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BARGAINING (84) answer(s).
 
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1
ID:   120718


Argumentative dimension to the EU-Africa EPAs / Hurt, Stephen R; Lee, Donna; Lorenz-Carl, Ulrike   Journal Article
Lee, Donna Journal Article
0 Rating(s) & 0 Review(s)
Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract Abstract Not only is the participation of developing countries in international trade negotiations growing, so is their influence over the global trade agenda. This article highlights the increasing activism and impact of African states through a detailed study of the current Economic Partnership Agreement (EPAs) negotiations with the European Union (EU). In examining African resistance to EPAs, the article develops a constructivist approach to North-South trade negotiations that pays close attention to the role of development discourses. We argue that the growing willingness of African states to challenge the EU to deliver on its development promises during the decade-long EPA process was crucial to informing their sustained opposition to the EU's goal of completing a comprehensive set of sub-regional economic agreements. We document African resistance to EU trade diplomacy in the EPAs, exploring how these otherwise weak countries were able to pursue normative-based negotiation strategies by recourse to the EU's promise of a 'development partnership.'
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2
ID:   124143


Bargaining and the interdependent stages of civil war resolutio / Findley, Michael G   Journal Article
Findley, Michael G Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract This article examines civil war resolution as a process comprised of multiple interdependent stages. It engages directly the idea that peace emerges only as a process comprised of battle, negotiation, agreement, and implementation of an agreement. I hypothesize that events at earlier stages of the peace process have implications for later stages, but not always in the same ways. Drawing on bargaining models of war, I consider how two factors that might prevent successful bargaining-stalemates and the number of actors-can encourage cooperation early in a peace process but impede lasting cooperation at later stages. Using a nested dichotomies statistical approach to capture interdependence, I find support for the argument that stalemates and the number of actors have different effects depending on the stage of the peace process. The results substantiate the need in theoretical and policy work to consider peace as an interdependent, sequential process.
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3
ID:   058793


Bargaining and the nature of war / Smith, Alastair; Stam, Allan C Dec 2004  Journal Article
Stam, Allan C Journal Article
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Publication Dec 2004.
Key Words Conflict  Armed Conflict  Warfare  Bargaining  Nature of War 
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4
ID:   140001


Bargaining between rebel groups and the outside option of violence / Nygard, Havard Mokleiv; Weintraub, Michael   Article
Nygard, Havard Mokleiv Article
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Summary/Abstract Although military cooperation among rebel groups in multi-party civil wars could help rebels defeat or extract concessions from an incumbent government, violent conflict among rebel groups is empirically prevalent. Why do rebel groups in multi-party civil wars choose to fight one another? This article models the strategic dilemma facing rebel groups in multi-party civil wars as an alternating-offer bargaining game of incomplete information with an outside option. The game-theoretic model explores the relationship between the status quo distribution of power among rebel groups, the costs of fighting, and the likelihood that one rebel group will opt to unilaterally end bargaining over a set of goods, such as access to supply routes, natural resources, and control over civilian populations. We show that the likelihood of violent conflict between rebel groups is lowest when the status quo distribution of benefits reflects the existing distribution of power.
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5
ID:   147369


Bargaining over local public good provision in nested social dilemmas: a comparative study of variation from South India / Müller, Ulrike; Chaliganti, Raghu   Journal Article
Müller, Ulrike Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract In rural India, decentralized government schemes and assembly constituency development programs represent major channels through which local public good provision is realized. This polycentric governance structure confronts local leaders with a distributional conflict, which is nested in a social dilemma situation. Based on a controlled case study approach, we investigate the provision of small-scale infrastructure in three South Indian communities. Apart from roads and drinking water facilities that directly appeal to the residents of a community, local leaders bargain over infrastructure contracts, which serve as patronage resources in interactions with politicians from higher government levels. A comparative game-theoretic analysis of the results suggests that coordination through political party identities has translated into alternative bargaining strategies and hence varying distributional outcomes regarding contracts and local public goods in the communities under review. The study concludes with recommendations for polycentric institutional design.
Key Words Bargaining  Social Dilemmas  South India  Local Public  Good Provision 
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6
ID:   188036


Bargaining toward Pareto-Efficiency: Relative Gains, Simultaneity and the Case of South Tyrol / Castelli, Emanuele   Journal Article
Castelli, Emanuele Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract Building on bargaining theory literature, I outline an original rationalist model that takes in consideration the problem of relative gains to explain why bargaining failures may lead to escalation in an open civil war and when negotiations in civil disputes are more likely to lead to Pareto-efficient solutions. I apply the model to the South Tyrol case, a relatively unknown identity-based dispute that emerged in Italy in the aftermath of the Second World War and was defused before it could produce a real escalation in violence. I show that direct and indirect compensations may help to overcome the problem of issue indivisibility, and that third-party intervention in domestic disputes may work as a functional substitute for simultaneity between the agreement and the enforcement phase.
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7
ID:   087767


