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| 1 |
ID:
188665
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| Summary/Abstract |
The rise of China and how other countries respond to China’s rising is widely studied. But little has been done on how other countries reacted to the rise of China throughout history and how China strategically interacted with them. The conventional wisdom holds East Asian international relations did not operate in the Westphalian way and China’s rising in history did not trigger regional balancing actions. In this article, we challenge that view. We argue East Asian international relations were not exceptional to basic rules of the Westphalian system. Each time China rose up, it triggered balancing actions from neighboring regimes, including nomadic empires and settled kingdoms. The neighboring regimes would accommodate China only after they were defeated by China or pro-China regimes propped up in these countries. The Chinese hegemony in East Asian history could not be taken for granted. Over last 2,000 plus years, only during three periods of time (the Qin-Han 秦汉, Sui-Tang 隋唐, and Ming-Qing 明清 dynasties) China could successfully overpower regional resistance and enjoyed a stable tributary relationship with neighboring states. In the rest of time, the Chinese state could not retain hegemony in East Asia.
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| 2 |
ID:
177307
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Revisionism is an important concept in international relations discourse, and it is especially prevalent in discussions about relations between China and the United States in the context of a possible power transition. Yet, this concept has until recently not received the systematic research attention that it deserves. We present in this essay different strategies that a revisionist state may pursue. It builds on recent scholarship by other colleagues and is drawn from a larger project of ours to study revisionism historically and develop it conceptually. We argue that military conquest and subversion—or in our terminology, hard revisionism—have become less likely in today’s world compared to the past. Instead, different approaches of soft revisionism intended to advance institutional changes should be given more attention. We provide a typology of these soft revisionist strategies and offer examples from recent Chinese and US conduct to illustrate them.
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| 3 |
ID:
001529
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| Publication |
New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1995.
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| Description |
x, 279p.
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| Standard Number |
1560007907
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041135 | 355.825119/HOP 041135 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
160777
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| Summary/Abstract |
Donald Trump's election was a surprise to almost everyone all over the world. His presidency so far has been full of surprises and uncertainties as well. Although he has developed a good personal relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Trump is still in search of a viable and coherent China policy. The U.S.-China policy and interactions between the U.S. and China are closely connected to the prospects of cross-Strait relations. The United States and China have different views on the current "cold peace" or stalemate across the Taiwan Strait, but they have shared an interest in avoiding conflict and maintaining peace and stability in cross-Strait relations. Neither President Trump nor President Xi wants to push the Taiwan issue to the top priority in U.S.-China bilateral relations. The Trump administration, unlike the Obama administration, has yet to articulate a clear regional strategy of hedging and balancing against China. It has no interest in pushing Taipei and Beijing to the negotiation table either. It is also unlikely that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will come up with a new defining formula for the relationship, which is close to the "1992 Consensus," during the Tsai Ing-wen administration. If U.S.-China relations do not sour drastically under Donald Trump, cross-Strait relations will continue as a "cold peace" for the coming years.
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| 5 |
ID:
174402
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| Summary/Abstract |
China is and will remain the most important great-power rival for the United States in the 21st century. The Trump administration has adopted a whole-of-government approach to compete with China. Washington is taking tough measures confronting China's challenges to the US economic interests, values, and security. The Indo-Pacific region is a key area where US-China strategic competition takes place. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) is a core competitive instrument for Washington to contain China's rising power and influence among those countries along the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The articles in this special section examine the changing parameters of the US-China relationship and how Beijing responds to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy.
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| 6 |
ID:
174403
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US-China relationship defines geopolitics in the 21st century. Despite a messy start, the Trump administration was able to provide a new national security strategy within the first year in office. The new US national security strategy clearly defines China as a strategic rival that "challenges American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity." For the first time, the United States outlined an Indo-Pacific strategy to compete with and contain China's rising power and influence among those countries along the Indian and Pacific oceans. As part of an overall competitive strategy vis-à-vis China, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called for "a new alliance of democracies" against China in the international community. The Chinese government has yet to officially respond to the US Indo-Pacific strategy as well as the "free and open Indo-Pacific" concept. Ten years ago, when the Obama administration rolled out the "pivot to Asia" strategy, Beijing's answer was a grand geoeconomic plan to expand Chinese economic power along the ancient Silk Roads on land and sea. Ten years later, how will Beijing respond to the new strategic challenge from Washington? In this article, the authors argue that Beijing has not taken tit-for-tat action to respond to the US Indo-Pacific Strategy. Instead, China has responded to the new American challenge in a more constructive, peaceful, and nonconfrontational manner. Beijing's objective is to mitigate possible national security risks while continuing to extend its international influence in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond.
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| 7 |
ID:
143778
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| Summary/Abstract |
The current Chinese foreign and national security system suffers from problems of inefficiency, a lack of coordination and information sharing, and accountability of decision makers. China’s newly established Central National Security Commission (CNSC) is designed to build a strong platform to coordinate national security work and to strengthen unified leadership of national security at the central level. This article examines the CNSC’s foreign policy and institutional rationales. It argues that the establishment of the CNSC must be viewed in light of China’s growing power and Xi’s aspiration to play ‘big power diplomacy’ in world affairs as well as his ambition for overall institutional reforms of foreign and national security policymaking in China.
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| 8 |
ID:
163409
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| Summary/Abstract |
Chinese foreign policy and the conduct of China’s diplomacy have undergone tremendous transformation under Xi Jinping’s leadership since 2012. How can scholars explain the foreign policy transformation under Xi Jinping? As Chinese power rises fast, do the new power status and the changing balance of power lead to the foreign policy change, or does the more confident leadership play the ‘game changer’ role? The author argues that international structural changes alone cannot explain the foreign policy shift, and Xi Jinping’s leadership has played a key role in transforming Chinese foreign policy since 2012, elevating it to a new height of ‘major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,’ a brand name for the transformed Chinese foreign policy. Xi’s leadership role not only affects the redefinition of the vision and mission of Chinese diplomacy, but also leads to institutional restructuring of Chinese foreign and security policy apparatus.
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