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| 1 |
ID:
163592
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's irredentist claims cover an area so vast that it is already tantamount to a sphere of influence.
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| 2 |
ID:
172088
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| 3 |
ID:
055961
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| Publication |
2003.
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| Description |
p57-78
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| 4 |
ID:
054014
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| Publication |
Houndmills, macmillan Press, 1997.
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| Description |
viii, 183p.
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| Standard Number |
0333699858
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 039136 | 355.03305/ROY 039136 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
095998
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korean behaviour that appears intended to raise tensions with Pyongyang's adversaries is not only vexing but puzzling. The North Koreans periodically throw up obstacles to the economic cooperation their country desperately needs, including harassment of the joint North-South industrial zone in Kaesong. Pyongyang often speaks as if it welcomes a fight with the United States and South Korea, its strongest potential adversaries. With its second nuclear test in May 2009, Pyongyang clearly angered even its important partner China, a major supplier of such basic needs as food and energy. If fear of aggression by the United States and its allies is a principal driver of North Korean foreign policy, why do the North Koreans frequently risk providing the putatively aggressive Americans further motivation to attack? Some observers argue, for example, that transfer of nuclear material or technology is extremely unlikely because Pyongyang is deterred from crossing what is clearly a red line for the United States that would bring massive military retaliation. Yet North Korean officials have more than once threatened to cross that line, seemingly for the purpose of frightening the Americans by playing on one of their worst fears.
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| 6 |
ID:
145203
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The crisis over North Korea’s nuclear-weapons programme, now stretching into a third decade, is worsening. There seems little chance that North Korea will give up its arsenal absent a drastic change in circumstances. Pyongyang has repeatedly said its status as a nuclear-weapons state is permanent, even writing this into its constitution in 2012. In the minds of the North Korean people, elevating the country into the nuclear-weapons club is perhaps the greatest tangible accomplishment of the late Dear Leader, Kim Jong-il (father of current leader Kim Jong-un), as economic development foundered during his tenure. Hopes that Pyongyang might have considered its nuclear-weapons programme as a bargaining chip to be traded away for improved relations with its adversaries have largely faded.
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| 7 |
ID:
062320
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Description |
p191-214
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent anti-Japanese disturbances in China remind us that the two countries are locked in a difficult relationship, with heavy historical baggage. Although there are glimmers of Chinese ‘new thinking’ about Japan, the history issue, deep societal antipathy and substantial strategic divergences keep the political relationship from progressing the way the bilateral economic relationship has grown. Japan is not likely to re-emerge as a great power or discontinue its alliance with the United States, despite the steady expansion of the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Japan–China tensions therefore simmer on, with the risk that a crisis over Taiwan or some other issue will plunge the East Asian giants into a cold war.
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| 8 |
ID:
065493
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| 9 |
ID:
065581
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