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| 1 |
ID:
119450
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Libya's relationship with sub-Saharan Africa has been complex, troubled and misunderstood, both during the rule of the late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the conflict that culminated in his overthrow and death. The Libyan conflict of 2011 divided Africa, but nonetheless the African Union (AU) was able to agree on a political strategy aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement and power transition.
The AU's peace initiative was launched in March 2011 and, contrary to widespread perception that the AU sought to prop up Gaddafi, it offered a credible and balanced option of a negotiated solution. United Nations Security Council resolution 1973 expressed support for the initiative, but in the event France, Britain and the United States blocked its chances of success.
This article draws on evidence and analysis provided by the AU officials involved. It details the process whereby the AU adopted and implemented its decisions, and describes the AU's diplomatic engagement with Gaddafi and the National Transitional Council. The article also draws on information provided by Sudanese military and intelligence officials, providing an account, hitherto untold, of how the Sudanese government supported the Libyan opposition with military supplies, training and intelligence, in tacit cooperation with NATO countries.
The article concludes with reflections on how the Libyan conflict has had an impact on the doctrine of the 'responsibility to protect', on the AU, and on Libya's relations with Africa.
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| 2 |
ID:
069385
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| 3 |
ID:
119116
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The African Union's new offices in Addis Ababa stand upon the site of the city's former central prison, known as Alem Bekagn, where thousands of people suffered and died. This article traces the history of the prison and examines efforts to create a memorial at the site. These initiatives illustrate the African Union (AU) in transition. They echo AU commitments to act against atrocities and in support of rights and justice and suggest a distinct vision of pan-African community and a corresponding institutional culture. But, much like the AU itself, the meaning of the planned memorial is ambivalent and contested. The fact that the AU bulldozed Ethiopia's most notorious prison in order to establish its new offices and a conference hall is richly symbolic of 'buried memory' - the tendency of post-colonial elites to suppress the memory of victims of state violence while celebrating chosen heroes. The AU still venerates leaders and is quiet about current violations, but the organization's promise and process to remember the ordinary victims of state violence indicate a political opening and may contribute a novel space for the recounting of human rights abuses.
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| 4 |
ID:
067564
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| Publication |
London, Zed Books, 2005.
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| Description |
xiv, 152p.
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| Standard Number |
1842776967
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 050587 | 962.7043/FLI 050587 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
054202
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| Publication |
London, Hurst and Company, 2004.
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| Description |
xiii, 279p.
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| Standard Number |
1850657319
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 048708 | 297.272096/WAA 048708 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
154379
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper examines how contests over military control were played out during peace negotiations and in the implementation of agreements (including the manipulation or violation of the terms of agreements) in Sudan between 2002 and 2011. The cases examined are the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, the Darfur peace talks which took place from 2003 to 2011, and the post-referendum arrangements talks of 2011. The central arguments presented are as follows: the principal political players consistently sought control over the military as a main component of their political strategies; senior military officers posed a threat to the power of nominally civilian leaders; security arrangements were determined by a combination of the leaders’ calculations over their internal power base along with their expectations of ongoing or anticipated armed conflicts; and external programmes and policies for security sector reform were manipulated and instrumentalised in pursuit of these power goals.
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| 7 |
ID:
138406
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| Summary/Abstract |
When they celebrated independence on July 9, 2011, the people of South Sudan hoped that the fundamental problems that had doomed the united nation of Sudan over the previous 55 years had finally been resolved. At long last, as citizens of their own independent sovereign nation, South Sudanese would no longer be a minority subject to racial and religious discrimination, and robbed of their immense natural resources—water, farmland, and oil—by northern compatriots, who often bore a greater resemblance to colonizers than fellow citizens.
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| 8 |
ID:
066794
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| 9 |
ID:
133102
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
South Sudan obtained independence in July 2011 as a kleptocracy - a militarized, corrupt neo-patrimonial system of governance. By the time of independence, the South Sudanese "political marketplace" was so expensive that the country's comparatively copious revenue was consumed by the military-political patronage system, with almost nothing left for public services, development or institution building. The efforts of national technocrats and foreign donors produced bubbles of institutional integrity but the system as a whole was entirely resistant to reform. The January 2012 shutdown of oil production bankrupted the system. Even an experienced and talented political business manager would have struggled, and President Salva Kiir did not display the required skills. No sooner had shots been fired than the compact holding the SPLA together fell apart and civil war ensued. Drawing upon long-term observation of elite politics in South Sudan, this article explains both the roots of kleptocratic government and its dire consequences.
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| 10 |
ID:
062030
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