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| 1 |
ID:
057728
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2004.
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| Description |
xxiv, 129p.
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| Standard Number |
0833036408
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 048925 | 958.1047/OLI 048925 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
070262
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2002.
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| Description |
xv, 136p.
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| Standard Number |
0833030957
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046138 | 947.086/OLI 046138 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
067313
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2003.
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| Description |
xxvii, 379p.
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| Standard Number |
0833032607
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046572 | 355.033058/OLI 046572 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
054036
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2003.
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| Description |
xxvii, 379p.
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| Standard Number |
0833032607
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046584 | 355.033058/OLI 046584 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
069575
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2002.
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| Description |
xxx, 121p.
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| Standard Number |
833029592
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 046135 | 358.413570973/SHL 046135 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
162361
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| 7 |
ID:
150980
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although Russia is a contributor to and beneficiary of the current illiberal surge, its causes lie within democratic countries, and solutions must be found at home.
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| 8 |
ID:
149559
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| Summary/Abstract |
When Russia intervenes, according to analyst Olga Oliker, the result is not the respect that Moscow seeks but a reputation for unpredictability. A policy of anti-American opportunism renders many of the Kremlin’s relationships transactional and fleeting. Oliker argues that until Russia develops a more intentional foreign policy, the country’s direct influence won’t extend beyond its neighborhood.
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| 9 |
ID:
058164
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2001.
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| Description |
xxv, 102p.
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| Standard Number |
0833029983
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045177 | 947.086/OLI 045177 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
172893
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| Summary/Abstract |
At a time of technological and political change in the international security environment, Russia continues to view nuclear weapons as guarantors of peace and security among great powers. Nuclear weapons also assure Russia's own great-power status and mitigate uncertainty in an emerging multipolar order. In a world where the United States pursues improved missile defense capabilities and appears to reject mutual vulnerability as a stabilizing factor, Moscow views its modernized nuclear arsenal as essential to deter Washington from a possible attack on Russia or coercive threats against it. Some elites in Russia would like to preserve existing arms control arrangements or negotiate new ones to mitigate a weakening infrastructure of strategic stability. At the same time, however, they seem skeptical that the United States is willing to compromise or deal with Russia as an equal. Meanwhile, multilateral arms control appears to be too complex a proposition for the time being.
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| 11 |
ID:
154181
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| Summary/Abstract |
Prospects for U.S.-Russian arms control look dim. Even extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which is due to expire in February 2021, is in question. If the treaty reaches its end date with nothing to take its place, there will be no mutually agreed, verifiable limitations on strategic nuclear systems between the two countries whose arsenals make up more than 90 percent of the global total.
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| 12 |
ID:
156412
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| Summary/Abstract |
Prospects for U.S.-Russian arms control look dim. Even extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which is due to expire in February 2021, is in question. If the treaty reaches its end date with nothing to take its place, there will be no mutually agreed, verifiable limitations on strategic nuclear systems between the two countries whose arsenals make up more than 90 percent of the global total.
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