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Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
080300
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Publication |
Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005.
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Description |
xv, 331p.
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Series |
BCSIA studies in international security
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Standard Number |
9780262572224
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
052982 | 300.722/GEO 052982 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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2 |
ID:
092045
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Publication |
Cambridge, MIT Press, 2005.
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Description |
xv, 331p.
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Series |
BCSIA studies in international security
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Standard Number |
9780262572224
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
054574 | 300.722/GEO 054574 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
152818
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Summary/Abstract |
How are some rebel leaders able to sustain violent collective action but others not? Most theories focus on leaders' use of selective incentives and efforts to lower their transaction costs and raise those of the government. We argue that a leader's ability to arouse emotions of anger, humiliation, and fear is also critical. Foreign leaders and former exiles typically lack the legitimacy and understanding of local politics necessary to incite such emotions. We test this argument in three case studies in Iraq between 2003 and 2011. In this period, the Sadrist Trend sustained violent collective action and gained lasting political power, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq failed to maintain its influence, and al-Qaeda in Iraq first gained and then lost its ability to mobilize violence.
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4 |
ID:
053969
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Publication |
Hampshire, macmillan Press, 1997.
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Description |
vi, 362p.
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Standard Number |
033366633X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
039184 | 355.031/BEN 039184 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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5 |
ID:
098790
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6 |
ID:
141966
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Summary/Abstract |
The articles in this collection constitute the third of four symposia on qualitative and multi-method research in the study of national and international security. The symposia are the product of two workshops held in the fall of 2013, the first at the American Political Science Association annual meeting in Chicago and the second at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs. The conveners and participants are convinced that it would benefit scholars of security studies to be aware of some of the recent developments and debates among methodologists concerning qualitative and multi-method research. Each symposium comprises a longer essay with the author's view of the state-of-the-art on the topic at hand, and three shorter essays—typically one on specific applications to security studies, another on relevance to foreign policy making, and a final one featuring critical reflections.
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7 |
ID:
147898
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Summary/Abstract |
The articles in this collection constitute Security Studies's fourth and final symposium on qualitative and multimethod research in the study of national and international security. The symposia are the product of two workshops held in the fall of 2013, the first at the American Political Science Association annual meeting in Chicago and the second at the University of Virginia's Miller Center of Public Affairs. The conveners and participants are convinced that it would benefit scholars of security studies to be aware of some of the recent developments and debates among methodologists concerning qualitative and multimethod research. Each symposium comprises a longer essay with the author's view of the state-of-the-art on the topic at hand and three shorter essays—typically one on specific applications to security studies, another on relevance to foreign policy making, and a final one featuring critical reflections.
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8 |
ID:
140398
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Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that applying the Bayesian logic of process tracing can improve intelligence estimates, appraisals of alternative policy options, and reassessments of whether policies are working as planned. It illustrates these points by demonstrating how more systematic use of this logic could have improved each of these three elements of policymaking regarding the 2003 US military intervention in Iraq.
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