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ID:
020925
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| Publication |
Nov 2001.
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| Description |
445-451
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| Summary/Abstract |
The University of Queensland's School of Political Science and International Studies organised a round table in Canberra on 27 June 2001 that brought together a select group of government policy-makers and academic specialists to discuss the issue of ballistic missile defence (BMD). The round table provided useful insights into Australian thinking on the issue. This report seeks to summarise the essence of those discussions in order to contribute to the broader national debate.
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| 2 |
ID:
123986
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article aims to explore the credibility of future US extended nuclear assurance in Asia.
Extended nuclear assurance, all too frequently confused with extended nuclear deterrence, faces a daunting series of challenges: a US strategic mainstream fractured on the roles and purposes of nuclear weapons; an Asia where assurance demands are high during a period of strategic uncertainty; and a US theatre- and tactical-range nuclear arsenal much depleted from its heyday. Meanwhile, nuclear latency is growing in Asia as more countries reach the technological level that the US attained in 1945, as nuclear skill sets become more prevalent, and as delivery vehicles appropriate to nuclear weapons become more typical in regional arsenals.
The US now provides extended nuclear assurance to nearly 40 countries worldwide, agreeing to run nuclear risks on behalf of its allies and friends. The bulk of those assurances derive from the NATO alliance, but it is the non-NATO-related assurances - and settings - that seem likely to be the more controversial ones over the next decade or two. Asia is coming into its own at a time when extended nuclear assurance needs reinvigoration as a key ingredient in US strategic policy.
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| 3 |
ID:
060805
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| 4 |
ID:
066708
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| 5 |
ID:
098170
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that, over the decades, Australians have held three different, coherent, long-lived 'visions' of nuclear weapons and strategy. Those visions-which we have labelled Menzian, Gortonian and disarmer-compete on four grounds: the role that nuclear weapons play in international order; the doctrine of deterrence; the importance of arms control; and the relevance of nuclear weapons to Australia's specific needs. We believe this 'textured' framework provides a richer, more satisfying, and more accurate understanding of Australian nuclear identity, both past and present, than previous scholarship has yielded. Moreover, the competition between the three visions might not be at an end. Changes in international norms, in proliferation rates, in regional strategic dynamics, or even in the deterrence doctrines of the major powers could easily reawaken some old, enduring debates. Australian nuclear identity faces an uncertain future.
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