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1 |
ID:
028959
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Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.
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Description |
v, 232p.
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Series |
International studies
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Standard Number |
0521250943
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
023193 | 327.73/LIT 023193 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
081725
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
Between the poles of nuclear-weapons acquisition and transparent disarmament lies a third option: cultivating ambiguity about capabilities. The current crises with Iran and North Korea are playing out against the backdrop of the contrasting nonproliferation precedents set in 2003 - in Iraq, through a change of regime, and, in Libya, through change within a regime. Washington has sent mixed messages to Tehran and Pyongyang whether the US objective is regime change or behaviour change. Coercive diplomacy, combining credible inducements and penalties to roll back their nuclear programmes, is not possible when the goal is the maximalist one of regime change. But even if the United States clarifies its objective, negotiations with North Korea and Iran can realistically aim only to narrow, but not to eliminate, the ambiguity. A strategy of containment, whose key elements are deterrence and reassurance, offers the best approach for narrowing and hedging against these states' nuclear ambiguity
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3 |
ID:
023136
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Publication |
Winter 2002-03.
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Description |
53-79
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Summary/Abstract |
Under the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy document, military pre-emption against ‘rogue states’ and terrorist groups has been elevated to official doctrine. But the conditions under which pre-emption would be undertaken remain unclear. Military action against terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, enjoys broad international legitimacy, but that consensus breaks down over the use of force against a state violating non-proliferation norms. A comparative analysis of historical cases reveals force to be as problematic as its non-military alternatives. Inadequate intelligence, concern over collateral damage to civilian populations and the fear of triggering a broader conflict have been major constraints on the use of force to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the post-11 September era, pre-emption should be a rarely invoked policy option, and successful prevention strategies, employing non-military instruments, might forestall the need to resort to it.
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4 |
ID:
056914
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Publication |
2003.
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Description |
p7-31
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5 |
ID:
154091
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Summary/Abstract |
In a 2010 interview with The Washington Post's Bob Woodward, then-President Barack Obama judged the United States generally resilient to terrorist attack, but qualified that “a potential game changer would be a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists, blowing up a major city.”11. Bob Woodward, Obama's Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), p. 363.
View all notes
This game-changing scenario, which had been a concern since the chaotic breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, had arisen just four months after his inauguration: a CIA intercept between two Taliban leaders in northwestern Pakistan revealed that the terrorist group claimed to have acquired “nuclear devices.”
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6 |
ID:
001833
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Publication |
Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994.
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Description |
xx,290p.
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Standard Number |
0943875978
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
042981 | 327.73/LIT 042981 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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7 |
ID:
059238
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Publication |
Cambridge, Ballinger Publishing, 1988.
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Description |
ix, 295p.
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Standard Number |
088730253X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
029028 | 327.1/LIT 029028 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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