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| 1 |
ID:
100214
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| 2 |
ID:
145937
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| Publication |
Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2016.
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| Description |
xi, 184p.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9781442239531
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058720 | 320.96/MAZ 058720 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
099469
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| 4 |
ID:
109843
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| 5 |
ID:
129510
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| 6 |
ID:
120352
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| 7 |
ID:
129171
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| 8 |
ID:
129515
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| 9 |
ID:
027603
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| Publication |
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
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| Description |
Vii, 359p.
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| Standard Number |
0521374715
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 031834 | 327.112/NIO 031834 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 10 |
ID:
132973
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article presents a new explanation of the widespread occurrence of cycles of protest in electoral autocracies - the most common type of authoritarian regime in the world today. Because multiparty elections in autocracies are partially free but unfair, opposition parties are compelled to compete for office while contesting the rules of competition. To fulfill this dual goal, opposition parties actively seek to recruit a wide variety of independent social movements who can provide votes and lead major mobilizations during election campaigns and in post-election rallies to denounce fraud. Because electoral participation can cause divisions within social movements, social activists join socio-electoral coalitions when opposition parties offer them financial and logistic resources and institutional protection to mobilize for their causes during non-election times. This quid pro quo explains how isolated protest events become aggregated into powerful cycles of mobilization and why protest is more intense during elections but persists beyond election cycles. When political liberalization leads to increasingly free and fair elections, the prospect of victory motivates opposition parties to discourage radical mobilization, bringing cycles of protest to an end. Drawing on an original database of indigenous protest in Mexico and on case studies, I provide quantitative and qualitative evidence of the causal impact of electoral incentives on the rise, development and decline of a powerful cycle of indigenous protest as Mexico transitioned from one-party to multi-party autocracy and into democracy. Beyond Mexico, I show that the introduction of multiparty elections in a wide variety of autocracies around the world gave rise to major cycles of protest and discuss why the relationship between the ballot and the street is a crucial factor for understanding the dynamics of stability and change of authoritarian regimes.
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| 11 |
ID:
105527
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| 12 |
ID:
103519
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| 13 |
ID:
129320
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| 14 |
ID:
110990
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With the death of its most recent president Malam Bacai Sanha, Guinea-Bissau has once again been plunged into turmoil and political uncertainty.Kate Thomas assesses the best-and worst case scenarios for the troubled country.
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| 15 |
ID:
094471
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| 16 |
ID:
134096
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The history of the People's Republic, according to the dominant narrative, falls into two broad sections: the turbulent decades dominated by Mao Zedong, the founder of "New China," and the time of "reform and opening up" started by his successor, Deng Xiaoping. Now, however, the Chinese state has passed important political and economic inflection points. As a result, the third era of the People's Republic-an era of crisis and instability-has already begun.
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| 17 |
ID:
122430
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| 18 |
ID:
131170
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| 19 |
ID:
133431
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the late 1990s international state builders have paid increasing attention to fighting corruption in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. On the surface this effort has brought significant results, since both countries have adopted legal frameworks modelled on the best practices of Western democracies. In practice, however, corruption remains rampant. This disappointing outcome has several explanations: in reviewing the empirical evidence we consider the two countries as cases involving heavily assisted transition from both socialism and war, highlighting how collusive practices between political and criminal interests have played a role in establishing formally liberal but substantively 'hybrid' institutions. We argue that the spread of corruption has been implicitly legitimised by international actors, who have pressured local parties to accept the formal architecture of good governance, including anti-corruption legislation, while turning a blind eye to those extra-legal structures and practices perceived as functional to political stability.
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| 20 |
ID:
032810
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| Edition |
2nd ed
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| Publication |
London, Oxfored University Press, 1968.
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| Description |
xi,182p.
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 000875 | 320.092/PLA 000875 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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