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| 1 |
ID:
061681
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| 2 |
ID:
062305
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| Publication |
Winter 2004-05.
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| 3 |
ID:
138701
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| Summary/Abstract |
Was the battle of Midway won or lost? In a recent edition of the Naval War College
Review, James Levy grappled with some of the recurrent issues found in the scholarship of the battle of Midway, all of them related to the question whether one or another aspect of the Japanese way of war led to a catastrophic defeat at the hands of the U.S. Navy.
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| 4 |
ID:
132556
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article examines the reorientation of the defense policy of the United States, initiated during the Bush and Obama Administrations, toward giving increased priority to the Asia Pacific region. It begins with the historical perspective of the development of American naval power in the twentieth century. The world wars, in which Europe represented the primary theater of conflict, had the effect of shifting a greater share of American military assets toward the Euro-Atlantic theatre, while the onset of the Cold War after 1945 required the United States to develop a navy of truly global strategic reach in which Atlantic and Pacific commitments were kept in balance. With the diminished concern for European security since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a Strategic Competitor in the Asia Pacific region, the United States is required in an age of defense austerity to refocus attention again to the Pacific.
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| 5 |
ID:
051114
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| Publication |
New York, Garland Publishing, Inc, 1999.
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| Description |
xviii, 372p.
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| Standard Number |
0815327919
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 043526 | 355.03304/HOD 043526 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
097093
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| 7 |
ID:
085133
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Theodore Roosevelt's most enduring contribution to American power and influence in the world was in the promotion and construction of a blue water navy. Although much has been written about Roosevelt's notion of a uniquely American imperial vocation, as well as of his social Darwinist conception of Great Power competition, the priority he awarded to American naval power was based above all on a dispassionate and pessimistic interpretation of the direction of international affairs between 1890 and 1909. Bracketed by the inauguration of German Weltpolitik on the one hand and the Japanese naval triumph at Tsushima on the other, Roosevelt's naval policy was not the product of a romantic imperial imagination but rather of a wholly objective appreciation of the most fundamental imperative of American national security for the near and distant future.
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