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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
122320
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the broad outlines of the conflicting views and interests concerning economic readjustment following the December 1978 Third Plenum are adequately understood in the existing literature, academic accounts and the official narrative seriously misunderstand or misrepresent the élite politics surrounding the readjustment program in 1979-80. The view that Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun joined forces in an alliance against Hua Guofeng has merit, but not, as commonly claimed, as a rejection of Hua's failed economic policies-Deng in fact was the most forceful advocate of the pre-plenum policies which Chen found most detrimental. The second widely accepted proposition, that Deng and Chen subsequently fell out along reform vs. readjustment lines, with Chen gaining the upper hand by late 1980, also distorts political reality. When readjustment finally achieved its most forceful manifestation, the actual policies were formulated by Zhao Ziyang, with Deng's crucial backing.
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| 2 |
ID:
106755
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| 3 |
ID:
001909
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| Publication |
New York, M E Sharpe, 1999.
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| Description |
xxvii, 319p.hbk
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| Series |
Contemporary China Papers
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| Standard Number |
0765602016
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 043140 | 951.05/TEI 043140 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
059920
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| 5 |
ID:
170317
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the context of wider misunderstanding of the roles of Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping in the post-Mao "reversal of verdicts," conventional wisdom views Hua as an obstacle to the vindication of the 1976 Tiananmen protests, and the outcome as contributing to Deng's victory in an ongoing struggle between the two. In fact, the politics of the Tiananmen reversal were complicated and multilayered, and at clear variance from common assumptions concerning the two leaders. At the level of specific policy, there is no evidence of differences between Hua and Deng. But in terms of engagement, Hua was more proactive in pushing the process forward, albeit hoping that this could be done in a relatively quiet manner, while Deng showed little interest. When the crucial moment came during the 1978 Central Work Conference preceding the Third Plenum, Deng was overseas while Hua took decisive action to affirm that the protests were "completely revolutionary." Back in Beijing, Deng supported "the decision of the Party Center headed by Chairman Hua," a decision reflecting Hua's political approach from virtually the outset of his leadership. As both leaders sought to explain the decision, Deng's main concern was to temper the result, particularly by warning of "consequences" that could damage Mao's reputation if not handled carefully.
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