| Publication |
2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Emboldened by the recovery of the domestic oil industry and determined to exploit comparative advantages in world markets, President Putin put Russia once again on the move to secure control over Caspian energy spoils. The revitalization of Moscow's posture renewed debate over the contours of geopolitical competition in the region, and the effectiveness of non-military instruments of statecraft more generally. Yet, much of the controversy is misplaced due to empirical and theoretical oversights. The first is due to a misreading of the record of Moscow's Caspian energy posture, and an under-appreciation for the mixed success of Russia's energy leverage across the oil and gas sectors. The second comes from the failure to understand the conditions under which institutionally weak states can manipulate markets and regulatory mechanisms in global energy relations for purposes of national security. The article offers a first cut at substantiating these claims by examining the geoeconomic dimensions to Russia's Caspian energy policy.
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