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| 1 |
ID:
017942
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| Publication |
Fall 2000.
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| Description |
87-123
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| 2 |
ID:
152414
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| Summary/Abstract |
We study the factors that influence citizen support for defense spending in fourteen democracies over the period 2004–2013. We pose two research questions. First, what factors influence citizen support for war and military force? We refer to this as the acceptability of war. Second, in addition to the acceptability of war, what other factors affect support for defense spending? Our principal finding is that citizen acceptance of war and support for defense spending are most influenced by basic beliefs and values. Gender also has a strong negative influence on attitudes toward war and thus indirectly lowers support for defense spending among women. Attitudes toward war and defense spending are also sometimes influenced by short-term threats and by alliance considerations, but the effects are not as substantively meaningful. We conclude with a summary of the results and a discussion of the implications for theory and policy.
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| 3 |
ID:
158410
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| Summary/Abstract |
What is the nature of the strategic game that states play during crises? Extensive research examines the leading answer: coercive bargaining. States prevail by signaling resolve, establishing the credibility of their threats, and coercing their adversaries into backing down. However, instead of (or in addition to) traditional coercive bargaining, this article shows that states frequently play out a different game with its own set of rules and tactics. The article explores how states outmaneuver their adversaries: working around their red lines, taking gains by fait accompli and imposing pressure where it is possible to do so without quite crossing the line of unambiguously using force. Based on this premise, the article develops a theoretical framework for understanding strategic interaction during crises, referred to as advancing without attacking, and shows that it best explains the course of the Berlin Blockade Crisis of 1948–49 while also shedding light on other prominent crises.
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| 4 |
ID:
020144
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| Publication |
Autumn 2001.
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| Description |
81-93
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| 5 |
ID:
081385
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
German strategic decision-makers have to reconsider their approach to the use of force. In Afghanistan, the Bundeswehr is faced with the challenge of a growing insurgency. This situation requires a willingness to provide combat forces for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force. Hence, the conviction in German domestic politics that the Bundeswehr should only be employed for the purposes of stabilization and reconstruction is increasingly challenged by a changing operational reality in Afghanistan, and allies' reluctance to continue to accept German policy. In essence, the issue is about German participation in counterinsurgency operations. To continue current policy undermines Germany's military credibility among allied partners and restrains Germany's ability to utilize fully military power as an instrument of policy. This article argues that while military force in recent years has become an integral part of German foreign policy to pursue national interests, political decision-makers in Berlin and the broader German public will still have to come to terms with the reality of a new security environment in Afghanistan. For the German government the 'small war' in northern Afghanistan is a very politically exhausting undertaking. Both politically and militarily Germany seems ill-prepared to sustain such an operation. Its political and strategic culture still promotes an aversion to involvement in war-fighting. In addition, the government and the Bundeswehr lack vital strategy-making capabilities. Still, there are indicators that the changing operational reality in Afghanistan might lead to a significant evolution of the German approach to the use of force
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| 6 |
ID:
055640
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| 7 |
ID:
022428
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| Publication |
Sept-Oct 2002.
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| Description |
44-60
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| 8 |
ID:
062314
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Description |
p57-86
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| Summary/Abstract |
The manner in which and the reasons for which the United States went to war against Iraq in 2003 do not represent a radical departure from the past. American history shows that the United States has had a strong propensity to become involved in unnecessary wars. These wars share some common characteristics: they were justified in the name of America’s presumed historical mission; they were entered into on the basis of false premises; a relatively small ‘war party’ was indispensable to the decision to go to war; the two-party democratic competition frequently acted as a stimulus to military action; the wars exhibit a kind of ‘law of unintended consequences’
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| 9 |
ID:
022490
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| Publication |
Aug 2002.
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| Description |
572-596
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| 10 |
ID:
169334
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| Summary/Abstract |
Armed conflict in outer space could happen in two scenarios: first, a state may rely on relevant data obtained from the satellites to strengthen the effectiveness of its military action and second, a state may use either space-based or ground-based space weapons to attack a military target. Legally speaking, the above two scenarios constitute the use of force as defined in international law rules. From jurisprudential point of view, the extension of the right to self-defense to armed conflict in outer space provides a potential legitimate basis for the use of force in outer space, which is indirectly confirmed in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. In view of the potentially serious consequences arising from armed conflicts in outer space, general principles and rules in international humanitarian law (including the limitation principle, the distinction principle, and the proportionality principle), together with the soft law rules and draft conventions arising from the ongoing regulatory efforts, shall provide a basic regulatory framework for armed conflict in outer space.
