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ID:
151426
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| Summary/Abstract |
A key organizational challenge for all modern militaries is instituting an effective command-and-control (C2) structure for joint operations. China has been a relative latecomer to joint operations, with a persistent weakness in joint C2. Reforms launched in early 2016 sought to overcome this challenge by establishing a permanent two-level joint C2 structure. Although not a ‘tipping point’ that will lead ineluctably to stronger operational effectiveness, this reform is nonetheless an important milestone in an evolutionary process towards better PLA joint operations. The result could be added operational challenges for several of China’s neighbors and the United States.
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| 2 |
ID:
124031
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Bedrock leadership principles aren't passes, but today's navy officers needs an eclectic mix of abilities to succeed.
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| 3 |
ID:
130341
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| 4 |
ID:
005289
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| Publication |
Fairbairn, Air Power Studies Centre, 1995.
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| Description |
25p.
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| Series |
Air Power Studies Centre;28
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| Standard Number |
0-642-22501-X
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 036480 | 355.330410994/WAT 036480 | Main | Withdrawn | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
179966
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| 6 |
ID:
073094
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| 7 |
ID:
148216
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is halfway through a multi-decade modernization process. It has begun a major restructuring effort as it shifts its focus from a traditional continental defensive posture to a more maritime-oriented emphasis. In order to create more balanced joint force, it has adjusted the structure of its highest command organization, the Central Military Commission; abolished the former four General Departments and seven Military Regions; created five new joint Theater Commands and service-level commands for the Army and Rocket Force; and is reducing the size of its active duty force by 300,000 personnel. While seeking to overcome numerous internal obstacles, the PLA continues to develop and improve its capabilities to conduct integrated joint operations to deter a variety of threats to China’s sovereignty and territory and, if deterrence fails, to win informationized local war.
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| 8 |
ID:
121976
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| 9 |
ID:
070617
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| 10 |
ID:
130346
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| 11 |
ID:
110516
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has since the late 1990s been engaged in an ambitious, concerted, and methodical transformation. As a result, the PLA has noticeably improved its capabilities in several specific areas - particularly missile attack, precision-strike, power projection at sea and in the air, and joint operations. In particular, it has made significant advances in exploiting "informatisation" when it comes to developing advanced weaponry, accelerating the pace of military modernisation, and creating new levers of military power for the PLA. While Chinese military power may still pale in comparison to the US armed forces, the strength of the PLA relative to its likely local competitors in the Asia-Pacific region, such as Taiwan and Japan, has grown significantly, and will likely continue to grow over the next ten to 20 years. As a result, China is definitely gaining an edge over other regional militaries in the Asia-Pacific region.
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| 12 |
ID:
177816
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| Summary/Abstract |
A slew of structural changes to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) combat capabilities, deterrence as well as military operations other than war (MOOTW) were enacted following the announcement to streamline China’s armed forces in September 2015. Primarily driven by the Chinese military leadership’s desire to resolve longstanding shortcomings in the PLA’s ability to conduct combined arms and joint operations, unprecedented changes in the form of so-called ‘below the neck’ reforms gathered pace since the end of 2016. By focusing on those changes to the PLA’s established service branches as well as ‘new types’ of forces, this brief introduction will provide a summary of the prospects and problems as the Chinese military embarks on its latest endeavour to modernize itself.
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| 13 |
ID:
158150
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) face continuing challenges concerning joint operations of military services (e.g. air and ground forces) since, as in other militaries, the existence of separate service cultures creates operational difficulties. This article analyses in-depth interviews with commanders from the IDF’s air and ground forces. Its findings reinforce the ‘polarisation assumption’ of ‘us’ (the in-group) and ‘them’ (the out-group) that challenges successful cooperation, reflecting differences in the scripts of expectations and modes of action underlying perceptions of successful joint operations. These scripts create assumptions that are manifestations of a deep-rooted service culture. Such assumptions also have an effect on combat motivation as certain scenarios lead towards greater risk-taking in concrete operational situations. Cooperation between the Israeli Air Force and Special Forces is far more successful and smooth. The analysis of the success of joint operations can aid the armed forces in bridging differences and improving cooperation.
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| 14 |
ID:
057380
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