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| 1 |
ID:
107986
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| 2 |
ID:
103586
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Various reasons purport to explain why the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) has failed to evolve from confidence building to preventive diplomacy (PD). These include the ARF's large membership, its strict adherence to sovereignty and noninterference principles that contradict any effective implementation of PD, and contrasting strategic perspectives among its participants. Although these factors have certainly hindered security cooperation, none are sufficient conditions by themselves to explain the forum's ambivalence toward PD. The authors argue that these factors do not tell the whole story, not least when they have not stood in the way of experiments in PD by other processes in the Asia-Pacific. The claim here is that the ARF has evolved into a highly inflexible forum, which in turn has led to the formalization of its approach to PD. This has severely inhibited the adoption of a PD agenda and actionable measures under the ARF framework.
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| 3 |
ID:
053472
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| Publication |
Armonk, M.E. Sharp, 2004.
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| Description |
xxxii, 264p.
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| Standard Number |
076561474X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 048532 | 355.031095/TAN 048532 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
067772
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| 5 |
ID:
176243
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses how south-east Asian countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have responded to the ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategies promoted by the United States and the other countries in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the ‘Quad’: US, Japan, Australia and India). Their nuanced ripostes imply a persistent commitment to hedging and shifting limited alignments in the face of growing great rivalry and the lack of a clear FOIP vision among Quad members. In the face of external pressure to take sides, the ASEAN states are likely to keep hedging through working selectively with China and the United States. Given the United States' apparent preference to balance China and Trump's disregard for multilateralism, ASEAN's ability to maintain its centrality in the evolving regional architecture is in doubt—despite the Quad countries' (belated) accommodation of ASEAN in their FOIP strategies. However, the success of the US strategy depends on Washington's ability to build and sustain the requisite coalition to balance Beijing. ASEAN has undertaken efforts to enhance bilateral security collaboration with China and the United States respectively. In doing so, ASEAN is arguably seeking to informally redefine its centrality in an era of Great Power discord and its ramifications for multilateralism.
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| 6 |
ID:
119243
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2012.
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How Asian countries relate strategically with rising China remains one of the most debated questions in Asian security today. Although the concomitant rise of regional powers (China, Japan, and India) has undoubtedly shaped, and continues to shape, the geopolitical milieu of post-Cold War Asia, it is the perceived emergence of China as an economic and military power that has nonetheless engendered most concern among Asian countries, not least Singapore. Analysts, however, disagree over how Asians perceive and respond to China's rise. One view, for example, has it that Asian countries have opted to bandwagon with China (as vassal states once did with imperial China);1 another that Asian states on the whole have demonstrated a greater inclination towards balancing China.2 A third view adopts the via media in suggesting that aspects of both bandwagoning and balancing can in fact be discerned in the behaviour of Asian states.3 Smaller and/or weaker Asian countries accordingly 'hedge'4 against China and other major powers as they manage their respective vulnerabilities and dependencies vis-Ã -vis those more powerful than they.5
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| 7 |
ID:
083831
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For the most part, the theory of security sector governance does not comport with extant Southeast Asian realities owing to its Western assumptions and expectations. Singapore's security sector resembles that of other ASEAN countries in its technocratic, illiberal and comprehensive security-oriented aspects, where governance is exercised solely in a top-down fashion ("governance by national government"). Against this common wisdom, we argue that the Singapore case can, with qualifications, also be understood in terms of both "governance with multiple governments" and "governance without government", categories that better fit Western industrial democracies. For example, growing regionalism in Southeast Asia suggests, not inconceivably, that the future management of the region's security sectors, not least Singapore's, could be a multi-tiered, shared enterprise involving not only national governments, but regional organizations such as ASEAN as well as non-official mechanisms ("governance with multiple governments"). Moreover, the highly professionalized fashion in which Singapore manages its security sector differs markedly from the "new/developmental professionalism" of other ASEAN security sectors. Borrowing from Michel Foucault's ideas of disciplinary intervention and self-formation, we show how Singapore's security is in part reliant on habits and rituals of self-governance among ordinary Singaporeans ("governance without government"
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| 8 |
ID:
119486
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The role that peer pressure plays in efforts by member nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in socializing a reluctant or recalcitrant member(s) toward a diplomatic posture or policy position has been noted but not systematically addressed in the existing literature. Given that the decision-making in ASEAN has traditionally been a consensus-based, political suasion is therefore the key modality through which ASEAN members develop shared perspectives and, where possible, ensure collective assent to an existing or emerging norm or position. Peer pressure is likely the only means available for ASEAN states to promote 'voluntary compliance' without contravening their institution's non-interference principle. Three historical developments are examined: Indonesia and the formation of ASEAN, the establishment of the ASEAN Charter, and the constructive engagement of Myanmar. In all three instances, force-based coercion did not play a role, but persuasion did.