Bargaining, fear, and denial: explaining violence against civilians in Iraq 2004-2007 / Boyle, Michael J   Journal Article
Boyle, Michael J Journal Article
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Publication 2009.
Summary/Abstract From mid-2004 to mid-2007, the Iraq war was distinguished from other comparable insurgencies by its high rates of civilian victimization. This has been attributed to a number of different factors, including the role of Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as the regional ambitions of Iran and Syria. Using an unpublished dataset of violence in Iraq from 2003-2008 from the Iraq Body Count (IBC), this paper argues that the violence against civilians is best understood as a combination of three interacting logics-bargaining, fear, and denial-that are predominantly local in character. First, armed Iraqi actors bargained through violence both across and within sectarian communities, and were driven by mechanisms of outbidding and outflanking to escalate their attacks on civilians. Second, the pervasive fear about the future of the Iraqi state encouraged the "localization" of violence in Iraq, particularly in the emergence of a security dilemma and the proliferation of criminal and tribal actors. Finally, Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq played the spoiler in Iraq, using mass-casualty attacks to generate fear among the population and deny U.S. efforts to build a functioning state. Only by addressing each of these three logics as part of its counter-insurgency strategy can the U.S. put an end to violence against civilians and develop the Iraqi state into a credible competitor for the loyalties of the population.
Key Words Terrorism  Violence  Iraq  Bargaining 
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8
ID:   103388


Bourgas–Alexandroupolis oil pipeline: will matching institutional and regulatory contexts lead to an effective bargaining and eventual consensus? / Menegaki, Angeliki N   Journal Article
Menegaki, Angeliki N Journal Article
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Publication 2011.
Summary/Abstract This paper employs Muthoo's bargaining principles/prerequisites for an effective bargaining result (Muthoo (2000). A Non-Technical Introduction to Bargaining Theory, World Economics 1(2): 145-166) to decide whether Greece and Bulgaria can form a successful energy coalition. Motivation for this is the proposed construction of the crude oil pipeline from the Bulgarian port Burgas to the Greek Aegean port of Alexandroupolis. The reason Turkey is the third country in the analysis despite its current non-membership in this venture, is that: (i) Turkey offers to host a competitive route of the pipeline, (ii) It is a transit, neighboring country to Greece forming an important geopolitical triangle together with Greece and Bulgaria and (iii) co-operates separately with Bulgaria and Greece in other energy pipelines. Therefore, the three countries engage to interwining energy and geopolitical futures. Whether B-A oil pipeline will be implemented or not, will be due to a mix of bargaining procedures. The paper shows that Muthoo's principles/prerequisites for an effective bargaining result, through their constituents (selected economy and energy figures and characteristics), are fulfilled by Greece and Bulgaria. A broader coalition with the inclusion of Turkey might also be permissible and promising based on this theory.
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9
ID:   100958


Choosing genocide: economic perspectives on the disturbing rationality of race murder / Anderton, Charles H   Journal Article
Anderton, Charles H Journal Article
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Publication 2010.
Summary/Abstract An economic theory of genocide is presented with application to Rwanda-1994. The theory considers 'macro' conditions under which an authority group chooses genocide and 'micro' conditions that facilitate the spread of genocide. From the macro perspective, a bargaining model highlights four rational explanations for an authority's choice of genocide: prevention of loss of power, indivisibility, elimination of a persistent rival, and political bias. From the micro perspective, an evolutionary game model shows how supporters of genocide gain the upper hand in group dynamics over resisters and bystanders. The theory and application suggest that the conditions for genocide are not exceptional.
Key Words Conflict  Game Theory  Race  Rwanda  Genocide  Bargaining 
Murder 
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10
ID:   144797


Circumstances, domestic audiences, and reputational incentives in international crisis bargaining / Debs, Alexandre; Weiss, Jessica Chen   Article
Debs, Alexandre Article
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Summary/Abstract We present a new theory of interstate crisis bargaining. A country’s resolve is a function of intrinsic qualities of the government and external circumstances, both of which are unknown by the domestic electorate and the foreign country. When domestic political debate reveals that circumstances favor the use of force, the government can extract better terms than if circumstances are revealed to be unfavorable. The revelation of circumstances, however, exacerbates reputational incentives. Because governments can no longer hide behind unknown circumstances, voters can better discern the government’s type from its actions, strengthening the incentives to appear resolved. The model bridges the gap between audience costs and its critiques, showing how domestic audiences punish leaders for inappropriate policies rather than empty threats. At the same time, it highlights how the prospects for peace are worse if uncertainty about the circumstances is removed, suggesting that greater transparency does not always promote peaceful outcomes.
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11
ID:   183147


Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining / Mahajan, Aseem; Kline, Reuben ; Tingley, Dustin   Journal Article
Tingley, Dustin Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.
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12
ID:   173897


Conditional effect of audiences on credibility / Hauenstein, Matthew   Journal Article
Hauenstein, Matthew Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract How do leaders signal their intentions during a crisis? Scholars point to audience costs, potential political punishment for bluffing during bargaining, to explain how accountable leaders communicate. However, the empirical support for audience costs is mixed. I argue that this apparent disconnect between theory and evidence is due to different ways that audiences can threaten to use their sanctioning power during a crisis. When determining whether to punish a leader for a failed coercive threat, their domestic supporters should balance concerns over consistency and policy outcomes. As such, accountable leaders’ ability to credibly communicate is not automatic, rather it depends on their supporters’ policy preferences. I apply this insight using casualty sensitivity as a conditioning policy preference. I expect, and find, that audiences only help a leader commit to fight when fighting is low-cost, and actually prevent commitment when fighting is high-cost. Using compellent threat data, I find that audiences have countervailing effects on credibility due to their preferences for leaders who are both consistent and avoid costly conflict. This conditional effect could explain prior mixed support for audience costs in observational data, as prior studies pool together instances where I find audiences have strong, but opposing, effects.
Key Words Bargaining  Audience Costs  Coercion 
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13
ID:   171010


Cooperative Procurement in Building National Defence: Why Are There So Few? / Kanniainen, Vesa; Lehtonen, Juha-Matti   Journal Article
Lehtonen, Juha-Matti Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract The economic benefits of cooperative procurement derive from, at minimum, increased bargaining power relative to contractors and from economies of scale in production. There is, however, a puzzle: why is this kind of procurement so rare? This paper introduces a bargaining model with forward-looking expectations about the scale of procurement. It is shown that the price sensitivity of the scale of acquisition is favourable for the buying partnership, as it tends to push down the bargaining price. We propose several explanations for why it is hard to align buyers’ incentives: First, preferences for the properties of the products are country-specific, with divergent implications for national security. Second, countries that place a low value on the product have more bargaining power than those that value it highly, and may require a side payment in order to enter a partnership, while the partner may not have sufficient incentives to make such a payment. Third, the gains from cooperative procurement for the producer may not be sufficient to compensate for conflicting preferences among contractors. Fourth, while the future unpredictability of technologies or the future risks of deteriorating national security might support longer-term cooperative procurement, short-term opportunism tends to prevent long-term commitments.
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14
ID:   113866


Cyberwar: a new 'absolute weapon'? the proliferation of cyberwarfare capabilities and interstate war / Liff, Adam P   Journal Article
Liff, Adam P Journal Article
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Publication 2012.
Summary/Abstract This article examines the implications of the proliferation of cyberwarfare capabilities for the character and frequency of war. Consideration of strategic logic, perceptions, and bargaining dynamics finds that the size of the effect of the proliferation of cyberwarfare capabilities on the frequency of war will probably be relatively small. This effect will not be constant across all situations; in some cases the advent of cyberwarfare capabilities may decrease the likelihood of war. On the other hand, the use of computer network attack as a brute force weapon will probably become increasingly frequent.
Key Words proliferation  Deterrence  Cyber War  Bargaining  Coercion  Cyber - Security 
Strategy 
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15
ID:   095373


Delegating differences: bilateral investment treaties and bargaining over dispute resolution provisions / Allee, Todd; Peinhardt, Clint   Journal Article
Allee, Todd Journal Article
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Publication 2010.
Summary/Abstract Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the dominant source of rules on foreign direct investment (FDI), yet these treaties vary significantly in at least one important respect: whether they allow investment disputes to be settled through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Through the compilation and careful coding of the text of nearly 1,500 treaties, we identify systematic variation in "legal delegation" to ICSID across BITs and explain this important variation by drawing upon a bargaining framework. Home governments prefer and typically obtain ICSID clauses in their BITs, particularly when internal forces push strongly for such provisions and when they have significantly greater bargaining power than the other signatory. Yet some home governments are less likely to insist upon ICSID clauses if they have historical or military ties with the other government. On the other hand, although host governments are often hostile toward ICSID clauses, particularly when sovereignty costs are high, they are more likely to consent to such clauses when they are heavily constrained by their dependence on the global economy. Our findings have significant implications for those interested in FDI, legalization, international institutions, and interstate bargaining.
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16
ID:   141975


