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| 1 |
ID:
058733
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| 2 |
ID:
010237
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| Publication |
April 1996.
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| Description |
170-173
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| 3 |
ID:
061393
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| Publication |
Jan 2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This essay contends that the 1998 tests were a tactical – not strategic – surprise to the US and international community. It proceeds to map out four main arguments. First, following India’s 1974 test, the US did not detect New Delhi’s changing cost–benefit calculus with respect to testing. Second, even if the US had been able to ascertain these shifting perceptions, there is little it could have done to deter India as the US nonproliferation agenda with respect to India was subsumed within other policy goals. Third, the one thing that the US could have done was the one thing that it made no effort towards: It never considered – much less formulated – a contingency plan to govern engagement with New Delhi should India resume testing. Nor were advance preparations undertaken to guide interactions with Pakistan following an Indian blast. Fourth, this lacuna in policy instruments persists to date despite apprehensions about North Korean and Iranian nuclear aspirations and intentions.
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| 4 |
ID:
020947
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| Publication |
Dec 2001.
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| Description |
865-889
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| 5 |
ID:
046574
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Atlantic publishers and distributors, 2000.
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| Description |
v1(lxi, 288p.),v2(289-604p), v3(xxv, 226p), v4(227-478p.)
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| Standard Number |
8171568858
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Copies: C:4/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045471 | 327.174/GUP 045471 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 045472 | 327.174/GUP 045472 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 045473 | 327.174/GUP 045473 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 045474 | 327.174/GUP 045474 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
057406
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