| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
078934
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2007.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
In 2006 the Secretary General's High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence called for a dynamic new gender entity led by an Under-Secretary General. The follow-up to this recommendation is still ongoing, leaving the UN gender machinery in its current fragmented and weakened state. This enduring dilemma has its origins in bureaucratic incoherence, lack of senior management support for UN gender equality efforts, the failure of member states to support the Beijing Platform for Action, the impact of conservative regimes, and recent US dominance over the UN reform process. Is a new women's agency, with increased authority, new staffing and significantly increased resources possible, or should transnational feminists seek to establish an autonomous women's agency outside the UN system to provide better leadership for gender equality efforts world-wide?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
075400
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2006.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The article examines three specific aspects of military operations authorized by the UN Security Council in the post-Cold War period. The trends examined respond to the following questions: Who chooses what gets on the Security Council's agenda? Who implements actions authorized by the Security Council? And what is it that they are doing? The answers reveal that it is the P-5 who control both what gets on the Security Council agenda and, importantly, what does not. In terms of carrying out Security Council activity, the post-Cold War period has generated a division of labour whereby developing states are the main providers of troops for blue-helmeted UN operations, while developed states contribute to coalition operations in their own regions and/or when their own vital interests are at stake. The main activity is post-conflict or what might be termed pre-post-conflict operations. Taken together, these trends characterize a Council that can be described as distant and disengaged, at least for some conflicts in some parts of the world. Using Claude's idea of collective legitimization, the article argues that these trends suggest that greater consideration needs to be given to how to recoup Council legitimacy, not just how to increase its representative nature, when debating UN reform. While both representativeness and legitimacy are desirable, the pursuit of one without considering the repercussions to the other may ultimately undermine the objectives of reform.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
078179
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
107680
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
066725
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
053669
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Sep-Oct 2004.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
083192
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
An ad hoc group of reforms aimed at achieving greater integration of the UN system during peace operations has largely ignored the numerous barriers to their implementation. Accordingly, these integration reforms have fallen far short of their goal of increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN's efforts in countries in, or emerging from, conflict. Integration reforms are hindered by the absence of both adequate organizational change and accompanying incentives for implementation. The article outlines some of the key barriers to integration within the UN structure, and within war-to-peace transitions generally. The analysis highlights evidence of the need to revise these reforms, and concludes with suggestions for altering UN procedures and practices to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its post-conflict efforts
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
065757
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
065323
|
|
|