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ID:
183002
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| Summary/Abstract |
A terrorist organization constructing and detonating a nuclear device is often a topic of popular, academic, and political concern. Yet, assessing this risk is a challenging task. This article aims to contribute to the encompassing nature of any future nuclear terrorism threat assessments by further exploring the often overlooked organizational dimension in probability assessments on nuclear terrorism. Particular emphasis is given to the role of the organizational design. In order to do so, this article theoretically builds on a 2017 research article and empirically studies Aum Shinrikyo’s chemical and biological armament activities. This article confirms and further refines the idea of an effectiveness-efficiency trade-off for a terrorist organization implementing a nuclear armament project. It particularly zooms in on the constraints that follow from the covert nature of this type of plot and elaborates on the role of Aum Shinrikyo’s value-rationality.
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| 2 |
ID:
133050
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
There should be no distinction between a good and a bad terrorist which is what some countries are trying to do. The scourge will consume all unless it is ruthlessly eliminated. Countries sponsoring terrorism might realise that it is like riding a tiger that, one day, they might tall prey to. The biggest worry at these countries which have sulterecl at the hands at terrorists is that Weapons of Mass Destruction may fall into the hands at the terrorists and that catastrophic consequences would tollowi A worldwide integrated approach to tackling terrorism is, therefore, a must.
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| 3 |
ID:
090640
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Bush administration's strong preference for seemingly more flexible initiatives, involving a select group of countries, and limiting the size of international bureaucracies, which has resulted in three US-driven multilateral initiatives to address the threat of WMD-terrorism - the Proliferation Security Initiative, the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and the committee and group of experts it established - has produced mixed results so far. Although it helped to ensure a more rapid initial response to WMD terrorism, such an approach has also impeded efforts to build and sustain global support to respond to that threat
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| 4 |
ID:
072885
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2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The prospect of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is often referred to as the foremost danger to American national security. This danger has become more realistic because of al-Qaeda's expanding global network and the expressed willingness to kill thousands of civilians. In the past four years, numerous media reports have documented the group's ongoing quest for WMD capabilities; many reports have detailed al-Qaeda members' attempts to manufacture or obtain certain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) agents to use in WMD against targets in the West and the Middle East. Yet the question remains: Does al-Qaeda's current WMD capability match its actual intent? While most studies of the group have focused on its explicit desire for WMD, allegations of CBRN acquisition, and the killing potential of specific CBRN agents, few open-source studies have closely examined the evolution of al-Qaeda's consideration of WMD and, most notably, the merit of actual CBRN production instructions as depicted and disseminated in the group's own literature and manuals. The following report will examine the history of al-Qaeda's interest in CBRN agents, the evolution of the network's attitude toward these weapons, and the internal debate within the organization concerning acquisition and use of WMD. More so, the following research will assess the validity of actual CBRN production instructions and capabilities as displayed and disseminated in al-Qaeda's own literature and websites.
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| 5 |
ID:
054802
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