Demanding the impossible: war, bargaining, and honor / Dolan, Thomas   Article
Dolan, Thomas Article
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Summary/Abstract This article shows that honor concerns can influence war initiation and termination decisions. When bargaining implicates status or commitments to in-group members, moral nationalists may experience dishonor—and with it emotions like shame and humiliation—when they have to make concessions. These honor costs are different from other costs because they can sometimes be vindicated through costly action. Including these costs in a basic, complete information bargaining model demonstrates that honor concerns can give rise to a “fight, then agree” equilibrium. These influences of honor on war initiation and termination are illustrated with case studies of British decisions in the 1982 Falklands War and French decisions during the 1940 invasion of France.
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17
ID:   152415


Democracy and war effort : an experiment / Bausch, Andrew W   Journal Article
Bausch, Andrew W Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract This article uses a laboratory experiment to explore how groups’ internal rules for leader selection affect how leaders select into and fight conflicts. The findings reveal that, counter to expectations, leaders of democratic groups were more likely than leaders of autocratic groups to select into a conflict rather than accept a negotiated settlement. Conditional on conflict occurring, democratic leaders did not mobilize more resources for war than autocratic leaders. However, democratic leaders were less likely to accept a settlement once a war was underway and they expended more effort in the last round of conflict, suggesting once they entered a war they fought for a decisive victory. Domestically, democratic leaders were punished for losing wars more often than autocratic leaders, while winning wars did not benefit democratic leaders significantly.
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18
ID:   121800


Democracy, civil liberties, and hostage-taking terrorism / Lee, Chia-yi   Journal Article
Lee, Chia-yi Journal Article
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Publication 2013.
Summary/Abstract While hostage-taking has been a common form of terrorism for decades, which types of governments are more prone to it remains unclear. Does democracy motivate terrorists to engage in hostage-taking acts because of how easy negotiating with a democratic government is? Or does democracy impose 'audience costs' on the government leaders, driving them never to negotiate with hostage-taking terrorists following the long-held principle of no negotiation? This article argues that hostage-taking terrorists are more inclined to target democratic governments because of the greater value given to human life and personal freedom in democracies. Additionally the helplessness of held hostages is more freely exposed by the media in democracies, which leads to the audience focusing on the hostages themselves rather than on the interests of the nation. This in turns compels decisionmakers to concede, especially near election time. It is only when institutional constraints on the executives are high that democratic leaders refuse to make concessions. Using data on hostage events from 1978 to 2005, this article finds strong evidence that supports this theory, showing that democracy has competing effects on hostage-taking terrorism - civil liberties and press freedom are positively associated with hostage-taking incidents, whereas executive constraints have a negative association.
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19
ID:   157550


Democratic peace and the wisdom of crowds / LeVeck, Brad L; Narang, Neil   Journal Article
Leveck, Brad L Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract This article proposes a new theory for the democratic peace that highlights a previously unexplored advantage enjoyed by democracies in crises. We argue that because democracies typically include a larger number of decision-makers in the foreign policy process, they will produce fewer decision-making errors in situations of crisis bargaining. Thus, bargaining among larger groups of diverse decision-makers will fail less often. In order to test our hypothesis, we use data from experiments in which subjects engage in ultimatum bargaining games. We compare the performance of individuals, small groups and foreign policy experts against the performance of larger groups of decision-makers. We find strong support for the idea that collective decision-making among larger groups of decision-makers decreases the likelihood of bargaining failure.
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20
ID:   168279


Devil’s Haircut: Investor–State Disputes over Debt Restructuring / DiGiuseppe, Matthew   Journal Article
Digiuseppe, Matthew Journal Article
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Summary/Abstract When do private creditors versus debtor states accept a greater burden in resolving sovereign debt crises? In this study, we argue that distributive politics helps explain the “haircut”—or losses—private creditors take in debt restructuring cases. Despite the expected convergence of partisan policies in a globalized economy, we argue that right and left leaders extract different settlements in debt negotiations. Left governments, representing constituents most likely to be hurt from higher debt repayment, credibly demonstrate more bargaining power and extract greater concessions from creditors. Distributive politics, however, is an indeterminate factor in explaining states entrance into debt negotiations. We use recently released data on the outcome of sovereign debt restructuring cases between states and private creditors from 1975 to 2013 to test our expectations. Results from a double-hurdle model indicate that creditors receive a larger haircut when negotiating with left governments.
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