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| 9 |
ID:
116366
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Defense diplomacy is a relatively new phenomenon aimed at addressing the strategic complexity and uncertainty of the post-Cold War world. It has hitherto received little analytical attention where defense relations in Southeast Asia are concerned. Our article seeks to redress that lack. Borrowing from historical and contemporary debates on diplomacy, we offer a working definition of defense diplomacy that distinguishes its pragmatic and transformative aspects. Building on the four articles that follow, we suggest that bilateral and multilateral engagements in defense diplomacy by Asian countries have primarily been pragmatic in form and function, aimed at maintaining peaceful and stable regional relations. Our modest contribution is hopefully a useful start to what could in time become a meaningful debate and cumulative knowledge on defense diplomacy.
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| 10 |
ID:
104750
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
ASEAN has proved an enduring regional architecture, but the Asia-Pacific increasingly faces a series of interrelated political and security challenges for which the organisation may be outmoded. See Seng Tan asks whether ASEAN centrality enhances regionalism or merely rationalises the status quo in which it enjoys pride of place.
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| 11 |
ID:
059278
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| 12 |
ID:
067129
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| 13 |
ID:
108051
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2011.
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Despite their declaratory support for the United Nations' adoption of the "responsibility to protect" (R2P) principle, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) governments nonetheless reject the UN proposition that military intervention can and should be employed for implementing the R2P. However, this reluctance has not precluded the development of an ethic of responsible sovereignty in Southeast Asia. But rather than responsibility as protection as assumed by the R2P, ASEAN countries arguably define responsibility in terms of provision for the well-being of their populaces. The development of such an ethic in Southeast Asia has been uneven as evidenced by the Myanmar government's initial reluctance to receive foreign humanitarian assistance following Cyclone Nargis in 2008. That said, as the contemporary policy debate and regional institutional developments in Southeast Asia together attest, an ethic of responsible provision is emerging among ASEAN states.
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| 14 |
ID:
068525
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| 15 |
ID:
145688
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Perspectives from Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam show that South Korea’s middle power role in Southeast Asia is confined to economics and capacity building. Despite being absent from Southeast Asia’s geostrategic calculus, Korea’s non-revisionist inclination is seen to be advantageous in its pursuit of enhanced middle power status.
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| 16 |
ID:
117732
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Michael Leifer's passing over a decade ago has done little to diminish the force of his scholarly ideas and their continued relevance to the study of regional order and security of contemporary Southeast Asia. Leifer's intellectual influence is apparent in the way analysts of different theoretical persuasions continue to grapple with and debate over the problem of regional order in Southeast Asia. In so doing, they rely on terms of reference originally defined by Leifer. This article reviews and assesses a number of noteworthy insights from Leifers oeuvre against the contemporary political-strategic situation of Southeast Asia and its immediate extra-regional context. The insights include the elusiveness of regional order, the primacy of the balance of power, and the emphasis on conservation rather than innovation in the management of regional security in Southeast Asia. While Leifers ideas are by no means timeless, they continue nonetheless to speak in telling ways to the security challenges facing Southeast Asia today.
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| 17 |
ID:
116367
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article looks at the regionalization of defense relations in Southeast Asia from the Cold War to the present. The evolution of defense cooperation involving the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and their dialogue-partner countries has been impressive, with the formation of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM+?defense-ministerial arrangements, themselves the beneficiaries of more established dialogue processes. Despite these developments, the aim of defense regionalism in Southeast Asia has remained decidedly modest. While "action-oriented" cooperation in various nonconventional security areas has been incorporated into its agenda, Southeast Asian defense regionalism persists largely as an exercise in informal confidence building, with at best limited and incidental forays into preventive diplomacy. In conclusion, it still lacks the strategic imperative and institutional coherence befitting a model of regionalism.
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| 18 |
ID:
085876
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This preliminary survey of international relations (IR) teaching in Singapore argues that while the hegemonic goals of the nation-state have been pervasive since 1956, the influences upon IR teaching have become more complex and subtle in tandem with Singapore's transition from pristine developmentalism to an aspiring global city. Today, IR teaching has acquired characteristics of a division of labor among the main universities, research institutes, and business-oriented schools. Nonetheless, the dialectics of whether the future lies in open-ended knowledge inquiry or hewing to some version of state-associated pragmatism remains unresolved.
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| 19 |
ID:
061674
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| 20 |
ID:
077241
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Dominant discourses and strategies of the post-11 September 'war on terror' reflect an ideological absolutism that has left the democratic space of civil society in the Asia-Pacific severely curtailed and compressed. Recovery of this distinct space of freedom, so crucial to 'civilisational' amity, begins with the strategic deconstruction of the totalising logics and practices underwriting not only the words and deeds of religious militants but also those of state actors. Accordingly, amity is best sought not through uncritical fidelity to essentialist and exclusivist understandings of subjectivity, but acknowledgement and acceptance of the reality that the self is necessarily indebted to the other, to which the former must exercise an ethical responsibility.
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