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| 11 |
ID:
052897
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| 12 |
ID:
054610
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| 13 |
ID:
077884
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| Publication |
2007.
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| Summary/Abstract |
International norms are influential when they are seen as legitimate, and recent American behaviour may undermine the legitimacy of norms on the use of force. I examine three kinds of legitimacy crisis that might arise from American revisionism. First, the US threatens to delegitimate the norms that it challenges, particularly on military preemption. Second, it threatens to undermine its own influence by disassociating American power from one source of legitimation. Finally, it may negate the basic idea of American hegemony as that term is understood in constructivist scholarship and so transform the structure of the international system. Any of these might lead to a crisis, though of different kinds. The American challenge to the customary law on preemption threatens to delegitimize both the existing norms and the social basis of US power, while also attempting to legitimize American interests and new understandings of the norms. It therefore shows the productive and destructive aspects of the power of legitimation in world politics. Legitimation is the link between states and the normative structures of international society
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| 14 |
ID:
055485
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| Publication |
2003.
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| Description |
p57-71
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| 15 |
ID:
172106
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Emerging powers from the global south have generally opposed the use of force in international politics. However, taking a closer look at the area of peacekeeping, the international community’s most institutionalized response to international insecurity, it is clear that the global south has been actively engaged in what has been described as peacekeeping’s coercive turn: the increasingly greater use of force. Building on the cases of Brazil and Indonesia, we argue that the peacekeeping policies of these emerging powers have been inconsistent with their declared reticence to use force. We explain the inconsistency by reference to knowledge imbalances between civilian and military actors, a gap in peacekeeping expertise and involvement in policy-making that allowed the armed forces to push the two countries into increasingly coercive peacekeeping. Moreover, civil–military knowledge imbalances prevented the emergence of alternative ideas more in line with Brazil’s and Indonesia’s traditional stance on the use of force.
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| 16 |
ID:
053734
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| 17 |
ID:
074399
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| 18 |
ID:
111154
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explains the heightened aggressiveness that North Korea has shown since late 2009. It argues that a combination of militarism and frustration amplified by precarious leadership transition caused Pyongyang's astonishing belligerence. Simultaneously, it calls into question common alternative accounts pointing to either excessive or insufficient engagement or a presumably uncontrolled military as the primary cause for North Korean hostility. In addition, the article argues that North Korean aggressiveness is channelled towards South Korea (rather than the United States) and particularly its western maritime frontier, because there are especially acute grievances in that region and safer grounds for implementing militaristic policy.
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| 19 |
ID:
153661
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article is concerned with the role of perceived policy objectives in German citizens’ attitude formation toward military action in Afghanistan. While some scholars have claimed that public opinion is prudent because citizens assess the effectiveness of a mission on the basis of these perceptions, micro-level tests of this kind of prudence remain scare. Drawing on two cross-sectional surveys of the German population conducted in 2008 and 2009, we use responses to open-ended questions about the German government’s policy goals in Afghanistan to analyze whether such perceptions influenced support and whether any such influence was mediated via the perceived effectiveness of the mission. The results indicate that, irrespective of the level of political awareness, it was virtually irrelevant what German citizens perceived the military mission’s objectives to be. In contrast, value-based attitude formation emerges as more important, with the foreign policy predispositions antimilitarism and Atlanticism exhibiting especially large effects.
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| 20 |
ID:
163453
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| Summary/Abstract |
In contrast to the expansive literature on military casualties and support for war, we know very little about public reactions to foreign civilian casualties. This article, based on representative sample surveys in the United States and Britain, reports four survey experiments weaving information about civilian casualties into vignettes about Western military action. These produce consistent evidence of civilian casualty aversion: where death tolls were higher, support for force was invariably and significantly lower. Casualty effects were moderate in size but robust across our two cases and across different scenarios. They were also strikingly resistant to moderation by other factors manipulated in the experiments, such as the framing of casualties or their religious affiliation. The importance of numbers over even strongly humanizing frames points toward a utilitarian rather than a social psychological model of casualty aversion. Either way, civilian casualties deserve a more prominent place in the literature on public support for war.
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