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| 1 |
ID:
164608
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article posits that most postcommunist members of NATO and key partners continue the practice of using communist concepts of command at the national level of governance. These concepts include the hyper-centralization of decision making, collective decision making, and of most concern, unclear chains of command and alignment of authority with responsibility. Combined, these concepts have the potential for inhibiting the timely and clear command of a nation's armed forces, let alone their effective assimilation into the alliance's integrated command structure. Such an eventuality has clearly negative implications for the alliance generally, but these weaknesses also could have the unexpected consequence of compromising “new” allies' national sovereignty in crisis and war.
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| 2 |
ID:
147809
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article posits four key challenges to address the question as to why logistics reform in Communist-legacy defense institutions has been so slow. First, what is the conceptual foundation for logistics in these countries? Second, what is the general state of national logistics capabilities in these countries? Third, why has the reform of logistics in these post-Communist legacy defense institutions been so slow and superficial? Fourth, in an attempt to understand the problem better, what do legacy defense institutions need to do themselves in order to be able to adopt modern Western logistics concepts? Conversely, what do donor nations need to understand about these legacy logistics organizations the better to enable them to understand the immense gap that divides Communist from Western logistics concepts? In addressing these questions, the author will argue two points. First, logistics reform has been impeded to date by a lack of appreciation on the part of particularly Western officials that legacy logistics concepts could not be more antithetical to their Western counterparts. Second, reform of legacy logistics organizations will not follow from attention and resources directed at tactical-level formations and importing the expeditionary logistics concept. Rather, the causation of the continued inability to adopt Western logistics concepts can be found in national-level policy, financing, laws, and regulations that continue to enable the operation of legacy concepts.
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| 3 |
ID:
161360
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| Summary/Abstract |
By any objective measure, defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe have all but universally been incapable of producing viable defense plans that are based on objective costing and operational planning data. This situation exists in spite the provision of considerable Western advice and assistance, let alone reporting to and receiving assessments by NATO’s International Staff under Partnership for Peace, as well as via the integrated defense planning and reporting systems. An explanation for this systematic failure across European post-Communist defense institutions can be found in the continued slow development of an over-arching policy framework which directs and approves all activities of the armed forces, as well as the de-centralization of financial decision-making down to capability providers. The essay ends with an examination of the adverse effects of the early introduction of planning programming, budgeting system (PPBS), have had on the development of effective policy and planning capabilities within these defense institutions.
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| 4 |
ID:
148978
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US has exported versions of the Department of Defense’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) to almost all the legacy defence organisations of former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe to enable them to plan and create modern financial management systems. Thomas-Durell Young traces how these efforts have largely failed to produce viable defence plans, and argues that only by strengthening the influence of policy over programming will this be possible.
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| 5 |
ID:
160995
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| Summary/Abstract |
Using two recently published essays by the current writer that assesses the dismal record of performance of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in enabling communist legacy defence institutions in Central and Eastern Europe to develop viable defence plans, this essay argues the need for deep reforms in the region’s defence institutions. To guide this reform effort, pragmatic solutions are suggested to improve the ability of these organisations to produce viable defence plans. Recommended reforms are: (1) conduct conceptual and cultural “audits,” (2) make operational and financial data central to decision-making, (3) change current organisational sociology, (4) examine planning methods and practices, and (5) stress the need to adopt policy frameworks to drive the operation of defence institutions.
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| 6 |
ID:
054350
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| Publication |
Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2004.
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| Description |
xxiv, 100p.
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| Standard Number |
0833035762
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 048781 | 355.0310973/SZA 048781 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
165395
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines why readiness has not been accepted as a critical element of defence governance by defence institutions in Central and Eastern Europe. Thomas-Durell Young presents a survey of known instances of readiness under-performance, based on an analysis of publicly available information, to create a macro view of the problem, grouped by services across the region to facilitate comparability. He highlights cases of success and identifies the factors which contributed to such outcomes to learn lessons which can be replicated elsewhere. Finally, in order to provide a degree of continuity and context, the Slovenian armed forces are examined in each category.
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| 8 |
ID:
149014
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| Summary/Abstract |
Traditionally, policy and planning have been institutionally weak in the Naval Staff (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations – OPNAV). In their place, the N8 (Programming) has dominated resource decision-making, and, by default, decisions relating to policy and planning. Recent uncertainty over defense authorization and appropriations has resulted in calls for a greater role to be played by the N3/5, Policy and Plans Directorate. The article argues that reform of the Department of the Navy’s planning process is urgently needed. OPNAV’s weak planning and overly dominant programming practices are compared with those of the Departments of the Army and Air Force and are shown to be out of conformance with them. The article concludes with specific and detailed recommendations for reform of both the current planning and programming processes.
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