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| 1 |
ID:
119766
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| 2 |
ID:
080591
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| 3 |
ID:
086730
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's rapidly incerasing demands for energy has been a subject for debate for years. To climate observers, the most important issue is how to safeguard energy supply and maintain economic growth. To most western analysts, the more crusial issue is how Chinese energy policies and activities will affect world energy markets and world politics.
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| 4 |
ID:
110603
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
President Barack Obama on Dec. 31 signed into law legislation to impose sanctions on firms doing business with the Central Bank of Iran, a move intended to make it more difficult for Tehran to sell oil abroad.
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| 5 |
ID:
104868
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| 6 |
ID:
120174
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In "Protecting 'The Prize': Oil and the U.S. National Interest," Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press present an important counterargument to many common but overwrought worries about energy security. Yet they themselves go too far in the opposite direction. Gholz and Press argue that only three types of potential oil market disruptions could induce "particularly painful" adjustments and hence rise to the highest level: consolidation of a large fraction of Persian Gulf reserves under a single power, domestic instability in Saudi Arabia, and blockage of the Strait of Hormuz. I argue in this response that Gholz and Press confine the second and third scenarios too narrowly, and hence understate the security risks stemming from U.S. dependence on oil.
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| 7 |
ID:
185044
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| 8 |
ID:
058189
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| 9 |
ID:
144562
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| Summary/Abstract |
As was anticipated, the nuclear sanctions imposed against Iran were finally lifted on January 16, 2016 after it was certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that Iran had met its obligations under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) reached in July 2015 among six world powers. The deal has not only allowed Iran access to the billions of dollars of assets in international bank accounts that were frozen during the sanctions period, but will also possibly see thousands of barrels of Iranian crude added to its current exports of 2.9 million barrels per day (mb/d), with the possibility of 1 million barrels extra per day (mb/d) by the end of 2016.
The announcement of the end to the sanctions regime imposed on Iran, has reiterated what the markets have been predicting for a while—that any recovery in oil prices will not be taking place till the end of the year at least, if not longer. But more importantly, what will it mean for the oil market in general and for the Persian Gulf oil-exporting states in particular at a time when the oil market is witnessing a 12-year low with prices that have dipped under $30 a barrel? Interestingly, despite the slump, demand has been tepid at best, contributing to the dismal price scenario. Given that the market was over-supplied by around one mb/d already, why did Washington allow Iran to return to the oil market at a time when the US oil sector was adversely affected by the low oil prices?
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| 10 |
ID:
026757
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Wiley Eastern, 1080.
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| Description |
507p.
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| Standard Number |
082267002
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 020953 | 333.79/PAC 020953 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 11 |
ID:
085797
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The contemporary world has witnessed a spiraling controversy over nuclear issues where the independent foreing policy of decision making of a nation like Iran is circumscribed. The United States, the police of security, is employing every tactics to bring into book defiant Iran and projecting the situations as immensely threatening. Any rational internationalist can argue that there is no fee lunch in international politics and realism looms large in state behavior.
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| 12 |
ID:
131228
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| 13 |
ID:
140501
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| Publication |
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015.
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| Description |
xii, 257p.: figureshbk
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| Standard Number |
9780190212698
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058287 | 338.272820973/YET 058287 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 14 |
ID:
053690
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| 15 |
ID:
063089
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| 16 |
ID:
129045
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| 17 |
ID:
063065
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| 18 |
ID:
170078
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Vivekananda International Foundation, 2020.
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| Description |
138p.pbk
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| Series |
Monograph
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| Standard Number |
9788194379508
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059810 | 338.27282/MAL 059810 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
069001
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| 20 |
ID:
076835
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Those who worry about the vulnerability of the world's oil shipping lanes should calm down. Oil tankers are more resilient than often presumed, and only the United States has the capability to seriously disrupt maritime traffic -- which it will not do.
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