| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
053805
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
083481
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2008.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
There was not, except in the very broadest sense, a unified 'Allied' grand strategy regarding any aspect of World War II. British-American strategy and Soviet strategy were formed in isolation. This was certainly true of the strategy of anti-German insurgency. Aside from geographical and ideological factors a major source of difference was that Britain was at war with Germany from September 1939, while the USSR and the USA became involved two years later. There were major asymmetries: Moscow's insurgency strategy for most of the war was in practice applied to its own national territory, while British (and later American) insurgency strategy was applied to foreign countries occupied by Germany. It will be argued, however, that in different parts of the Grand Alliance the path of insurgency strategy followed a similar trajectory, even if this strategy was not synchronised in time or space. In London, Moscow, and Washington, high hopes were initially placed on popular rebellion in German-occupied territory. It was only months after the entry of their countries into the war that the high commands, both west and east of the Reich, came to the conclusion that insurgent forces could only be used as an auxiliary to huge conventional armies.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
124571
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the development and failure of a plan by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) to use a small-scale mutiny by German troops in Greece in 1944 to engender a widespread uprising within the Reichsarbeitsdienst and the ranks of non-German troops serving in the Wehrmacht. Through an analysis of this operation, codenamed 'Kitchenmaid', an assessment will be made of the capabilities and motivations of SOE's Greek section (Force 133); the problem of its cooperation with Greek communist guerrillas in relation to British foreign policy towards Greece; and the strategic and political value of 'Kitchenmaid'.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
090125
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Cyprus, together with Gibraltar and Malta, constituted the 'crown jewels' of British sea power in the Mediterranean during the Second World War. Being deployed on Cyprus the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force could fight the Germans and Italians in the Southeast Mediterranean, thus inhibiting the continuous supply with troops and war material of the Africa Corps of Field Marshall Ervin Rommel. This article aims to shed light on the activities of the Special Operations Executive on the island. Citing recently declassified files we assess the espionage and propaganda as well as the guerrilla warfare contingencies in case of an Axis invasion of Cyprus. We provide a critical assessment of the British guerrilla warfare strategy, arguing that the SOE and the 25th Army Corps based on Cyprus had not been well prepared to counter aggression due to inter-service rivalries, bad planning and lack of manpower. Besides, the SOE distrusted the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots to the extent that the training of guerrillas was planned to commence only after a successful invasion and the occupation of the island. Finally, SOE officers considered the Cypriot communists with their anti-colonialist declarations as another threat to be confronted with special operations.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
061104
|
|
|