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| 1 |
ID:
131272
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| 2 |
ID:
151027
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| 3 |
ID:
112452
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The concept of 'credibility' is a central component of deterrence theory. In this article, credibility is used as a lens through which to examine the effectiveness of conventional force as a deterrent. An advantage that conventional force enjoys over its nuclear counterpart is that it can be used with much greater discrimination. Conventional threats can, therefore, be considered more politically credible than nuclear threats under all but the most extreme circumstances. Conversely, the relatively modest power of conventional weapons renders their effects 'interpretable' to a problematic degree by potential aggressors. Thus, such threats are less likely to be as technically credible as their nuclear equivalents. A range of communicative efforts may serve to reduce the scope for interpreting the effects possible to conventional weapons, although efforts of this kind risk being hampered by cultural obstacles. In consequence, success with conventional deterrence will turn on the ability to identify the specific technical and cultural conditions under which credible threats can readily be made.
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| 4 |
ID:
139219
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| Summary/Abstract |
Insurgent guerrilla groups are on occasion faced with difficult decisions: whether and when to become a conventional force, and whether to defend an operational base or fixed site. Standard doctrine suggests that to achieve state capture or acquire autonomous status apart from a central authority, the ability to successfully engage in conventional warfare may became necessary. A conventional force must be capable of defending territory, a defined space. Accompanying the decision to defend territory is a certain level of risk. This article examines the decision by four insurgent organizations to defend ‘operational hubs’, territory deemed worthy of a defense. The analysis herein submits that in insurgent warfare the utility of the territory being defended often supersedes the likelihood of a successful defense, on occasion generating negative outcomes for the insurgent forces.
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| 5 |
ID:
122017
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| 6 |
ID:
184370
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| 7 |
ID:
056236
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| 8 |
ID:
062596
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| Publication |
Mar-Apr 2005.
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| 9 |
ID:
060409
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| Publication |
Mar-Apr 2005.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The fighting in Iraq has exposed the limits of Donald Rumsfeld's transformation agenda. The U.S. military remains underprepared for dealing with guerrillas, and such unconventional threats will grow in coming years. The next stage of military transformation must focus on training large numbers of infantry for nation building and irregular warfare--and Washington must make that task a top priority.
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