Weapons of Mass Destruction Series; 2
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Standard Number |
9781442223752
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
058759 | 327.1747/BUR 058759 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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