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| 1 |
ID:
123842
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| Summary/Abstract |
The American reaction to the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914 is always portrayed as one of shock and horror. Yet there has been no systematic study of the subject. This article examines American public at the time from the outbreak of war in August 1914 through the congressional elections of November 1914, through the medium of newspaper and journal writing. The picture that emerges is that the American population, far from being shocked and horrified, was excited and fascinated by the idea of a war in Europe. Moreover, the most widely shared sentiment was one of satisfaction at the economic opportunity presented by the war, as it was seen as being very much in American economic interest. This article also includes the present discussion among political scientists and strategic thinkers about the American public and its reaction to war in general, to provide different models by which to examine American behavior in 1914.
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| 2 |
ID:
105214
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Herbert Hoover is often portrayed as a business-centric relatively non-political historical figure. In particular during his time as Commerce Secretary in the administrations of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge, Hoover is often described as supporting a United States foreign policy that first and foremost served the needs of American corporations. This article attempts to recalibrate that picture by stressing Hoover's political self-interest as a motivating factor in his policies. Far from being politically unconcerned, Hoover was a man desperate to become president of the United States. His disastrous campaign for the Republican nomination in 1920 made him doubly determined to use his power in the Republican cabinets to improve his chances for the nomination later. This can be seen in one of the most famous of Hoover's foreign policy interventions, the Anglo-American rubber crisis. Far from serving the needs of American business, during this crisis Hoover was acting mostly from political self-interest. In particular attacking the British allowed him to reframe his image, which was seen as Anglophiliac in 1920. In the end it was a very successful rebranding, as Hoover was able to run for the presidency in 1928 from a position of strength when it came to foreign affairs.
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| 3 |
ID:
169107
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| Summary/Abstract |
The decision by the US government to drop the atomic bombs on Japan is one of the most heavily debated questions in history. This article examines one element of that debate, in many ways the most surprising. That was the different views of the top of the military hierarchy in the USA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was on the whole more sceptical about using atomic weaponry than the USA’s civilian leadership, for ethical and strategic reasons. As such they were willing to consider very different ways of ending the war.
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| 4 |
ID:
054725
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| Publication |
London, Frank Cass, 2001.
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| Description |
xiii, 272p.
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| Series |
Cass series: naval policy and history; no.3
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| Standard Number |
0714651257
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 044966 | 359/O'B 044966 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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