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| 1 |
ID:
053234
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Manas Publications, 2004.
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| Description |
x, 342p.
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| Standard Number |
8170491975
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 048460 | 306.09521/TOW 048460 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 054466 | 306.09521/TOW 054466 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
145479
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper sheds new light on the North Korean nuclear conundrum, which has long been the source of security dilemmas on the Korean Peninsula, and South Korea’s strategic choices with regard to it. In doing this, this paper deals with four research questions: 1) How serious are North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities?; 2) What are the implications of international sanctions and countries’ positions?; 3) Can and will South Korea and the international community stop the North Korean nuclear program successfully?; and 4) And if not, what should South Korea do? This paper indicates that in the wake of North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and subsequent missile test, North Korea’s nuclear Pandora’s Box is almost about to open. It urges that if it indeed opens, it would completely change the strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. This deep frustration and a sense of urgency have driven South Korea and the international community to impose stronger and tougher sanctions against North Korea than before. However, this paper argues that multiple factors––South Korea’s limited ability; the escalation of the U.S.-China global and regional rivalry; the strategic consideration of countries involved, especially China; and North Korea’s tenacious survival strategy—engage in strong pessimism, leaving the North Korean nuclear situation unresolved. Therefore, on the one hand, South Korea has to make every effort to denuclearize North Korea until the last minute, exhausting every possible option and means. However, on the other hand, it has to prepare for a worst-case scenario. This paper points out that South Korea’s exit strategy should be a “strategy of delicate deterrence” that is a comprehensive strategy of deterrence to combine military, political and diplomatic means.
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