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| 1 |
ID:
055488
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| 2 |
ID:
173945
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides a genealogical account of European actorness in Afghanistan. It argues that European agreement towards facilitating modernisation and development in Afghanistan was initiated with aid and trade, evolving into humanitarianism in the 1990s, and reconstruction and democratisation in the 2000s. The European Union has had a positive impact on Afghanistan, focusing on humanitarianism, but its multilateral and programme level approach to reconstruction and democratisation has failed to meet the EU’s stated objectives. By promoting the flawed “Bonn Model”, the EU is proportionally culpable for failed international attempts to reconstruct Afghanistan; even though the United States has been the primary international actor. Drawing a series of broader lessons, such as tensions between Atlantic solidarity and European integration, and the limitations of the European crisis management, the article demonstrates how European policy has been shaped by crises inside Afghanistan and the larger geopolitical crises these have generated. These have contemporary importance as history suggests that as the US withdraws its commitment to Afghanistan, the EU will have a very significant role in attempting to fill a humanitarian vacuum.
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| 3 |
ID:
056737
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| 4 |
ID:
073855
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| Publication |
2006.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Don't bother trying to recreate the Cold War-era transatlantic relationship-it is long gone.
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| 5 |
ID:
056921
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| Publication |
2003.
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| Description |
p173-191
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| 6 |
ID:
074410
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article asks whether the differing manner in which liberal-democratic allies perceive security threats might prove corrosive to their alliance. In effect, the authors seek to test the assumption that 'democratic alliances' and liberal-democratic security communities are virtually indestructible so long as the members remain liberal democracies. The case chosen for diachronic analysis is the collapse of Anglo-American-French comity in the immediate aftermath of the liberal-democratic allies' victory in the First World War. Argued here is that differential threat perception (or DTP) contributed significantly to the ending of meaningful security cooperation among the group. In this sense, DTP seems to have weakened the conceptual underpinning of the democratic alliance implied by democratic peace theory (or DPT).
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| 7 |
ID:
056692
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| 8 |
ID:
055480
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| 9 |
ID:
138765
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| Summary/Abstract |
Nothing is more important to Europe’s future as a security actor than supplying its armed forces with modern weaponry. Because individual states lack the research and development budgets and scale economies to remain autarkic, the survival of Europe’s defence-industrial base depends on international cooperation. As in other areas of international affairs, the ability of states to cooperate ‘under anarchy’ is inextricably tied to the existence of international institutions. However, the nature of arms production renders the design of institutions particularly challenging. Problems lie in both the multiplicity of potential cooperative outcomes and the variety of policy tools available. Ultimately, the choice of policies and policy tools can generate friction between the key groups of actors involved in defence-industrial policymaking. This study systematically explores how variations in the structure of international armaments institutions have shaped both the influence of different groups of actors and the nature of collaborative weapons projects. To preview my conclusions, three broad trends can be observed in the evolution of armaments institutions. These are as follows: (1) the gradual incorporation of a larger number of actors into the arms cooperation process; (2) the incremental exclusion of military professionals from armaments institutions; and (3) the growing influence of corporate actors.
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| 10 |
ID:
057403
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| 11 |
ID:
056707
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| 12 |
ID:
071030
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| Publication |
2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Attempts to address the transatlantic capabilities gap in military space is complicated by the rivalry between NATO and the European Union's ambition to undertake a greater role in European security, as well as being held hostage by the extent and nature of the EU's role in this crucial policy area. In light of this, transatlantic military space cooperation is likely to be modest and on a bilateral basis between Washington and the various European capitals, though NATO may yet play a larger role in this area.
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| 13 |
ID:
114938
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The transatlantic tensions of the Bush years are behind us but the future of transatlantic relations remains uncertain at the closing of the Obama term. Policy alignment has been found on a host of issues but 'existential' questions have resurfaced, casting shadows on Western unity and relevance in the coming years. So far the crisis has failed to focus attention on the need for a common vision for the 21st century. Key strategic issues, from the future of the European order to transatlantic engagement in the Middle East, should figure prominently on the next transatlantic agenda, shifting the debate from the notion of a 'Pacific century' to how the West can address ongoing power transitions.
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| 14 |
ID:
142634
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US policy of ‘rebalancing to Asia’ is likely to have major implications for transatlantic relations as well as for the role of rising powers, such as China. US public opinion and leaders are largely aware of this eastward shift in attention and this awareness can be considered, albeit in a somewhat indirect way, an indicator of support for the policy. On the other side of the Atlantic, however, Europeans seem to be less aware of the fact that the Far East is becoming the main chessboard of international relations in a multipolar global order. Nevertheless, when objectively informed about China, people on both sides of the Atlantic are less in favour of a shift in interests toward Asia and their negative perceptions of China are significantly correlated to a hesitancy in supporting a rebalancing policy. Moreover, if people perceive Beijing as a threat, especially an economic threat, they are even less likely to support a shift of interests to the Far East, the only exception being American elites, who tend to increase their support for the rebalancing strategy in the presence of a Chinese economic threat.
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| 15 |
ID:
056736
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