| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
142904
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The International Spectator published my article in 2000. As the title clearly suggests, the aim was to consider how the phenomenon of Kosovo affected Russia’s foreign policy. My present comments focus exactly upon this theme. They pretend to address neither the overall issue of Russia’s international behaviour nor the situation in the Balkans, and even less the policy of the West therein. They only represent a modest attempt to draw the line between what happened fifteen years ago and what is taking place nowadays – in terms of Russia-related aspects of international developments.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
142903
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The article analyses Russia’s perceptions of, and attitudes to the developments in and around Kosovo, as well as their implications for Russia’s foreign and security policy-thinking and policy-making. It is argued that the Kosovo crisis has influenced Russia’s ideas on its relations with the outside world in a more fundamental way than any other event during the last decade. Russia’s policy during the crisis and Russia’s involvement in the crisis management are considered. The ongoing reassessment of Russia’s national interests in the light of the Kosovo crisis might have a significant impact on the major lines of Russia’s foreign and security policy, especially with respect to such issues as the role of military factors and the use of force. In particular, there may be substantive links between the case of Kosovo and the war in Chechnya. However, although comments in Russia about the performance of NATO-led conflict settlement in Kosovo are becoming increasingly sceptical, the issue seems to be overshadowed by new foreign policy lines associated with the change in the political leadership in Moscow.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
146681
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Russia’s predominantly suspicious and even negative attitudes toward R2P are closely related to its traditional attachment to the notion of sovereignty, but its reluctance to ‘bless’ the use of force with R2P also serves as a pretext to cover various instrumental goals. Russia’s more assertive foreign policy has exacerbated this trend. Disagreements stem from differences between Russia and the West both in their conceptual approaches to security and in their assessments of specific cases. In particular, Russia has an existential concern over possible application of R2P by extra-regional actors in its immediate post-Soviet vicinity. However, in the conflicts around South Ossetia (2008) and Crimea / Southeastern Ukraine (2014-), there was a noticeable trend to refocus R2P-related arguments in support of Russia’s own actions. By and large, R2P continues to be perceived as a Western attempt to establish certain rules of behaviour which require caution and prudence. Nevertheless, more positive attitudes do not seem impossible. To play a prominent role in the evolving international system, Russia will have to make the R2P segment of its foreign policy more salient and overcome the lag in promoting this concept as a working tool indispensable for cooperative and responsible leadership.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
096956
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
018774
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
Spring 2001.
|
| Description |
19-25
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|