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| 1 |
ID:
131673
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| 2 |
ID:
106667
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the 1990s both Chile and Argentina embarked on efforts to tackle tax evasion. The strategies they pursued differed substantively: Argentina followed a coercive approach that created an elite audit team endowed with special legal powers, while Chile undertook a less spectacular service-oriented approach that improved the fiscal pact between state and society and enacted tax administration reform. Chile succeeded in permanently lowering tax evasion levels, while Argentina's success was short-lived and evasion levels soon returned to previous heights. Besides important differences in the institutional strength of these countries, the contrasting outcomes can be attributed in no small measure to the different strategies adopted. Their experience can provide some useful lessons in the elusive battle against tax evasion in Latin America.
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| 3 |
ID:
056259
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| 4 |
ID:
120572
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
STATES AND TERRITORIES are cautious about exchanging information for tax purposes even though such exchange has long been recognized as a tool for combating international tax evasion.
In the late 1930s, most governments polled on behalf of the League of Nations noted the difficulties they would face in exchanging information and listed the reasons for this. At first glance, these reasons were quite diverse, but on closer inspection it becomes obvious that the problem lay in the difficulty of amending legislation so as to allow governments to demand information from their subjects not for domestic purposes but for meeting the requests of other states
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| 5 |
ID:
155555
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| Summary/Abstract |
World Policy Institute fellow Khadija Sharife investigates the tax avoidance strategies of one of the world’s biggest lottery corporations. While the company, GTech (now known as IGT), profits off the poor, it has shielded hundreds of millions in revenue from the tax man by “inverting” its headquarters overseas and relying on tax havens.
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| 6 |
ID:
093926
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
While somalia's humanitarian situation remains dire, militant groups are controlling international aid distribution in the country for political and financial ends.
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| 7 |
ID:
161489
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The study empirically examines the relationship between tax rates and tax evasion for Sri Lanka. This is examined in the context of border tax evasion, where I test for the presence of evasion via the ‘evasion gap’: the discrepancy between exports to Sri Lanka (as reported by Sri Lanka’s trade partners) and imports by Sri Lanka (as reported by Sri Lanka) for products imported by Sri Lanka from its top seven import partners in 2014. The study focuses on two forms of border tax evasion: underreporting and mislabelling. In addition, the study estimates the effect of a policy to bring selected value-added tax (VAT)-exempt products into the VAT net, on the evasion gap. Results from OLS estimation suggest that both forms of evasion are present. The difference-in-difference results of the impact of the policy change on the evasion gap are insignificant, but require post-treatment data to arrive at a more concrete conclusion.
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| 8 |
ID:
165592
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The cross-border impacts of whistleblowing recently have become far more visible and consequential, as evident with the ‘Paradise’ and ‘Panama Papers’ leaks, which exposed tax and other financial wrongdoings of prominent personalities around the world, leading to scandals, resignations and prosecutions. Despite its new prominence, whistleblowing often continues to be seen as a series of ad hoc chance acts. We argue instead that whistleblowing is an increasingly institutionalized regulatory tool that is enabled by an emergent ‘whistleblowing system’, with similarities to other new forms of informal global governance. Whistleblowing can be controversial, and we develop a framework for assessing whether any particular whistleblowing event and the system that enables it are in the public interest. We then apply this analysis to the case of global tax evasion. We conclude that a whistleblowing system can make important contributions to difficult cross-border regulatory challenges such as tax evasion, especially where other governance systems fail.
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